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Abstract
This thesis examines the wartime planning and postwar administration of regional policy and its
relationship with the British motor industiy. It presents a three part analysis, based on
government papers and business records. Part One consists of two chapters which explore the
intellectual and industrial context of UK regional policy. Chapter Two focuses on the nature and
character of potential policy responses. Chapter Three centres on the motor industry, and
explains the economic importance of the sector. Part Two deals with policy execution. It covers
the period from 1945 to 1964, and examines the political and administrative background to
intervention. It argues that the extent and radicalism of British regional policy from 1945-51 has
been exaggerated, and suggests that a fundamental revolution in intervention did not occur until
the 1 960s. This revolution centred on the Board of Trade's acceptance of coercion as a legitimate
policy tool. The discussion uses examples from the motor industry to illustrate policy evolution,
and deals with a wave of expansion which saw new factories established in Development Areas
during 1960. Part Three attempts to analyse the effects of this relocation on motor finns. The
analysis suggests that relocation increased production costs, although there was compensation
through regional development incentives and lower labour costs. It is suggested that previous
studies have underestimated the role of financial incentives in redressing transport costs. Finally,
Chapter Eight examines labour relations in the new plants. It finds that Development Areas were
more prone to strikes than core manufacturing regions. An important contributing factor was
management's experiments with new forms of work discipline. While recogrnsing that there was
a regional element involved in disruption, the analysis argues that labour difficulties should be
reinterpreted as part of an industry-wide crisis affecting organisational change.
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From 1945 to 1964, the Board of Trade found itself commanding the pattern of
industrial location in Great Britain. It was charged with securing a 'proper
distribution of industry' while combating regional unemployment differentials.
Amongst its weapons were Building Licences and Industrial Development
Certificates. These were negative location controls, which identify Britain as one
of the few Western nations to favour a coercive regional policy.
Although there have been exhaustive inquests into both regional policy and site
selection, the gap between the two has rarely been forded. In particular, location
surveys have focused on ex-post theoretical constructs, while policy studies have
been dominated by macroeconomic political debates.' This study examines
industrial steering within a microeconomic context. By concentrating on a specific
manufacturing industry and specific location decisions, it will address five
important questions:
How did the relationship between industry and the state develop in postwar
Britain?
. What were the processes and motivations behind British location policy?
Were locational penalties anticipated at either government or enterprise level?
Did controls lead to poor site selection - with quantifiable cost penalties?
What were the consequences for individual firms?
The motor sector offers an ideal candidate for study. In quantitative terms, it was
the UK's most important export industry. In policy terms, its continued expansion
attracted the interest of both politicians and the Board of Trade. Since expansion
was subject to state approval, the motor industry became necessarily entangled in
DC disputes. Major investment projects were diverted to the regions, and
'package deals' were negotiated between manufacturers and the state. To date
'For example, compare the literature review in Smith (1981, pp. 68-107) with Parsons (1986),
Scott (1996) or Armstrong & Taylor (1993).
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historians have been unable to assess the effect of the moves, retreating into broad
generalisations and untested hypotheses (e.g. Dunnett 1980, Foreman-Peck et al
1995). However, a detailed study can restore regional policy to the heart of
political and economic debate. This is because too many discussions over the
legitimate role of the state have glibly assumed that forced relocation was a
disaster for British car firms.
The following investigation tests this assertion. It presents a three part analysis,
based on government papers and previously confidential business records. A brief
outline of the methods and arguments employed in each chapter follows, as well as
an indication of how the study relates to the existing historiography. But first, we
examine the nature of Britain's regional problem and its place in political debate.
§1.2 The British 'Regional Problem'
Britain's twentieth century 'regional problem' has centred on a long term division
between the fortunes of 'inner' and 'Outer' Britain (Table 1.1). This distinction
developed in the interwar period, and is still used as a proxy for the more familiar
concept of the north-south divide (Middleton 1996, p.154). Regions in the north,
Wales and Scotland had unemployment rates well above the UK average in the
1930s, and this trend persisted through the postwar period. Conversely, the South,
South East and Midlands enjoyed relatively prosperous conditions. It was
previously thought that this pattern became established after 1918, but Southhall's
work (1988) points to a long term regional disequilibrium in Britain.
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TABLE 1.1
REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES (1), 1929-88 (%)
	
1929	 1937	 1951 1964	 1973 1979	 1988
London & South East 	 5.6	 6.3	 0.9	 1.0	 1.3	 2.9	 4.9
East Anglia	 1.6	 3.7	 4.7
South West	 8.1	 7.8	 1.2	 1.5	 2.1	 4.6	 5.7
West Midlands	 9.3	 7.2	 0.4	 0.9	 1.7	 4.7	 8.2
East Midlands	 9.3	 6.6	 0.7	 1.1	 1.8	 3.8	 7.0
Yorks. & Humberside	 0.7	 1.1	 2.3	 4.7	 9.1
North East	 13.7	 11.0
North West	 13.3	 14.0	 1.2	 2.1	 2.9	 5.9	 9.9
Northern	 ..	 17.9	 2.2	 3.3	 3.9	 7.3	 11.5
Scotland	 12.1	 15.7	 2.5	 3.6	 3.8	 7.3	 10.9
Wales	 19.3	 22.3	 2.7	 2.6	 3.0	 6.3	 9.5
InnerBritain(2)	 6.3	 5.9	 0.8	 1.1	 1.7	 3.9	 6.1
OuterBritain(2)	 12.9	 14.5	 2.6	 3.2	 3.5	 6.8	 11.1
United Kingdom	 9.7	 10.1	 1.3	 1.7	 2.0	 4.7	 7.6
NOTES: (I) The administrative divisions were rearranged periodically, thereby
precluding exact comparisons over time (2) Inner Britain is here defined as
London & the South East, the South and Midlands and East Anglia; Outer Britain
as Northern England, Yorkshire and Humberside, Wales, Scotland and Northern
Ireland.
SOURCES: Middleton (1985, table 2.1), Broadberry (1991, table 7.2).
This disequilibrium was associated with the antiquated structure of Britain's
industrial base and long term changes in domestic and world market conditions. In
the former case, the British staple industries, based largely in the outer regions,
experienced a painthi period of readjustment during which many jobs were lost. At
the same time, the expanding industrial sectors of light engineering, electronics,
chemicals etc. concentrated their activities in the South and Midlands. These 'new
industries' valued market proximity higher than access to raw materials, and
depended on domestic consumption rather than international demand. These
forces combined to produce a massive structural problem in interwar Britain,
ameliorated only by rearmament and a return to hostilities in 1939.
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The postwar regional problem was also related to industrial structure. We shall see
in later chapters how the recession of 1958/9 marked a climacteric for theory and
policy. Prior to this, the staple industries in 'outer' Britain had shared in an
international restocking boom and strong domestic growth. When these forces
were exhausted at the end of the 1950s, Britain's regional economies returned to
historical trends. Unemployment increased, and commentators once again focused
on the north-south divide.
This brief history serves to underline the longevity of Britain's regional problem.
But while the nineteenth century origins of this phenomenon are clear, it was not
until the 1920s that politicians were forced to confront the problem. This was due
to a mixture of economic, social and political concerns.
At a basic level, regional unemployment disparities became socially unacceptable.
Even before the first Liberal welfare reforms, it was clear that issues of social
justice had become policy concerns. This was especially true of a period when
information about social conditions and poverty was being widely disseminated by
the first social investigators. 2 The increasing attention paid to regional problems
can be viewed as part of a developing consensus on social issues, where moral
concerns and the extension of the franchise undermined traditional laissez faire
ideas. The Liberal statesman, President of the Poor Law Board and later
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Goschen, outlined this new mood in 1883:
I hold the principles of 'Laissez-faire' to have lost favour, chiefly owing
to moral considerations, to the assertion of the claims other than material
interests, and to a growing feeling that it is right deliberately to risk
commercial and industrial advantages for the sake of reforming social
abuses, and securing social benefits (Middleton 1996, p.225).
People also began to recognise broader macro-social consequences of persistent
inequality. Primary amongst these were the problems caused by overcrowding and
selective migration. On the one hand, labour was concentrated in stressful urban
settings. On the other, depressed areas lost their most able and competent people.
The result was a kind of regional apartheid - where an affluent and socially diverse
core coexisted with a culturally and materially impoverished periphery. In the
2 For details see Buliner et al (1991).
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Context of 1930s Britain, this was a powerful analogy for the conditions outlined
in An English Journey and The Road to Wigan Pier. Here the descriptions of
'outer' Britain had focused on disintegrating communities rather than economic
distress.
Politically speaking, there were powerful reasons why British parliamentary parties
should be interested in regional prosperity. As we have seen, social policy became
important with the extension of the vote beyond the middle class. In this sense,
regional policy might be viewed as part of the legislative package associated with
universal suffrage. In the same vein, it is hardly surprising to find that the Labour
party has depended on votes from 'outer' Britain. In fact two of the most active
periods of regional policy coincided with a Labour administration (1945-51, 1964-
70). But with the publication of the Employment White Paper of 1944, both main
political parties professed a nominal commitment to reducing regional
unemployment differences.
Underlying this commitment was a belief that unemployment affects voting at the
constituency level. By the early 1980s, a number of authors had succeeded in
relating government popularity to economic variables (Gibson 1992). We shall see
in later chapters how fears of regional depression in the 1 940s prompted wartime
policy reviews, and why the collapse of the Scottish vote in the mid 1950s
persuaded Conservatives to reactivate regional policy. Similarly, Labour's
commitment to regional planning after 1964 appears to have paid significant
dividends, contributing to good local results in the 1970 general election.
Gordon (1990) has offered a different perspective. He argued that British regional
policy is a blocking strategy, and that 'its basis should be sought neither in
theoretical rationales or short term electoral calculations, but in a perceived threat
to two party hegemony in the United Kingdom'. The threat arises from territorial
issues being placed on the political agenda, displacing the traditional class-bound
issues of national politics. This would endanger both left and right, generating
'oppositional claims on the central state'. This argument invites speculation as to
how the motives of regional policy vary between parties, and suggests that
'consensus politics' should be re-interpreted in terms of an amended Downsian
model of competitive democracy.
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Even if one rejects Gordon's general thesis, he offers an interesting insight into the
nature of British economic policy making. Regardless of the government's true
intentions, he notes how regional policy has always been 'dignified and reinforced'
by efficiency arguments. Many of these 'efficiency' claims have related to the
policy gains identified in economic theory. These derive from a simple proposition:
if the unemployment rate could be permanently reduced in high unemployment
areas without leading to a loss of jobs in areas of low unemployment, the whole
nation would be better off - the previously unemployed would be producing
output and taxpayers would not have to support the jobless. Regional equilibrium
would produce a national saving, moving output towards the production
possibility frontier and increasing economic welfare.
A second proposition is concerned with wage inflation. In McCrone's words
(1969, p.38), 'a better regional balance of economic activity enables inflationary
pressures to be controlled more easily without creating excessive pools of
unemployment'. Persistent disparities in the unemployment rate mean that
whenever a significant business upturn occurs, inflationary pressures build up very
quickly in the low unemployment regions. In an imperfect labour market, wage
inflation is then transmitted to different areas through national pay agreements and
inter-plant bargaining. As will be demonstrated, many individual postwar location
decisions centred on the possible trade off between wage inflation in the South and
higher operating costs in peripheral locations. In most cases relocation was
perceived as the greater threat.
These and many other issues were familiar to economists in the 193 Os. However,
by that stage, the economic rationale for regional policy had not been fully
articulated. Typical of the tenor of contemporary analysis was Champernowne's
work, which argued that spatial variations in unemployment rates prevented
recovery from a trade depression:
This is because some regions achieve fairly full employment, and perhaps
experience a shortage of labour, when unemployment is still heavy in others.
When recovery continues, shortage of labour in the prosperous regions may
check both investment there, and also, through causing a shortage of
materials from the prosperous regions, check or cause a postponement of
investment even outside prosperous regions. Shortage of goods from the
prosperous regions may also retard recovery by making people spend more
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on goods imported from abroad: in so far as the shortage causes prices and
dividends to rise in the prosperous region, the stimulating effects of
increased investment may be wasted on a transfer of income from those who
save little to those who save much (1938, p.94).
Champernowne's approach reflected the embryonic nature of British regional
science. As late as 1969, Brown (p.789) noted that the subject lacked 'a coherent
body of analysis applicable to the affairs of a country'. The discipline was
dominated by American and continental economists, and it was not until the 1 960s
that British authors began to embrace more professional and theoretically
challenging critiques. Although the lack of a clear economic rationale handicapped
policy debate, it did not stop economic issues surfacing. But by modern standards,
these discussions remained ill-defined.
In March 1934, The Times reflected the changing policy context by running a
series of articles entitled 'Places without a future'. These sympathetically dealt
with the plight of a typical Durham village. The editorial which concluded the
series argued that there was a 'special' regional problem requiring action 'of an
emergency type'. To Parsons (1986, p.10) this marked a watershed,
The Times editorial was to introduce into political debate for the first time
the notion that there was a distinct and separate problem in the existence of
the 'depressed', or as it chose to call them 'derelict' areas; a problem which
required the introduction of special measures of central intervention in the
economy for the benefit of hard struck areas.
Thus, it is a combination of social, political and economic factors which help
explain why the regional problem became so important in twentieth century policy
debates. The following study examines these debates from the 1930s through to
the 1960s. It examines how politicians and officials conceptualised the problem,
and the way in which the state became reconciled with the notion of direct
intervention.
§1.3 Structure of the Study
Part One of the study consists of two introductory chapters which explore the
intellectual and industrial context of UK regional policy. Chapter Two focuses on
the nature of potential policy responses. Central to the discussion is a distinction
between market based and interventionist remedies; the former concentrating on
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removing imperfections in labour and capital markets, the latter identifying
fundamental flaws in market solutions. The analysis outlines why existing studies
have characterised Britain's regional policy as interventionist, and suggests that a
detailed investigation of policy execution may challenge this perception. The
chapter also outlines the novelty of Britain's policy regime. While the combination
of controls and incentives was not unique, the speed of introduction and the nature
of these schemes went beyond anything attempted in Europe. The chapter argues
that British policy represented a unique experiment, even if officials doubted its
value.
Chapter Three focuses exclusively on the motor industry. It explains the economic
importance of the sector, while examining long run trends and demand and supply
conditions. It outlines why car manufacturing was targeted for regional policy
intervention, and the contradictions and problems created by intervention. It also
provides a brief survey of the literature on the rise and decline of British car
manufacturing, and seeks to locate intervention in its correct historical framework.
Finally, it focuses on technological and organisational change, and argues that
intervention in the I 960s coincided with a transformation crisis. This crisis saw
British manufacturers struggling to adopt fordist methods in an increasingly
competitive international market place.
Part Two of the thesis is concerned with policy execution. It covers the period
from 1945 to 1964, when the Board of Trade's 1M6 division was placed in charge
of location controls. It examines the political background to intervention, and the
administrative changes associated with policy shifts. The postwar historiography
has generally distinguished four phases of regional policy activity in this period.
Typically, 1945-50 is regarded as 'active', when policy was dominated by physical
controls and the factory building programme; 1951-58 is viewed as 'passive',
when inducements and checks were held in abeyance by successive Conservative
governments; 1959-63 is regarded as 'transitional', with severe regional problems
prompting the return of selective intervention; while the years from 1963-70 mark
'the most prolonged, most intensive, and most successful attack ever launched on
regional problems in Britain' (Armstrong 1991, p.3l5). The study questions these
divisions, and argues in particular that the extent and radicalism of British
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distribution of industry measures from 1945-51 has been exaggerated. The section
also focuses on the period associated with Brittan's 'Great Reappraisal' in Tory
thinking (1960-61). This reputedly saw the early adoption of many of the
economic polices identified with Labour's 1964 administration, including 'a
regional approach to unemployment' (Brittan 1971, p.141). The section examines
this change from a civil service perspective, and argues that officials faced a
fundamental break from their established role. This was because they were forced
to impose solutions on industrialists for the first time.
Individual chapters centre on the ongoing battle between efficiency and industrial
relocation. In Chapter Four, the focus is on the immediate postwar period (1945-
51). The chapter outlines, (i) how the Board of Trade came to dominate regional
policy-making, (ii) the implementation of policy based on case studies from the
motor industry, (iii) the internal capabilities of the ministries for policy-making,
and (iv) a comparison between the 1945-47 and 1948-51 periods, rejecting 'policy
on' versus 'policy ofF comparisons. The chapter suggests that the government
lacked the necessary economic intelligence and political drive to successfully
challenge industrialists and that, as a result, Labour struggled to impose its will on
business.
Chapter Five is concerned with regional policy execution from 1951-58, and
examines events under a Conservative government committed to free enterprise
capitalism. This chapter demonstrates the importance of the motor industry in
establishing administrative precedents, and highlights the importance of ideology
in conditioning policy response. This ideology represents a continuity between
Labour and Conservative administrations, because officials and politicians
remained unwilling to challenge industrialists.
Chapter Six concentrates on the crucial period from 1958 to 1964. It argues that
there was a fundamental revolution in the tactics of regional intervention in the
early 1960s. This centred on the Board of Trade's acceptance of coercion as a
legitimate policy tool. A reluctance to enforce solutions on entrepreneurs was
overcome by political pressure from the regions and a growing body of empirical
evidence which changed the nature of location bargains. These developments
paved the way for the strategic rethink associated with Brittan's 'Great
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Reappraisal' and replaced a tradition of negotiated compliance with coercive
intervention. Once again, the chapter uses case studies drawn from the motor
industry to illustrate policy evolution. These form the core of Part Three's cost
analysis, and are associated with a wave of expansion which saw new factories
established in Scotland, Merseyside and Wales (Figure 1.1). The chapter suggests
that the negotiation process indirectly discriminated against British firms, and
allowed American-owned subsidiaries to acquire the best sites. This was because
Ford and Vauxhall could draw on a wealth of US experience, while British firms
were handicapped by their federated structure and boardroom disputes.
FIGURE 1.1









Part Three attempts to analyse the effects of motor industry relocation on
individual firms. It does not tackle the related issue of policy efficiency or cost per
job, since this is regarded as a distributional issue. 3 The brief is to highlight the
microeconomic consequences of forced relocation, and to assess the costs and
benefits associated with Development Area manufacturing.
Chapter Seven uses published and unpublished data to derive spatial cost profiles
for individual plants. Among the sources exploited are the Labour Cost Survey,
the House of Commons investigation into Regional Development Incentives,
government files, confidential company papers and files from the Scottish Record
Office. The investigation is based on a methodology pioneered by Luttrel] (1 962),
and adopted by Smith in 1966. This distinguishes between basic and locational
elements, and seeks to derive a per unit estimate of the extra costs incurred.
Unfortunately the disparate nature of the sources only allows data to be calculated
for a single year, but the estimates still represent the most comprehensive attempt
to understand the consequences of relocation in the vehicle industry.
The estimates suggest that relocation did increase production costs, although there
was compensation in the form of regional development incentives and lower
labour costs. Scottish sites were particularly disadvantaged, although higher
throughput would have improved performance. It is suggested that previous
studies have underestimated the role of financial incentives and other subsidies in
redressing transport costs, and that the failure of sites in Scotland and Liverpool is
linked both to location, and the transformation crisis afflicting British motor
manufacturing.
Chapter Eight examines the theme of labour relations in the new plants. Critics of
regional policy have always claimed that 'the new plants of outer Britain suffered
from poor if not poorer industrial relations than the original sites' (Foreman-Peck
etal 1995, p.205). By using the Department of Employment's Industrial Stoppage
Data, summaries from the Ministry of Labour and previously confidential
employment records, this claim is tested. The chapter finds that the Development
See the work of Moore and Rhodes (1973, 1977) and Moore, Rhodes and Tyler (1986) for a
discussion of these issues.
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Areas were more strike prone than core manufacturing regions, and that new
plants experienced different patterns of conflict, with a greater emphasis on
frequent, short term disputes.
The conventional explanation for these trends concentrates on the origins of new
employees and greater militancy amongst 'green' workers (Turner et a! 1967,
p.l'74). However, the chapter highlights the importance of management style. This
was important because all motor firms used their regional plants to experiment
with new forms of labour discipline. While workers opposed many of these
innovations, bosses also struggled to accommodate themselves to a new
bargaining framework. The result was an extended period of industrial disruption
which established damaging precedents.
Finally, the chapter considers the cost of industria% disruption. 1t argues that in
British-owned plants, labour problems contributed to closure. For the American-
owned plants, the effects were seen in unfavourable sourcing decisions and a
difficulty in securing new investment. While recognising that a regional element
was involved, the chapter argues that these difficulties should be reinterpreted as
part of an industry-wide crisis affecting organisational change.
§1.4 Implications
The main findings of this thesis relate to the nature of regional intervention and the
industrial context of policy appraisal. In the former case, the study highlights an
area in which fundamental beliefs about the efficacy of free markets were defeated
much later than has been assumed. A key element in this story was the way in
which theory lagged behind ambition, and failed to generate the necessary
intellectual or practical rationale for intervention. Despite the provision of coercive
legislation, ministers and officials felt unable to challenge industrialists. It was not
until 1960 that academic arguments and political pressure forced a tactical
reappraisal.
In the latter case, the thesis underlines the importance of organisational change. It
demonstrates how the failures of the decentralisation plan were linked to both
location and a wider crisis facing British based manufacturers. The Development
Area plants were the first experiments in a new form of industrial production, and
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many of their problems derived from their owners' inability to confront this
change. While location certainly played a part in their troubles, it is wrong to
suppose that the regional policy experiments were simply 'doomed from the
start'.4
An editorial comment by The Times, February 12, 1981. It followed Peugeot-Talbot's





2 The Intellectual Context
§2.1 Introduction
If entrepreneurs are given a free choice, it is reasonable to assume that they will
build their factories where the balance of economic advantages is greatest. By
minimising costs and maximising profits, the invisible hand is invoked to optimise
economic welfare. In this way, classical theory identifies the firm's interests with a
greater sense of well-being.
But regional policy subverts the market. However constructed, it implies a failure
of economic agents to satisf' policy makers' expectations. Consequently, the
decision to intervene constitutes a fundamental assertion about the efficacy of
market forces. There are three possible policy profiles: do nothing and rely on the
invisible hand, address market imperfections through limited intervention, or
directly impose solutions on entrepreneurs and the workforce. Each approach rests
on different economic assumptions, and each is attractive to different shades of
political opinion. This chapter places these decisions in their intellectual context. It
seeks to map the options available to legislators, and relate them to the relevant
strands of economic theory. It also briefly outlines the scope of Britain's policy
regime, distinguishing between interventionist and market based initiatives.
§2.2 Two Concepts of Regional Policy
In the neo-classical world, regional unemployment differentials are a transitory
phenomenon. This is because three mechanisms ensure market clearing. These are:
(1) wages falling in areas of high unemployment and rising in areas of low
unemployment, (2) workers migrating from low-wage to high-wage areas, and (3)
firms moving from high wage to low wage areas (Armstrong & Taylor 1993,
p.1 99). If any of these mechanisms fail, long term structural imbalances can result.
According to some observers, the existence of such imbalances in interwar Britain
provided a prima facia case for the implementation of a market based regional
policy.
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A market based approach to regional policy views long term disparities in regional
unemployment rates as evidence of imperfections in the labour market and/or
widespread barriers to capital and labour migration. Traditionally, commentators
have located the largest scope for failure in the labour market, where mobility and
pay flexibility are restricted by institutional rigidities.
A range of institutions can allegedly obstruct pay flexibility. These include
industry-wide collective bargaining arrangements, trade unions and wage councils
(McCormick 1991). Stoney and Bourn (1984) for instance, have argued that the
high levels of unemployment in postwar Merseyside are a consequence of real
wages being held above their equilibrium level. Institutional rigidities such as high
unemployment benefits, minimum wages and trade union power 'fracture the
relationship between pay and local conditions and severely constrict the inter-
regional wage structure. Inter-regional labour flows are thereby hindered and
geographical inequalities in unemployment tend to persist' (Walsh & Brown 1991,
p. 190).'
In terms of the iriterwar policy debate, neo-classical economists argued that sticky
wages and labour immobility were caused by over-generous welfare benefits.
While interwar governments shared this perception, the hypothesis remained
flawed. As Alford maintains (1996, p.157):
The alleged effects of welfare payments are based on an excessively
simplistic view of the labour market which, for example, takes no account of
the displacement costs of labour mobility. One of the most obvious and
heavy of such costs was the much higher levels of rents and house prices in
the more prosperous regions of the country compared with the areas of high
unemployment, differences which far outweighed any possible marginal
reductions in welfare provisions.
The second part of the neo-classical model centres on migration patterns. In
postwar Britain, it is fairly clear that migration did not conform to expected
patterns. Although traditionally depressed areas such as Scotland, the North and
1 Recent econometric investigations have failed to support this view. While the Bank of England
(1988) discovered little link between unemployment variations and regional wages, Blackaby and
Manning (1987) found that both the rate of unemployment and its change did affect earnings.
Walsh and Brown (1991) also showed how wage bargaining has become increasingly
decentralised, although they detected little enthusiasm for geographically differentiated payment
systems.
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North West did experience a net migration loss, the majority of migrants were
non-manual (McCormick 1991, p.221). Research shows that although these flows
were equilibrating, there was insufficient movement to make an impact on
unemployment disparities (Pissardes & Wadsworth 1989). There are several
reasons why net migration flows have not be large enough to combat regional
unemployment differences. The first is cost. Migrants incur many costs, some
pecuniary and some non-pecuniary (or 'psychic'). Pecuniary costs include the
expense of moving house, whilst 'psychic' costs result from the loss of family ties
and the problem of settling into a new community. Either can restrict mobility. The
institutional framework is also important. Restrictions operate in the housing
market (regional differences in house prices), the labour market (poor recruitment
agencies and job centres), and through government policies (taxation and
unemployment). Another important constraint is the efficiency with which
information disseminates to individuals, a key finding in the recently developed
discipline of labour market job search analysis (Annstrong & Taylor 1993, p.225).
Finally, the availability of local authority housing can have an impact on migration
patterns.
Information is also important for capital mobility. In 1937, the Board of Trade
argued that 'individual choice has on the whole placed industry where the
individual employer has found it economically most advantageous to place it'
(Board of Trade 1937). At the time this was strongly disputed by PEP. Its report
on the location of industry (1939, pp. 56-7) correctly argued that decision making
was constrained by the quality of information available, changing economic
circumstances and personal business acumen. These concerns formed the basis of
Allan Pred's 'behavioural matrix' (Figure 2.1), which classified entrepreneurs
according to their ability to analyse data and the quality of the information
available (Pred 1968). A position towards the bottom right indicates a good level
of knowledge and ability to use it. Here there is a high probability of good
locational choice. Knowledge and ability decrease towards the left of the matrix,










The numbers 1 and 2 indicate the number of firms occupYing specific positions in the matrix
Source: Pred (1968, p.92)
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While the neo-classical model assumes that entrepreneurs have similar abilities,
poor information can still trigger market failure. In these circumstances, the
industrialist is placed towards the top right of the matrix. With inadequate
knowledge, capital mobility will be restrained. Action to improve information flow
will enable businesses to shift towards the bottom right of the matrix, increasing
the probability that profitable sites will be chosen.
The basis of the neo-classical model is that well informed and rational decisions in
labour and capital markets will secure the long term erosion of regional
unemployment disparities. Accordingly, Britain's failure to achieve regional
equilibrium is evidence of market failure and can be corrected by removing
imperfections. Since the scope for market failure is greatest in the labour market,
the largest burden of adjustment is placed on migration and the incentive structure.
This means that a neo-classical approach is more usually associated with policies
that move workers to the work. This is within the broadest possible traditions of
British laissez faire economics, and found natural resonance with interwar
legislators locked into pre-Keynesian thinking. But while interwar policy makers
shared these neo-classical sympathies, the state remained aloof. This was because
the government felt unable to become involved in wage bargaining, preferring to
eschew corporatism in favour of limited tinkering with the welfare state. As a
consequence the labour market remained unreformed, contributing to what was
controversially termed a 'low-effort equilibrium' by Broadberry and Crafts (1990).
The interventionist view of regional policy is based on an entirely different concept
of political economy. At the centre of this approach is the view that regional
problems are caused by structural weaknesses and a fundamental deficiency of
investment in the poor regions. In these circumstances market based solutions
reinforce existing patterns and ignore the effects of externalities on wider
economic and social domains. The link between individual self interest and the
common good is broken, and governments are forced to impose solutions on
entrepreneurs and workers. This view rests on a particular understanding of capital
and labour markets, and it rejects conventional laissez faire thinking.
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A key focus of Keynesian theory relates to different concepts of regional
unemployment. The conventional typology distinguishes between four problems:
1. Frictional unemployment, where the search for jobs by unemployed workers
and the search for workers by employers takes time.
2. Structural unemployment, where unemployed workers may not be able to fill
existing job vacancies because they have the wrong skills or live in the wrong
place.
3. Neo-classical unemployment, where wages are kept above their equilibriating
level by trade unions or benefit payments
4. Keynesian unemployment, whece jobs ace thovt ppt'j ce 	 cy tNt\
of aggregate economic activity.
In the neo-classical world, frictional, structural and benefit induced unemployment
may be conquered by imposing market discipline. For Spatial Keynesians, this
diagnosis is flawed. This is because poor regions are fundamentally disadvantaged
and cannot compete for new investment and jobs. In these circumstances, regional
unemployment differentials remain. The untrammefled application of market based
solutions is rejected because of imperfect location decisions and the danger of
economic and social externalities accruing. These externalities relate to the
intensity of infrastructure use, agglomeration economies and congestion costs.
For example, the social capital hypothesis was one of the earliest rationales for
intervention. In the 193 Os, it was argued that acute economic distress and out-
migration from Britain's peripheral regions would lead to increasing under
utilisation of local infrastructure while generating unnecessary demands for new
investment in the South (PEP 1939, p. 143). The result would be unnecessarily
high social expenditure and a waste of public funds. One of the most startling
examples of this was in interwar Coventry, where the local corporation struggled
to provide housing and social services for a population which almost doubled
between 1919 and 1939.2
2 Thorns and Donnelly (1986, p. 24) report Coventiy's population growing from 136,000 in 1919
to 220,000 in 1939.
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The congestion argument is a partial extension of the infrastructure problem. Even
in interwar Britain, commentators were aware that the concentration of activity in
specific regions provided economic advantages for firms. These related to market
proximity, agglomeration economies, reduced transport costs etc. Neo-classicists
believed that these elements were internalised in the decision making process,
providing an optimal distribution of industry. However, others argued that the
South East and London were becoming so overcrowded that diseconomies of
scale applied. These were both internally (extra freight traffic) and externally borne
(e.g. pollution, travel to work costs), and indicated a fundamental market failure.
The Barlow Commission was surprisingly forthright:
It is not possible from the evidence submitted to us to avoid the conclusion
that the disadvantages in many, if not in most of the great industrial
concentrations . . . do constitute serious handicaps and even in some
respects dangers to the nation's life and development, and we are of the
opinion that definite action should be taken by the Government towards
remedying them (1-IMSO 1940, p.195).
The behaviour of entrepreneurs is the second important element of the
interventionist case. The argument here is that industrial location decisions tend to
be imperfect because of both information problems and irrational judgement. In
terms of Pred's behavioural matrix, this places industrialists towards the top left. It
means that even if businesses were in full possession of the facts, they would still
choose less than perfect locations. In the PEPs words (1939, pp. 21-22), 'The
industrialist about to set up a new plant is primarily concerned with the facilities
offered by competing sites. The subsoil and the drainage, the availability of raw
material supplies and the distance from markets, the cost of the transport of
goods, of fuel and of labour, the availability of satisfactory supplies of gas,
electricity and water, the proximity of works engaged in allied processes - all these
factors have to be looked into before one particular site can be chosen as the most
suitable of those considered. 1n some cases few, if any of these factors will be
made the subject of careful research'.
The PEP report foreshadowed the development of the behavioural industrial
location school. This was an offshoot of organisational theory and psychology,
and developed from the work of Greenhut (1956) and Pred (1968). Central to
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their approach was a rejection of homo economicus. In his place we have
individuals making decisions in the light of imperfect information and limited
business acumen. Such individuals may still be acting rationally, but rationality
may be defined in terms of non-pecuniary ambitions or targets. Once again, the
interwar policy community was aware of these arguments, but theoretical
rationales and empirical applications had yet to be established. It was this lack of
empirical work which would hamper governments in their postwar attempts to
confront leading industrial corporations.
The interventionist and free market perspectives employ markedly different
concepts of political economy. For the former, salvation lies in enforcing solutions
because market outcomes are undesirable. For the latter, untrammelled free
competition secures the long term elimination of regional unemployment
differentials. A priori one would expect the British Labour Party to favour an
interventionist strategy. This is because its centre-left agenda supports the use of
state power to alter market outcomes. 3 This is in contrast to the Conservative
commitment to 'social market' solutions. Each philosophy embodies a different
approach to regional unemployment, and each approach requires the use of
different regional policy tools.
§2.3 Regional Policy Tools
An initial distinction can be made between micro and macro-policy options. The
former are concerned with influencing the allocation of labour between economic
activities and regions, the latter with changing regional income and expenditure
(Vanhove & Klaason 1987, p.308). Macro-policy instruments can include
devolution of trade and fiscal policy, regionally discriminating tax and expenditure
plans (i.e. social security contributions, automatic stabilisers, government contract
preference schemes for tenders from assisted-regions firms) or regionally
The 1989 policy document Meet the Challenge, Make the Change made this point well:
'The market has a vital role to play, but it will not - left to itself - produce adequate
investment in education and training, in science and technology, in new products and new
capacity. The market will not reverse the short-term bias to favour productive strength in the
long term. It will not secure equal rights of disadvantaged groups, regional balance, or a
healthy environment' [emphasis added].
Quoted in Barberis & May (1993, p.9).
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discriminating monetary policies. Micro-options centre on administrative controls,
tax and subsidy schemes, migration policies and labour retraining.
Macro-policy initiatives are more widely associated with federal political systems.
For example, in the United States and Canada local governments enjoy limited
fiscal freedom. By contrast, British economic power is extremely centralised
(Armstrong & Taylor 1993, p.306). This does not mean that macro-policy cannot
regionally discriminate, but it makes planning and implementation much more
difficult.
But even without an appropriate institutional structure, UK macroeconomic policy
provides a regional effect (Blake 1995). Automatic stabilisers raise demand in low
income regions and reduce demand in wealthy areas, competitive tendering works
through existing industrial structures, while defence expenditure supports
peripheral communities. But this falls short of the systematic planning associated
with regional policy. In the words of Armstrong and Taylor (1993, p.313), 'too
often. . . policy makers are simply not sufficiently aware of the regional effects of
their decisions'.
However this thesis is concerned with microeconomic measures. While their
effects are easier to discern, they are also a much more visible political statement.
Relevant tools here include labour and capital reallocation schemes.
Labour reallocation schemes target geographical and occupational mobility.
Transfer policies aim at inducing a shift in the supply of labour between regions,
while in situ mobility policies aim at increasing the occupational and industrial
movement of labour at existing locations (Armstrong & Taylor 1993, pp. 224-25).
Practical policy weapons include occupational retraining, relocation subsidies, and
the encouragement of local collective bargaining.
Capital reallocation programmes represent a different philosophy. Their principal
aim is to move jobs to the workers. Unlike labour based policies, this can engender
both competitiveness and multiplier gains. This can be done by using restrictive
controls and/or financial incentives. In general, incentives should compensate a
region for its poor economic attractions. Payments could fall into nine categories
(OECD 1976, p.97):
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1. Grants for equipment plant and machinery.
2. Provision of factory buildings and development sites at low cost.
3. Loans at market or specially favourable rates of interest, as a contribution
towards capital costs.
4. Reduced taxation on profits over a period.
5. Favourable rates of amortisation of capital expenditure for tax purposes.
6. Favourable tax treatment of revenue from state aids.
7. Reduction or elimination of state charges, local taxes, licence fees etc.
8. Alleviation of certain costs, e.g. social security contributions and transport
charges, where these are within state control.
9. Grants towards labour costs
An alternative way of encouraging industrial migration is to penalise firms in
affluent regions. This can be done in various ways, the most obvIoii beit .
congestion tax. But a surcharge in a developed area has the same real effect as an
incentive in a backward zone. Both confer a comparative advantage on peripheral
regions, and both operate through financial media.
A more straightforward approach is to impose controls on the location of new
industrial or commercial capacity. These controls might be used in tandem with
incentive payments. Controls could identify and extricate mobile projects, while
incentives guide them to new locations. Controls have the advantage of being
cheap, flexible and easy to implement. Unfortunately, they run the risk of imposing
inefficient locations on firms and reducing national investment.
Incentives and controls can either be discretionary or non-selective. Discretionary
measures are generally more cost effective, but they force governments into
'picking winners'. This requires objective project appraisal and a large bureaucracy.
Intervention is made more acceptable by developing a universal policy. This
creates a level playing field and shields individual decisions from legal and political
challenge.
The various microeconomic policy tools may be categorised according to the
market failures they address and the media they use in operation (Table 2.1). The
definitions of market failure employed follow conventional economic theory, with
distinctions between externalities, irrationalities and friction/immobility. In each
case 'principal' failures have been identified, although it is often difficult to
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discriminate between categories. Thus administrative controls can override market
signals to account for externalities, but they might also be applied to counter
irrationality or friction and immobility in industrial relocation. The divisions are
often questionable and the table indicates where elements of doubt remain. But
despite these limitations, the table makes two important points. These centre on
the location of market failures and the methods of correction.
TABLE 2.1
MICROECONOMIC REGIONAL POLICY TOOLS
Instrument	 Principal Market	 Medium
Failures
Addressed
POLICIES TO REALLOCATE LABOUR:
Migration policies
Mobility policies
a) subsidies to cover
cost of moving
b) coercion
a) improved flows of
information to migrants
b) housing help, policies






Labour market policies action to improve efficiency 	 Friction/inunobility Market
of labour markets


























Administrative controls planning licences
	 Externalities,	 Command &
irrationality?	 Control
(1) Market mediated instruments alter market signals to adjust outcomes. Command and Control
decisions use no intermediary agents to change economic behaviour and often override market
signals.
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In the former case, the analysis confirms that capital reallocation policies tend to
be associated with structural problems and an interventionist agenda. Conversely,
the neo-classical view focuses heavily on labour reallocation policies. While this
distinction is quite clear, it is also obvious that market based remedies dominate
the policy media. In other words, it may be possible to correct many failures
without resorting to mandatory control. This is important because market based
solutions enjoy certain benefits over regulatory instruments.
In the first place, effective regulation requires a substantial degree of economic
intelligence. In principle, any given distribution of industry might be achieved by
administering a system of investment controls. However, taxes and incentives
could also be used to provide financial incentives for footloose firms. Under a
regulatory system, administrators will find that the costs of industrial relocation
vary between firms. This means that flexibility will be required from the regulators.
This flexibility demands a detailed understanding of production and distribution
costs. But a system of taxes and incentives means that the authorities do not need
to gauge the responses of individual firms to secure economically efficient
outcomes. While a tax in a congested region will make it unprofitable for firms
with low relocation costs to continue in situ, firms heavily dependent on existing
sites will still find it profitable to remain. The market mechanism therefore ensures
a degree of discrimination between companies.
The second major drawback of non-market solutions is the possibility of
regulatory capture. Here the parallel with the environmental policy literature is
striking. As McKay et a! note (1990, p.4) 'Because regulators need to understand
their industry in great detail to set sensible pollution targets, there is a tendency for
the regulators to become too closely identified with the interests of the industry
itself, rather than operating for the general interest . . . In contrast taxes are
relatively immune from the effects of special pleading by particular firms, because
one tax rate applies throughout an industry'. In terms of British location policy,
this is precisely the danger faced by the Board of Trade from 1945-64. In later
chapters we will see how, time and again, individual companies were able to
circumvent location controls by effective lobbying.
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However, the drawbacks of using market mechanisms should not be ignored. If we
take the example of a location tax, it is clear that a potentially expensive
administrative structure would be needed to police the system and collect
revenues. Secondly, appropriate tax rates would have to be established, and this
would require detailed knowledge of costs and relocation expenses - precisely the
kind of information that is supposedly unnecessary in the absence of regulatory
instruments. Finally, if decision makers continued to act in an irrational manner,
there is no guarantee that market signals will affect behaviour.
The final policy profile will reflect these practical and philosophical concerns. But
it will also reflect the policy trade-offs and contradictions inherent in a pluralist
society with distinct policy networks and communities. These trade-offs and
contradictions are the subject of chapters four, five and six, but for now we pause
to outline the nature of Britain's policy regime, and to ask whether the left/right
stereotype outlined in §2.2 accords with behaviour elsewhere in Europe.
§2.4 British Regional Policy: a comparative analysis
A simple working guide for policy analysis is provided by Hansen et a! (1990,
p.2). They argue that no policy should be considered regional, even if it has an
impact on the distribution of economic and social phenomena in space, unless it is
part of a formal effort to do so, and unless that intention is clearly stated.
According to this definition Britain's first regional policy measures were not
introduced until the mid 1920s. Up to that point the state had not seen the need to
devise a plan to deal with the spatial consequences of recession. The problem of
joblessness was viewed in administrative terms, and the government concentrated
its attention on the treatment and maintenance of the unemployed (Parsons 1986,
p.5). High localised unemployment was perceived as less of a structural or
regional problem, then as a symptom and casualty of world recession.
The first measures were ad hoc and designed to prop up communities until general
economic recovery could intervene. The earliest instance was in 1926, with
training schemes for the unemployed established at Claydon, Brandon,
Birmingham and Wallsend. In January 1928, this policy was institutionalised when
the Ministry of Labour appointed the Industrial Transference Board '. . . for the
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purposes of facilitating the transference of workers, and in particular miners, for
whom the opportunities of employment in their own occupation are no longer
available'. 4 Labour camps, social service centres and land settlement were also
promoted, but these were supplementary to the main strategy of encouraging
labour mobility. This approach was orthodox in as much that it relied on the
market mechanism of labour movement between regions and industries. It was
only when the slump deepened and national unemployment rose, that the
limitations of these tools became clear.
As the country headed into secular depression, the pressure on the Government
for further action became intense. A variety of damning industrial and area surveys
were completed. The most important of these was published in 1934 as Reports of
Investigations into the Industrial Conditions in Certain Depressed Areas. The
series comprised of four papers, and described extreme regional distress that
remained immune to government initiatives and 'natural economic forces'. One
report concluded that the depressed areas, '. . . can only escape from the vicious
cycle, where depression created unemployment and unemployment intensified
depression by means of some positive external assistance' (McCallum 1979, p.4).
The government responded with the Unemployment Act of 1934 which replaced
the Poor Law and attempted to place the relief of poverty 'outside party politics'
(Parsons 1986, p.12). But this failed to diffuse the growing political pressure, with
a media campaign allowing Labour and Liberal politicians to keep debate alive.
Under mounting pressure, the government passed the Special Areas (Development
and Improvement) Act 1934. Four Special Areas were designated, and two
commissioners were appointed to administer the legislation. At first, the
Commissioners had few resources and found their actions curtailed by official
indifference. Accordingly they were restricted to sewerage and resettlement
schemes (Dennison 1939, p.162). But in 1936, loan capital was made available for
small businesses in the Special Areas through the Special Areas Reconstruction
Association. The 1937 Special Areas Act empowered the Treasury to give loans
to larger businesses, and it also allowed the Commissioners to make contributions
towards taxes, rent and rates. However, by the outbreak of war, only £2 million
Quoted in McCallurn (1979, p, 3).
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worth of loans had been sanctioned, with a mere £50,000 paid towards taxes and
rents (McCallum 1979, p.5). The most successful measure was the provision of
Trading Estates. By 1938, government built factories were employing around
12,000 people, although this was closely associated with the nation-wide
rearmament programme.
The defining moment for the British regional policy debate came with the
appointment of the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial
Population in 1937. This was a response to failings in the existing market oriented
policy highlighted by disaffected Special Areas Commissioner Sir Malcom
Stewart. Throughout the Commission's hearings, the intellectual battle over state
intervention was rehearsed in meticulous detail. On one side, Dennison noted how
the Board of Trade supplied the 'classic' statement of belief in the efficiency of the
market. On the other, witnesses from the Ministry of Labour implicitly supported
state intervention, noting that 'The immediate economic interest of a given
manufacturer is not necessarily a national economic interest' (Dennison 1939,
p.33).
The report favoured a mixture of redevelopment, decentralisation and dispersal,
aiming to alleviate congestion in the South and South East while securing a
balanced distribution of industry in the rest of Britain. But in both the final
recommendations and dissenting memoranda, a clear distinction had been made
between the national position and private industrial interests. As a whole, the
Commission was in sympathy with the idea of concerted intervention. But the
report also included commitments to safeguard 'the conditions of successful
industrial growth'. In a key section, the Commission argued that:
there is no reason to suppose that, so far as the profitability of industrial
enterprise is concerned, the State, if it should take on itself unduly wide and
autocratic powers or regulation and control of industriaL location will be
likely in general to prove any wiser, or to make more far sighted and
enlightened choice, from the point of view of industry, then the generality of
those who guide individual undertakings (HMSO 1940, p.1 92).
The existing literature suggests that the exigencies of war allowed the
interventionists to triumph, paving the way for the Employment White Paper and
important Distribution of Industry (1945) and Town and Country Planning (1947)
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legislation (e.g. Booth 1982). This established a framework of negative controls
(Industrial Development Certificates) and financial incentives which betrayed a
peculiarly British trait.
This trait relates to the argument by Young and Lowe (1974) that while British
governments tend to equate microeconomic success with commercial
independence, they continue to intervene in the private sector to secure a balance
of macro-social benefits. This means that governments have become involved in a
delicate balancing act, playing off commercial autonomy against collective
interests. Young and Lowe (1974, p.208) argue that the British government's
reluctance to overrule the wishes of the firm has meant that 'basic economic
problems' have remained uncontested, while the state seeks to influence businesses
through persuasive arguments. The regional policy legislation of the late 1 940s
created a system in which these contradictions were given free rein.
The combination of the 'stick' and 'carrot' dominated regional policy
administration until the mid 1970s (Table 2.2). Although governments wavered in
their commitment to regional planning, the basic instruments of sanction and
incentive remained in force. As policy strategy changed over these years, it was
the balance between controls and incentives which caused the greatest
controversy. But while the British debated the symmetry of their regime, only one
other European country openly sanctioned controls; France. Yet even here,











Industrial and Juvenile Transfer
Schemes
Special Areas (Development and
Improvement) Act
Distribution of Industiy Act
Resettlement Scheme
Town and Countzy Planning Act
Distribution of Industmy Act
Key Workers Scheme
Distribution of Industty (Industiy
Finance) Act
Local Unemployment Act
Control of Office and Industrial
Development Act
Highlands and Islands Development
Act
TABLE 2.2
THE MAIN 1NSTRLTMENTS IN UK REGIONAL POLICY, 1928-83
Year	 Legislation	 -	 Major Provisions
Minor grant and loan assistance for
unemployed migrants.
Four Special Areas designated.
Commissioners had power to grant loans. Led
to the establishment of trading estates. Powers
extended in 1937.
Special Areas extended and designated as
Development Areas. The wartime building
licence control was kept. Grant and loan
powers vested in the Board of Trade.
Wide range of migration costs met for
workers in all regions. Replaced by
Resettlement Transfer Scheme in 1962.
Introduced the Industrial Development
Certificate (IDC) control. All new
manufacturing establishments or extensions
over 5,000 sq. ft. required an IDC. Exemption
limit altered frequently after 1947.
A further extension to loan and grant powers
for firms moving to Development Areas.
Assistance to key workers moving with their
firms to Development Areas.
Extension of loan and grant assistance to
areas of high unemployment outside
Development Areas. Tightening of location
controls.
Development Areas replaced by Development
Districts delimited on basis of unemployment
rates exceeding 4.5%. Strengthening of Board
of Trade powers. Introduction of standard







	 Free depreciation introduced for firms in
assisted areas.
Regional Planning Regional Economic Planning Councils and
Boards set up by Department of Economic
Affairs. Board of Trade loses responsibthtj
for regional policy.
Control of office development in London and
Birmingham with Office Development
Permits.
Established the Highlands and Islands
Development Board. Extensive powers of




Industrial Development Act	 Development Districts replaced by
Development Areas. Free depreciation
replaced by differential investment grants.
1967
	
Finance Act	 Manufacturing firms in Development Areas
could reclaim payments made under Selective
Employment Tax and were entilled to the
Selective Employment Premium and the
Regional Employment Premium. SET and
SEP withdrawn in 1970.
1967
	
Special Development Areas 	 Additional incentives in areas of greatest
need. Rent free premises and additional
building grants.
1970 Local Employment Act Seven Intermediate Areas established with
lower rates of assistance than Development




	 Investment Grants replaced by accelerated
depreciation in Development Areas.
1972
	
Industiy Act	 Regional Development Grants replace the
accelerated depreciation differential. IDCs
abolished in DAs and SDAs. Increase in other
forms of assistance; selective help for industry
under Section 7 of the Act
1972
	




Regional Employment Premium	 REP doubled.
1975
	
Development Agencies	 Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies
established. Powers to finance factory
building and to invest in industrial projects.
1977	 European Regional Development Fund ERDF established to help depressed areas.
Investment grants and interest rebates on
other Community loans for industrial, craft,
service and industiy projects.
1977	 Regional Employment Premium 	 REP abolished.
1979-83 Phased reform of GB regional policy
	 Major package of reforms: planned cut in
regional budget, redrawing of assisted area
boundaries, Office Development Permits
abolished, Industrial Development
Certificates abolished, Regional Development
Grants abolished in Intermediate Areas.
1983	 White Paper on Regional Industrial 	 Sets out proposals for major reforms and
Development
	 invites public discussion.
Source: Armstrong & Taylor (1993, pp. 363-68); Marquand (1980, p. 20).
French postwar controls had been introduced to tackle industrial development in
the Paris basin and to encourage relocation to depressed areas. Two instruments
were involved, Agrément, which was a permit system introduced in 1955, and
Redevance, a once and for all tax on new floor space. However, the first French
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decentralisation measures had been adopted during the 1930s (Hansen 1968,
p.54). These were dictated by military strategy and ran parallel to the British
shadow factory scheme. It was not until 1950 that Cladius Petit, the Minister of
Reconstruction and Urbanism, called for a national regional plan (Hansen 1968,
p.55). By this time, Gravier's Paris et le Desert Francais had set a distinctly
French policy agenda. Gravier had described how Paris had monopolised industrial
expansion - to the point were other regions faced structural decline. But legislation
had to wait for a political imperative. This arrived in the 1952-54 recession, when
regionally oriented staple industries collapsed and newer technologies rushed to
Paris (Allen & Maclennan 1970, p.157). Between 1954 and 1957, a flood of laws
was passed.
Both incentives and controls were introduced at the same time. Unlike Britain,
policy arose as a complete package (Nicol & Wettman 1978, p.1 86). Agrément
was designed as a flexible tool. Each application was to be treated on its own
merits, and compensatory relocation schemes (package deals) were encouraged. A
willingness to negotiate secured a favourable hearing, while systematic refusals
were reserved for the belligerent. Many large firms entered into Con/rats de
Localisation, which detailed the terms of the deal with five or ten year investment
plans (Nicol 1979). This policy was feasible given the good working relationship
between government and industry.
Agrément has often been compared to IDCs. But there were significant differences
(Nicol & Wettman 1978). First, IDCs were designed to divert all projects to the
assisted areas. Where verbal persuasion failed, refusals were issued. Package deals
were the exception rather than rule. Agrément was only refused where
negotiations collapsed. Second, IDCs sought to divert firms to the assisted areas in
general - they did not promote specific sites. Agrément had a much stronger
directional element, with both 'push' and 'pull' roles. Finally, IDCs and regional
incentives were administered separately. In France, decisions on Agrément and
subsidies were linked through negotiation. The Government could therefore
ensure that contentious schemes secured the maximum level of assistance.
While French decentralisation policy was clearly effective (Nicol 1979), the policy
framework was substantively different from Great Britain. The French promoted
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settlements and involved industrialists in a process of negotiated compliance; in the
UK, controls were administered with nominally fixed decision criteria. It was only
towards the early 1 960s that the British started to emulate the French - a move
made possible by a wide-ranging policy review.
Apart from France, two other countries flirted with some form of location control
in postwar Europe. The Netherlands introduced legislation in 1971, with a
Selective Regional Investment Bill. The act was designed to slow the growth of
firms and offices in the congested Randsiad region, whilst promoting a more even
distribution of employment. The bill defined a mixed control, with both permit and
fiscal elements (Nicol & Wettman 1978). The fiscal element was the selective
investment levy, which applied to all new projects if building costs exceeded
250,000 guilders. The second elements was a Rijmnond building licence, covering
extensions and new projects costing more than I million guilders.
As in the British case, direct controls were only introduced after debate and
experimentation. In the 1 940s and early 1 950s a 'work to the workers' strategy had
been favoured. This was abandoned in the late 1950s, when regional concerns
were overtaken by growth (Wever 1986, p149). Amidst boom conditions, industry
became highly concentrated in the 'Rim-City' area (Amsterdam-The Hague-
Rotterdam-Utrecht) (Hansen 1974). This generated labour shortages, housing
problems and political disquiet. These problems had been foreshadowed in a 1956
booklet called The West and the rest of the Netherlands. Written by the Central
Planning and National Spatial Planning Agencies, it became the Dutch Barlow
Report. Like its British counterpart, it argued for a more balanced distribution of
industry. In 1959, the government accepted that regional policy should 'aim not
only at combating regional structural employment, but also at the dispersion of
industry and economic activities' (Hendricks 1974, p.191). But the Dutch
continued to uphold entrepreneurial freedoms, focusing on direct (premiums) and
indirect (infrastructure) subsidies. It was not until the early 1970s that the
problems of the Randstad - and The Hague in particular - were deemed serious
enough to warrant administrative restrictions (Brown & Burrows 1977).
Once introduced, the Dutch measures had a chequered record. Delayed by the oil
crisis, they were launched into an unfriendly environment. The fiscal element was
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abandoned within eight months, while permit refusals reached just 0.5% (Nicol
1979, p.134). Part of the reason was a ruling which exempted renewal,
replacement and extension works (Nicol 1979, p.335). The underlying cause was
rising national unemployment, and the scheme was formally abandoned in the
1980s. As in many cases, regional policy became a luxury in times of widespread
economic distress.
The Italian Authorisation policy faced very similar problems. Introduced in 1971,
the measure applied to the whole country and to all manufacturing activities. Like
the Dutch system, it was a mixed control, with both fiscal and permit elements. A
refusal would block a project, but taxes allowed exemption or reversal (Cao-Pinna
1974). A uthorisation was the 'stick' behind a package of subsidies and incentives.
It worked within the Contrattazione Programmata, a system based on negotiation.
The Contrattazione Programmata was itself part of the first National Economic
Plan (Allen 1979, p.1 94) which addressed the long standing problem of the
Mezzogiorno.
Italy had been wrestling with the Mezzogiorno question for some time. The area
was plagued by poor physical geography and a lack of resources. For decades,
these conditions permitted little more than subsistence agriculture. Postwar
governments had focused on developing modern infrastructure, but this proved
largely inadequate. Better results were achieved in the 1960s, when the state
developed a battery of subsidies. State industry was also pushed South. An
example can be found in the vehicle industry, where an Alfa-Sud factory
employing 15,000 was built (Allen & Maclennan 1970, p.65). From 1965 to 1970,
there was a co-ordination of projects under the National Economic Plan. Under
this first plan, all central government agencies had to preserve fifty percent of
investments for the South, and thirty per cent of goods contracts. In addition, the
Cassa5 was granted sweeping rights of expropriation and subsidy. Northern
political resistance tempered these moves, but the 1971 'Law for the South'
restored the bias. As well as Authorisation, the law devolved regional powers and
The Cassa per ii Mezzogiorno, the original instniment of investment policy.
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increased levels of public investment. Thirteen billion dollars was allocated for
infrastructure, including 21 'special projects' (Cao-Pinna 1974).
Unfortunately, Authorisallon was not the success it was hoped for. In the period
from 1972 to 1975, the policy issued just seven refusals, giving an approval rate of
97.3% (Nicol 1979). This was partly due to its redefinition as a project licence.
This meant that firms could keep plans below exemption limits and follow a course
of incremental expansion. Decisions also faced judicial challenges. This was
because the Authorisation Bill had been framed as a decongestion measure.
Legally, applications had to be examined in relation to the proposed location.
Where de facto refusals were based on relocation 'potential', courts could
intervene. Until 1979, every appeal brought was successful (Nicol 1979). However
the real problem with this regime was that it was a fudge between a Socialist
Ministry of Economic Planning, and a Christian-Democrat led coalition (Nicol &
Wettman 1978, p.1 94). The original idea had been for permits in the north, with
accompanying congestion taxes. Political log-rolling changed this into a simpler
nation-wide planning fee. In this sense at least, ideological differences dictated
policy profile.
This brief survey of European disincentive policies serves to illustrate the novelty
of Britain's regional policy regime. While many countries adopted development
incentives, very few combined these with a negative location control. Moreover,
when legislation was introduced, it was often ineffectual and delayed. The closest
parallels are found in France, but there were significant differences between French
and British practices. In particular, a penchant for open negotiations meant that
the French tailored individual settlements to individual conditions. As we shall see,
British legislation attempted to apply fixed decision criteria and preserve an
illusion of scientific impartiality. This study will demonstrate that the Board of
Trade was ill-equipped to execute such duties.
§2.5 Conclusion
Regional policy and regional policy tools may be characterised on a scale between
market based and interventionist remedies. Market based initiatives rely on




approach identifies fundamental flaws in market solutions and favours imposing
solutions on entrepreneurs and workers. Regional policy intervention therefore
requires a major philosophical judgement. Whatever policy is chosen, it will reflect
fundamental beliefs about the efficacy of market forces and the legitimate role of
state. It is this conflict that lies at the heart of the political economy of regional
policy, and it was this conflict that the Board of Trade was forced to confront
from 1945-64.
According to the literature, British legislation has been interventionist in scope,
involving high levels of public expenditure and policies designed to reallocate
capital and labour between districts (Parsons 1986, Armstrong & Taylor 1983;
Scott 1996 etc.). Our contention, however, will be that while legislative activity
has been interventionist, postwar policy administration was actually dominated by
free market concerns.
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3 The Industrial Context
§3.1 Introduction
The motor economy has helped define modern industrial practice. It has also
dominated popular culture, becoming the ultimate expression of national and personal
identity. But the auto-industrial complex is important in its own right. Its scale,
employment and structure have made it one of the most dynamic industries of the
twentieth century. As Landes (1969, p.443) made clear, 'in the language of
development economics, no other product yielded so rich a harvest of forward and
backward linkages'.
By delimiting 1945 to 1964 as the regional policy horizon, this study focuses on a
unique period in British car making. Wartime restrictions gave way to two decades of
merger and adjustment, culminating in massive investment in the early 1960s. This
chapter will place these years into their economic and historical context. The
discussion will be divided into five parts. §3.2 will focus on the industry's economic
significance, while §3.3 considers long run trends. Demand and supply factors will be
examined in §3.4 and §3.5, before §3.6 relates the analysis to the regional policy
debate. A statistical appendix complements the discussion.
§3.2 The Economic Significance of the Motor Industry
In the last twenty years, the motor industry has experienced a profound
transformation crisis. Plant closures, mass redundancies and industrial unrest have
paralleled a wider despondency affecting British manufacturing. But cars have always
made news. The wildcat strikes of the 1 970s, Jaguar's 'kidnap' in the 1 980s, and
Rover's renaissance in the 1990s have all enjoyed front page coverage. This
fascination is part cultural, and part pecuniary. While cars personify success and
freedom, they also provide jobs and exports. They head a vast industrial complex
whose significance is best appreciated in terms of linkages, employment and foreign
earnings.
49
Like most industrial processes, car making is largely an assembly operation. Individual
components and sub-assemblies are combined to produce an integrated whole. Under
postwar conditions, over two thousand firms may have supplied items for any one
vehicle, and each car could contain up to 20,000 individual parts (Waymark 1983,
p.66; Dunnett 1980, p.18). Since both suppliers and assemblers have additional
material, industrial and service requirements, 'car-making' extends its influence beyond
the obvious boundaries. In short, the multiplier effect is substantial.
Nevertheless, the Census of Production attempts a direct measure of industrial
structure. The Statistics of Trade Act (1947) committed the British government to an
internationally recognised Standard Industrial Class/lcation. These definitions were
subsequently revised in 1958, 1968, and 1980. The Business Statistics Office put
postwar data on a consistent basis in 1978 (HMSO 1978). Under the 1978 regime, the
motor industry is defined in terms of Minimum List Heading 381 - Motor Vehicle
Manufacturing. I
If we begin with Gross Output in Table A3 (p.284), we can see that although
manufacturing output grew steadily up to the early 1 970s, the share of the motor
industry rose at a greater rate. This proportion peaked in 1963 at 7.3%, when motor
manufacturing was the eighth most important industrial activity in Britain (CSO 1964,
p.138). Despite the problems associated with successive OPEC price shocks in the
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CSO figures also show that the motor industry has been a major consumer of capital
goods. It accounted for as much as 8.5% of capital expenditure and 11% of all new
manufacturing building during regional expansion in 1963 (Table AS, p. 286). These
shares weakened a little in the mid 1 970s, but recovered thanks to restructuring and
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While these measurements are useful, they take little account of the complexity of
inter-industry links. Minimum List Heading 381 was designed to be both restrictive
and exclusive. As such, it merely hints at the scale of motor manufacturing. Input-
output analysis recognises this shortcoming, and it allows a much more
comprehensive picture of economic linkages to be drawn.
Although several earlier semi-official estimates were published, the British
government's first input-output tables were for 1954. 2 In comparison with later
efforts, the data was primitive. But for the first time, economists were able to study
linkages in depth. To demonstrate the technique's flexibility, a table was produced
showing the direct and indirect requirements of motor manufacturing (reproduced
exactly in Table 3.1).
2 For the first of input-output tables in Britain, see Barna (1952).
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TABLE 3.11
REQUIREMENTS PER £100 OF FINAL OUTPUT BY THE MOTOR AND
CYCLE iNDUSTRY, 1954
Industiy Group	 Direct	 Indirect	 Total	 - Total
requirements	 requirements	 requirements	 requiremen
(gross)'	 (net)2
(f)	 (f)	 (&)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 	 0.1	 0.1	 0.1
Coal mining	 0.3	 2.4	 2.7	 1.9
Othermining and quarrying 	 0.5	 0.5	 0.2
Coke ovens and coal tar products	 0.1	 1.5	 1.6	 0.3
Chemicals and dyes
	







0.2	 0.5	 0.7	 0.1
Oil and greases	 0.1	 0.3	 0.4	 0.1
Paint, plastics andmaterials	 1.7	 0.4	 2.1	 0.8
Iron and steel-melting, rolling and castings 	 11.9	 3.8	 15.7	 6.4
Ironandsteel-tinplate&tubcs	 0.5	 0.5	 1.0	 0.3
Non-ferrous metals	 3.5	 1.7	 5.2	 1.6
Motors and cycles	 0.4	 100.4	 42.7
Aircraft	 0.2	 0.1	 0.3	 0.2
Railway rolling stock etc. 	 0.1	 0.4	 0.5	 0.2
Shipbuilding and machine engineering	 0.1	 0.2	 0.3	 0.1
Mechanical engineering	 4.5	 1.6	 6.1	 3.4
Electrical engineering(general) 	 3.0	 0.6	 3.6	 1.8
Radioandtelecommunications	 0.5	 0.6	 1.1	 0.5
Hardware and hollow-ware 	 2.4	 0.7	 3.1	 1.4
Precision instruments, jewellet-y. 	 0.2	 0.1	 0.3	 0.2
Miscellaneous metal manufacture	 5.8	 0.8	 6.6	 2.9
Cottonandmanmadefibres	 0.4	 1.1	 1.5	 0.6
Woollenandworsted	 0.1	 0.2	 0.3	 0.1
Hosiery and lace
Othertextiles	 0.7	 0.4	 1.1	 0.4
Textiles finishing and packing 	 0.2	 02	 0.1
Leatherandfur	 0.3	 0.1	 0.4	 0.1
Clothing	 0.1	 0.1	 0.2	 0.1
Boot and shoe
Cereal foodstuffs	 0.1	 0.1
Other manufactured foods
Drink and tobacco	 0.1	 0.1
Timberandflirniture	 1.5	 0.4	 1.9	 0.7
Paper and board	 0.3	 0.7	 1.0	 0.4
Printing and publishing	 0.1	 0.6	 0.7	 0.4
Rubber	 4.2	 0.3	 4.5	 1.7
China and glassware 	 0.5	 0.2	 0.7	 0.4
Building materials	 0.1	 0.5	 0.6	 0.2
Miscellaneous manufactures	 0.6	 0.3	 0.9	 0.4
Buildingandcontracting 	 0.3	 0.7	 1.0	 0.5
Gas and water	 0.3	 0.6	 0.9	 0.4
Electricity	 0.6	 1.1	 1.7	 0.8
Services	 9.1	 8.8	 17.9	 13.2
Public Administration
Imports	 2.0	 8.6	 10.6	 10.6
Sales by foreign buyers	 0.5	 0.5	 0.5
Taxes on expenditure 1es subsidies	 0.4	 1.8	 2.2	 2.2
Gross domestic income	 42.6
Total	 100	 -	 -	 100
Notes:	 'In terms of gross output.
terms of net output (plus depreciation).
Source: (FIIMSO 1964, p.11)
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Table 3.1 underlines the importance of postwar car making. If one takes the motor
industry's 1954 gross output of £882.5m from Table A3, we can see that motor
building required £138.5m worth of inputs from the Iron and Steel sector; £23.8m of
coal products; £18.5m worth of paint and plastic materials, and £15m of electricity. In
constant 1985 prices, these figures would equate to £13 19m, £226m, £176m, and
£1 42m respectively.
A. G. Armstrong used input-output analysis in a landmark article published in the
District Bank Review (1967). He estimated that in terms of all industrial inputs in
1963, the motor sector directly accounted for 5.1% of production. A further 5.5% of
output was indirectly linked to car making. So overall, the motor industry accounted
for 10.6% of industrial activity. The addition of capital items brought the share up to
12%, while Armstrong went on to attribute 32% of industrial growth from 1953 to
1964, to vehicle manufacture. According to these statistics, if the motor industry's
output were to fall by 6%, then total economic activity would have been reduced by
2% (Rhys 1972, p.3T3). Further studies, completed during a parliamentary
investigation in 1974, indicate that 7-8% of GDP was connected to the motor sector
at that time (HMSO 1975b, p.31).
Employment statistics give these figures a human dimension. In terms of direct
employment (MLH 381), some 501,700 people made cars in 1974, representing 6.5%
of manufacturing employment (Table A4. p.285). Again, this share had been climbing
throughout the post war period, peaking at 7% in 1979. The industry's subsequent
run-down is well chronicled in the data. Lean production methods and rationalisation
cut the workforce to 261,000 in 1986, outpacing the more widespread reduction in
industrial employment. But this is only half of the story. For every line worker, a
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In practical terms, measurement of these wider effects has proved almost impossible.
Crompton et al's (1976) abortive efforts were typical, while some of the best
estimates come from Stoney and Bourn's (1984) eight year study of Merseyside. This
computed the following dependency figures:
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TABLE 3.2
EMPLOYMENT IN THE MIERSEYSIDE MOTOR INDUSTRY, 1984
No Employed
Direct Employment (Halewood, Ellesmere Port, Speke).	 24,570
Local Suppliers	 176
Merseyside Dependence 	 24,746
Other Suppliers	 13,000
UK Dependence	 37,746
Source: Stoney & Bourn (1984, p.39)
This study yielded a ratio of 1:0.54; in other words, for every one job in motor
manufacture, 0.54 additional workers serviced the industry. But even this was an
underestimate,
Our figures reflect, of course, only one arm of the Marshallian cross, the
supply side. . . We have not attempted a direct measurement of consumption
multipliers and our employment impact figures are underestimates in this
regard. . . £200 million worth of (wage) expenditure (including the proportion
saved) could be expected to generate employment in terms of a few thousands
rather than hundreds of people (Stoney & Bourn 1984, p.41).
The 1974/75 Parliamentary investigation was equally confounded. The Committee
estimated 'first round' employment at 835,000 (510,000 in MLH 381, and 325,000 in
supplying industries), with a further 435,000 in selling, repair and maintenance. But
further measurements were abandoned. The final report concluded, 'The employment
significance of the industry is increased by the multiplier effect. We do not wish to
make a judgement on the correct coefficient to use, as we have not taken evidence on
this point' (HMSO 1975b, p.16).
An exercise to correct these omissions would be helpful, but time consuming. For the
purpose of this study, it is enough to hint at the scale of dependency. Car making is
clearly a massive business, but so too is servicing, feeding, and clothing the
production infrastructure.
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This leads the discussion on to consider the international context. All of the major
British car producers are now owned by overseas companies, while prestige brands
like Rolls Royce depend on export sales. Cars are international commodities, and the
multinational nature of the industry has helped to make it one of Britain's most
important export earners.
In terms of units, the industry maintained a positive trade balance up to 1976,
contributing many millions of pounds to the current account. The various phases of
trade contraction and expansion will be examined below, but Table A8 (p. 291)
provides a neat summary. This shows that from 1952 to 1977 the motor industry
consistently accounted for over one tenth of British exports. Within the 'regional
policy horizon', this share topped 16% (1964), confirming the industry's key role in
trading relations.
Two observations should be made on this point. Firstly, export strength has been
related to the success of component makers. A legacy of Britain's engineering past,
component firms won praise from both the Central Policy Review Staff' (1975) and
the Expenditure Committee. Of the top twenty companies in 1979, only six were
foreign-owned (Wilks 1984, p.69). This sector would became increasingly
uncompetitive in the 1980s, although a more recent report suggests a recovery of
British fortunes (Carr 1990).
The second point cuts to the heart of this study. It is simply that motor exports have
been so vital to Britain's balance of payments that the question of external balance has
consumed other policy initiatives. In regional planning terms, governments have had
to balance 'the proper distribution of industry' with the need for efficient manufacture.
It is worth quoting the following passage from a briefing document prepared for Sir
Peter Thorneycroft, President of the Board of Trade in 1954. The Board had been
asked to approve new buildings for Ford and Vauxhall which ran counter to location
policy. Sir Peter's advisors were adamant:
It is felt that the importance of these two firms to the national economy is so
great, and particularly to our current and potential exports of motor cars. .
that we cannot refuse any part of their proposals. This means in effect the
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abandonment of the attempt to restrain the growth of central London, with
which presumably would have to go the policy for the other congested areas.
(PRO 1954c).
§3.3 Long Run Trends
The motor industry is the product of one hundred years of technical innovation and
development. British production began in 1896, when the Daimler Motor Company
established a factory in Coventry. In the early stages, basic engineering problems had
still to be overcome, and a large number of makers experimented with design and
specification. Many small firms were among the nearly 300 which entered the industry
before 1906, most of them to retire defeated (Richardson 1977, p.55). Throughout
these formative years, cars remained a novelty. The motor economy matured slowly,
but its development became a corollary of wider manufacturing history.
FIGURE 3.4
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Figure 3.4 shows the growth of production in Great Britain. This graph traces the
redefinition of the motor vehicle from a plaything of the rich before 1914, to a
consumer durable and workhorse in post-Second World War Britain. The phenomenal
growth in output mirrors a revolution in production technology which enabled costs
to fall and new markets to be exploited.
The inspiration behind these developments came from the United States. At first,
observers feared that America would be conquered by European manufacturers, but
the fledging US industry was blessed by two advantages (Richardson 1977, p.62).
Firstly, American per capita income was much larger than in Britain or France.
Secondly, standardised production methods were already an established practice.
Whereas Europe concentrated on hand-made vehicles, firms like Studebaker, Cadillac
and Buick realised scale economies from long production runs (Rubenstein 1992,
p.42). 'In short, high per capita purchasing power allied to low cost products and
production methods meant the establishment of a large industry' (Rhys 1972, p.10).
Henry Ford mastered the American market. His philosophy was supply driven:
The way to build automobiles is to make one automobile like another
automobile, to make them all alike, to make them come through the factory
just alike; just as one pin is like another pin when it comes from the pin
factory, or one match is like another match when it comes from the match
factory.
You need not fear about the market. The people will buy them all right. When
you get to making cars in quantity, you can make them cheaper, and when you
make them cheaper you can get people with enough money to buy them. The
market will take care of itself (quoted in Richardson 1977, p.65).
By the time Ford translated this approach to Manchester in 1911, the moving track
assembly line had been born. New technologies and utilitarian designs allowed output
to rise, and prices to fall (Table 3.3).
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TABLE 3.3
MODEL 'T' - PRODUCTION AND (CURRENT) PRICES, 1908-14









Source (Wood 1988, p.22)
Similar techniques expanded British production. In 1924, Morris remarked, 'Until the
worker goes to his factory by car, I shall not believe that we have touched more than
the fringe of the home market' (Turner 1963, p.22). His factories concentrated on
affordable and reliable cars. When faced with competition from the Austin 7 in 1922,
he ordered a cut in prices. The gamble worked, and in 1925 Morris built 54,151
Cowleys and Oxfords - representing 41% of the country's production. This was the
highest share ever attained by Morris, and it was unequalled by any British car maker
in the interwar years (Wood 1988, p.38).
Despite these moves, interwar motoring remained a middle class preserve (Bowden
1991; Bowden & Turner 1991, 1993). While production rallied to 390,000 cars in
193 7, the total number of vehicles in use barely topped 2.5 million. Two reasons
account for this. One was the high cost of maintaining a vehicle, another was the
Great Depression. 3 Morris' expectations could only be realised when the people's
means matched their reach. This would happen in the unprecedented prosperity of
postwar Britain. In the meantime, an army had to be provisioned.
3An SMMT survey in 1926 estimated a possible home market of only 835,000, based on annual
income not below £450 (Richardson 1977, p.103).
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If the Second World War was a GDP war, the motor firms were the economic shock
troops. Factories were redirected to war production, and the shadow factory scheme -
with all of its implications for industrial location - was introduced. Although there was
very little car production, the production of military vehicles was increased. This put
significantly better scale economies within the reach of British firms. New buildings
and equipment would increase the interwar productive capacity by as much 60% for
commercial vehicles and 20% for cars (HMSO 1975b, p.9). This investment
programme allowed the larger firms to re-equip on a massive scale. When the war
ended, it seemed that Britain was well placed to supply a greedy market.
Table AlO (p. 294) reflects the importance which the government placed on export
production. In the face of the dollar shortage, the President of the Board of Trade, Sir
Stafford Cripps, directed the industry to export at all costs
the motor car was seen not only as a thing of luxury and pleasure but the
means with which the economy could be rebuilt. The car firms were no
longer at the beck and call of fashion or economic recession, but were seen
by policy makers as the wherewithal to economic recovery (Rhys 1972,
p.Y79).
In order to spearhead this export drive, the home market was restricted by purchase
tax, credit controls, petrol duty and rationing. Nevertheless, demand was still strong,
and car makers were given further export inducements through the material
allocations scheme. All of this meant that although the domestic market was distorted,
output continued to grow apace. Manufacturers were given ample reason to invest in
new capacity, occasioning mini-investment booms throughout the 1 950s (Rhys 1972).
Despite potentially damaging cyclical disruptions (see §3.4), domestic output only
really began to falter in the mid 1960s. From a peak of 2.5 million vehicles in 1964,
the demand for British cars showed signs of terminal decline. The industry was
wracked by industrial disputes and a series of protracted corporate take-overs. The
1 970s would see rationalisation and retrenchment on a massive scale, before a modest
recovery began in the 1980 g. An indication of the industry's failing health can be seen
in the closing gap between new registrations and output. Before the late 1970s,
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Britain's annual production had always exceeded new registrations; from 1977 the
situation was reversed. While exports fell, import penetration continued to rise.
In terms of exports, the postwar period held much promise for British car makers. In
1938 only 20% of output was exported, by 1951 this figure was 77%. In succeeding
years, the proportion fell, with commercial vehicles following the same pattern.
Export expansion was based on a number of factors: the pent-up demand for cars; the
dislocation of European production; the priority accorded to exports; and rising real
incomes (Central Office of Information 1977, p.5). During these years, British firms
devoted considerable energy to the North American market, with the United States
becoming the largest overseas purchaser of British cars in 1956.
Table A9 (p.292) shows Britain's trading record since 1948. Throughout the early
postwar years, imports of motor vehicles were negligible. Quantitative restrictions and
the Mckenna duties provided tangible barriers to trade. From 1955 to 1959, an
average of 13,000 cars were imported, against annual exports of 440,000. One of the
very few success stories was Volkswagen, who succeeded in selling 36,000 Beetles by
1960 (Nelson 1970, p.161).
During the 1 960s Britain's position deteriorated. In terms of volume, the peak year for
car exports was 1969, but export growth had been declining for some time. Strong
competition in America cut into British margins, while sales in other areas stagnated.
The simplest indicator of trading decline was the increase in import penetration (Wilks
1984, p.'7l). This is defined as new car imports as a percentage of total registrations,
and stood at 7% in 1960, doubling to 14% by 1970 (Table All, p. 295). But even this
underestimates the sales loss. 1960 was itself an import peak, when foreign cars
'plugged' spiralling domestic demand (Rhys 1972, p.413). In 1961, conditions relaxed,
and imports fell to a more typical 3.1%. In the space of a single decade, the Kennedy
Round and EFTA had halved tariffs, while Britain's entry into the EEC promised free
intra-European trade. In the words of former BBC correspondent Martin Adeney
(1988, p.222), 'The protective fence which had allowed the British motor industry to
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grow was being dismantled plank by plank, and the British manufacturers found it
difficult to cope with the cold wind of competition'.
The 1970s saw these trends accentuated and prolonged. Although the British car
industry produced a record 1.9 million saloons and hatchbacks in 1972, output fell for
the next three years. Exports were also retarded - slumping below 500,000 in 1976.
More significantly, imports increased year on year. Foreign cars accounted for 56.7%
of all new registrations in 1980. All of this meant that the automotive trade balance
moved into the red in 1977, where it was to remain for the entire 1980s.
Britain's demise as a volume car producer can be traced in Figure 3.5. This shows
how first the Germans, then the French, and finally the Italians overtook British
output. In terms of world production, the United States has maintained a dominant
position. It was only in the 1980s that Japan's rapid growth outpaced Detroit.
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FIGURE 3.5
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Source: SMMT (1939,199 1)
This graph can serve as an analogy for world economic history. Waning British
power, postwar recovery and Western stagnation are all obvious trends. But the
aggregate data conceal structural changes which are best understood in the context of
growing corporate control.
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In its early years British car making was marked by a large number of firms entering
and leaving the industry. Up to 1913, 198 different makes of British cars had entered
production, of which 103 quickly disappeared (Rhys 1972, p.9). There was even less
success in commercial vehicle production, and Richardson's list of business failures
(1977) underlines the frailty of early manufacturers. Nevertheless, rising postwar
demand enticed many firms into the market. From 1919 to 1920, 40 new car
producers appeared; with a ftirther 46 entering the industry before 1925. But despite
these statistics, interwar conditions favoured concentration rather than diversity
TABLE 3.4
MOTOR INDUSTRY PROFILE 1922-24





Source: Rhys (1972, p.12)
Rhys shows how the number of vehicle producers fell from 196 to 74. Of the 33
remaining car makers in 1939, the 'Big Six' controlled the market (Table 3.5).
Nuffield, Ford, Austin, Vauxhall, Rootes and Standard accounted for 90% of car
output, while 70% of CV production was controlled by three firms (Nuffield, Ford
and Vauxhall). This concentration of production was brought about by internal
expansion and the competitive elimination of other firms (Maxcy 1958).
TABLE 3.5
BRITISH VEFHCLE PRODUCTION SHARES, 1929,1939
Year Vauxhall Standard Rootes Ford Nuffield Austin Total
1929	 1.1	 4.9	 -	 5.7	 51.0	 37.3	 100
1939	 10.4	 12.8	 10.9	 14.7	 26.9	 24.3	 100
Source: Rhys (1972, p.30'?)
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The significance of market concentration is explained by H.G. Castle, 'The
concentration of interests in the Big Six made it difficult for individual manufacturers
of new cars to enter the industry, and particularly for anyone who wished to make a
cheap car'. 4 Technical economies of scale acted as barriers to entry. These same forces
would provide the irresistible logic behind merger and agglomeration in postwar
Britain.
Afier 1945, the six became five, and the five merged into four. Ownership passed
from charismatic individuals like Billy Rootes and Herbert Austin, to faceless holding
companies and foreign multinationals. On February 1St 1994, the last British volume
manufacturer - Rover - surrendered control to BMW. It marked the end of a painful
process whereby both government and industry had tried to preserve at least one
indigenous producer.
Some of the key moments of postwar motor history were: the merger of Austin and
Morris in 1952; Rootes' take-over of Singer in 1955; Jaguar's 1961 bid for Daimler,
and Leyland's' capture of Standard-Triumph in the same year; the merger of BMC and
Jaguar to form British Motor Holdings, and Leyland's take-over of Rover in 1966;
Chrysler's assumption of majority control in Rootes in 1967; Leyland and BMIHI
merging into BLMC in 1968; and finally Peugeot's buy-out of Chrysler in 1977. All of
these episodes are well covered in the company histories, and the minutiae need not
concern this analysis. What is important are the generalisations that can be made
about company motives and economic consequences.
In most cases, mergers were negotiated from a position of weakness. Companies were
forced into marriage because their scale of organisation could not compete with rivals.
In the postwar period, this meant a counter to both GM and Ford, together with
European-owned producers. By comparison, British firms were 'Second Division
teams trying to play in the First Division' (Turner 1971, p.74).
Quoted in Wood (1988, p.56).
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The relevant production economies are examined by Dunnett (1980, p.23). His review
of cost studies suggests that in the 1940s, ' . . .product economies of scale exceeded
150,000 units per year. In the 1950s, automatic transfer machines and unitary body
construction had raised this figure, probably to above 500,000 units. In the 1960s this
figure increased towards a million, and in the 1970s exceeded a million. . . In no year
did any British company achieve sufficient production to exploit all potential
economies of scale in production'. Other scale economies in areas such as marketing
and research, imply savings at an even greater level. Dunnett (1980, p.25) concludes,
other things being equal, the more cars a manufacturer produced, the cheaper it
became on a per unit basis. The larger a manufacturer, the lower would be his costs.
and the stronger his competitive position'.
The 'big is beautiful' philosophy drove industrialists and policy makers alike.
Businessmen like Alick Dick soon realised that smaller firms could no longer support
mass production. The intervention of the Industrial Reorganisation Committee in
December 1967 reflected a general opinion that the motor industry was too
fragmented and that 'Britain needed to present one face to the world' (Turner 1971,
p.1 13). The IRC would eventually underwrite the BMII-I and Leyland merger -
providing a £25m dowry. For better or worse, Britain had entered the Leyland years.
The benefits of merger were never fully realised. In BMC's case, there was a
rationalisation of major mechanical parts - engines, gearboxes etc. - but little else. The
scattered collection of plants went unpruned, while early profits discouraged reform.
BMC had inherited five marque names, (Austin, MG, Morris, Riley and Wolseley) and
all were kept to exploit customer loyalty (Wood 1988, p.lO9). By 1959, no British car
was being made in volumes of much over 100,000 per annum. Although output
trebled to nearly 900,000 in 1960, the number of vehicles produced per employee rose
little. Given the concentration on small car production - this was disastrous (Williams
1983).
So although vehicle output rose dramatically, company profits did not (Table Al2, p.
296). In absolute terms, pre-tax returns never rose much above the £20 million level
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which was achieved in 1957-8. In relative terms, BMC's performance was even worse.
Ford constantly outpaced the British company, whilst Leyland's profit per vehicle
dropped from £44 in 1952, to £24 in 1965/6 (Williams 1983, table 23).
The subsequent creation of BLMC in 1968 compounded these problems. Leyland's
buyout was supposed to invigorate the British motor industry, instead the expanded
company proved incapable of managing change. Product development proved difficult
to co-ordinate, whilst the decision to concentrate on three new models - Marina,
Allegro and Princess - precipitated collapse (Williams 1983, p.228). While Ford had a
total of four plants and a highly integrated production strategy, BLMC's operations
extended to sixty sites (Thoms & Donnelly 1985, p.203). The 'wonderful merger'
proved a false dawn, and Stokes' words came back to haunt the corporation, 'You
cannot take two large complex companies and put them together and reap the benefit.
There is much planning, much rationalisation to do before the extra profits come in'.
(Adeney 1988, p.251). In fact, as late as 1975 - seven years after merger - Stokes
would admit that the company was, ' . . . still in the process of rationalisation . . . I
doubt whether we could have done it any more quickly. It is easy to say that you
should have fewer body shells and you should have fewer engines and so on. You do
have to remember that you have plant laid down for these items, you do have a model
selling in the market, and you cannot just chop them all off overnight' (HMSO 1975b,
p.115).
Reading the history of car making, it is difficult to escape from Meeks' (1977) general
conclusion that postwar mergers inhibited efficiency, and reduced profitability. But
this does not mean that mergers were unwise. In many cases, the alternative to take-
over was liquidation. Scale economies have simply remained beyond the reach of
British manufacturers. Subsidy and nationalisation provided a temporary palliative in
the 1 970s, but foreign take-over has become the ultimate cure.
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§3.4 Demand Factors
All firms try to anticipate market change. In a competitive world, survival can depend
on demand appraisal. Vauxhall's submission to the Expenditure Sub-Committee in
1975 illustrated the complexities involved (HMSO 1975b), citing fiscal policy,
transport policy, environmental policy, income levels, consumer taste and import
penetration as important factors. Vauxhall's statement could be re-written in any
number of forms, but the Dicks-Mireaux demand fljnction illustrates the key
relationships involved (Rhys 1972, p.224):
Dt =f(t Pt ht Sj t)
This makes aggregate new car demand (D) a function of per capita real income (Y),
relative prices (P), hire purchase (h) conditions and a time variable (t). S accounts
for the lag in adjustment from the present stock level to the desired level. However,
the existence of a second hand car market complicates the analysis (Rhys 1972,
p.225). Many people become car owners by buying second hand vehicles. Because
new vehicles form a relatively small proportion of total sales - the rise in car
ownership is heavily dependant on the used car sector. Most vehicles are sold by their
original owners when still in running order. With increasing prosperity, owners 'trade-
up' to newer, or more luxurious models. So except in a very few cases, new car
demand is a replacement demand.
Since this section is concerned with new car production, the emphasis will be on
Dicks-Mireaux type demand functions. We need to consider three elements - real
income, selective economic controls and price elasticity of demand. Consumer
preferences will be largely ignored, since the focus is on long term change and its
relationship with government policy.
The first observation we can make is that cars are a normal good par excellance. Any
change in income will normally produce a change in vehicle demand of the same sign.
Postwar studies typically estimate an income elasticity of between 1.1 and 4.2 (Rhys
1972, p.228), although estimates vary according to the statistical techniques
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employed. 5 A more recent study suggests a current income elasticity of approximately
1.7 in the United States (McCarthy 1996), while British studies suggest a figure
within the range of 2.4 for the 1960s and early 1970s (Dicks-Mireaux 1961; Rhys
1972, P. 228; Armstrong & Odling Smee 1979a, 1979b).
Among existing owners, rising incomes encourage early replacement and multi-car
ownership. Recession breeds deferred purchases and falling orders (Economic
Development Committee for the Motor Manufacturing Industry 1967, p.12). So in the
basic demand function, disposable income is paramount. On some occasions, a time-
trend appears equally significant, but ' . . . this is normally a combination of other
factors such as tastes, population increase, and relative prices, the influence of which
has changed systematically over time at a constant rate' (Rhys 1972, p.228).
From this discussion, it is clear that the demand for cars is closely related to a
country's general economic performance. The recurrent pattern during the 'regional
policy horizon' was bouts of rapid growth followed by enforced restraint. This 'stop-
go cycle' can be seen in Figure 3.6, which captures annual variations from the long
term trend of new registrations.
See Cowling and Cubbin (1971) and Cowling and Rayner (1970). Madden (1988) provides an
excellent discussion of the technical issues.
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FIGURE 3.6








Source: SMMT (various years), CSO (various years)
The history of 'stop-go' and the debate over its effects have been well rehearsed in the
literature. In particular, controversy has centred on the amplitude and depth of the
economic disruption compared with other Western economies (NEDO 1976, Whiting
1976, Prais 1981). While demand management was applied on a macroeconomic
level, policy makers also targeted car builders with individual measures. This was
because the sector was viewed as an ideal economic regulator. Postwar governments
focused on four such instruments: purchase tax, hire purchase regulations, the Road
Fund Licence, and petrol duties. Fuel taxation had been introduced in 1909, while a
flat rate 'licence' had been payable since 1948. But hire purchase and purchase tax
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proved the favoured weapons. The latter was introduced in 1940 at 33.33%, while HP
restrictions began in 1952. Bowden and Turner (1993) demonstrate that these
restrictions had a potent effect on the domestic market.
The 1 960s illustrate the influence which general economic instability and selective
measures can have on motor firms. After a record year in 1960 in which 1,353,000
cars were produced, output fell to 1,004,000 by 1961. Recovery in 1963 heralded a
mini-boom which was to last three years. A revival of export markets and increasing
consumer confidence enabled the motor industry to confidently expand into the
regions. A relaxation of purchase tax and Maudling's 'Dash for Growth' were key
elements.
1964 saw a Labour victory in the October General Election. At that time, there was
growing pressure on Britain's foreign reserves, but the government's National Plan
championed sustainable growth. In keeping with this, selective controls were resisted
(Dunnett 1980, p.91). Although the Labour government refused devaluation, a credit
squeeze and tax increase depressed car sales. An unavoidable hike in licence fees and
HP restrictions also affected demand. Added deflationary measures in 1966 included a
price freeze and a change in investment incentives. As The Economist noted, the 1966
motor show opened to a 'cacophony of complaints about government unfairness to
Britain's biggest export industry' (Dunnett 1980, p.92).
Credit restrictions were finally relaxed in the summer of 1967. The respite was short-
lived. In November, the pound was devalued, ending three years of 'miserable
resistance' (Dunnett 1980). Post devaluation measures reduced domestic car sales
from 1.3 million to 1.1 million (HMSO 1975b). Petrol taxes, car licences and credit
restrictions were increased, whilst the 1968 budget cut aggregate demand by a further
£975m. These measures were progressively tightened until 1969, when the industry
operated at just 50% capacity.
It was only in 1972, that the NEDO made the long term costs of selective intervention
and demand regulation explicit:
72
The Government can introduce great uncertainty by its management of the
economy. The motor manufacturing industry is peculiarly susceptible to
government economic measures aimed at demand regulation, and therefore the
risks involved in investment depends critically on an assessment of the future
movement of the economy and of government measures. Investment plans
conceived in the mid-sixties with expectations of steadily rising home demand
based on the projected rapid growth of the economy were met with five years
of stagnation in demand for vehicles, due primarily to (albeit necessary)
government deflationary measures, and returns were accordingly well below
expected levels. With this experience, companies are likely to take a cautious
view of future trends, and weight the probability that a project will achieve the
required rate of return accordingly. The greater the degree of uncertainty, the
lower is the probability that a project will achieve the required rate of return:
the number of projects which can meet the required rate of return falls, and the
amount of capital expenditure is likely to fall. The Government can counter
this by adopting policies which reduce fluctuations in demand for motor
vehicles (HMSO 1975b, p.385).
The final factor affecting demand is the price of other goods. In a detailed study of car
demand between 1952 and 1972, Hess (1977) has argued that substitution effects
account for seven times more variation than income changes. This is because a change
in the ratio between car prices and general consumer prices is equivalent to a change
in real relative prices. But this has proved difficult to model. The effect of prices will
vary according to individual patterns of expenditure: house prices affect owner-
occupiers, but not directly renters; fuel prices affect households in different climates in
different ways; food prices affect households according to the size and composition of
the household etc. 'To take aggregate national statistics is probably to obscure much
of this difference in the pattern of expenditure, and to obtain results which may only
be valid over the data set actually calibrated' (Mogridge 1983, p.S 1).
Nevertheless, various studies have attempted the measurement. Results suggest a
long-term cross elasticity of between -0.6 and -1.5. In general empirical studies find
that around 80% (P,.2 0.8) of demand variation can be explained in terms of income
and price changes (Rhys 1972, p.228). As Rhys notes, other demand factors 'should
be seen in this light'.
These and other findings help explain rising car ownership. But individual firms are
less concerned with total demand, than they are with branded sales. While forecasters
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want to anticipate market change, they also want to develop a competitive pricing and
marketing strategy. Instances of short-term price competition have been rare. 6 But
long-run 'model-price' competition is endemic. If a new car is priced too high, then
sales will be lost to cheaper models in the same class. In 1970, the Hillman Avenger
was pitched into the light medium sector £32 below the Ford Escort, £20 cheaper
than the Vauxhall Viva, and £40 under the BLMC 1300 (Rhys 1972, p. 311). More
recently, the Vauxhall Corsa deliberately undercut its Nova predecessor. But
manufacturers must balance the benefits of market share against profits per unit. As
BMC demonstrated, it is one thing to create a demand, quite another to profit from it:
The Mini was a perfect expression of Leonard Lord's famous dictum, 'If you
build bloody good cars they'll sell themselves'. . . But when it came to pricing
the Mini the corporation made a disastrous error . . . For at £496 in its
cheapest form, it was only £77 more than the archaic Ford Popular and was no
less than £93 cheaper than Dagenham's completely new impeccably costed
105E Anglia, announced at the same time as the Mini (Wood 1988, p.139).
The contrast with Ford is striking. In the words of the American subsidiary's former
director, John Barber:
• . BMC should have said, 'Where do we fit into the market? We've got the
most sophisticated car in the world. We can afford to charge another £100
more than the wretched Ford Runabout' (Wood 1988, p.139).
Barber's words were borne out by his own product planning division. Ford engineers
were told to strip a Mini and analyse its cost - part by part. Their investigation showed
that BMC was loosing approximately £30 per vehicle!
It is clear that there were powerful demand forces driving postwar recovery. Rising
incomes and falling prices put motoring within the reach of many people. When
regional policy initiatives were conceived, the future seemed bright. It was thought
that a growing industry could afford to relocate. However, the 1960s saw an
increasing focus on supply constraints.
6 One notorious example was Rootes' attempt to increase market share in the 1960s.
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§3.5 Supply Factors
Just as demand factors may be analysed through a demand fljnction, so supply factors
can be introduced with a production function. Basic economic principles hold that
output is determined by the combination of capital, labour, land, raw materials, and
technical knowledge. In postwar experience, raw materials acted as a constraint only
in the 1 940s and early 1 970s. Land (except its location) has always been a marginal
issue. It is the other three elements which provide the essential backdrop to Britain's
auto-industrial decline.
The received wisdom on the level and direction of capital expenditure in Britain's
motor industry was outlined by members of the Expenditure Sub-Committee in 1975
(HMSO 1975b, p.39):
• much of the British disadvantage in terms of value added per man was a
result of insufficient investment. A large proportion of the remainder is
attributable to the age of the capital stock. Investment in the British motor
industry has fallen progressively below requirements . . . The Ryder Report
said that whilst the automotive industry replaced most machinery after S to 12
years, more than half of British machines were over 15 years old. It concluded
that this was a dramatic indication of BLMC's serious underprovision for
depreciation. Mr Urwin of Sir Don Ryder's team told us that British Leyland
had the oldest plant of any motor firm in the world . . . At Dagenham, Mr
Murphy told us that most of the equipment was over forty years old. Tool-
makers had to use antiquated equipment, and presses imported from Detroit in
the 1930's were used at Dagenham. . . We believe that inadequate investment
and lower productivity of old plant have been the greatest contributors to the
poor profitability of the mass-production car side of the industry [emphasis as
in original].
This analysis relied on anecdotal evidence and a perceived statistical relationship
between fixed assets and productivity. Studies completed in the early 1970s (HMSO
1975b, p.36) suggested a causal link between value added per man (Y1) and fixed






T Statistic	 (1.07)	 (4.79)
R2 0.657
Of the five least capitalised firms in 1975, four were British, while the top six included
the American giants and their German counterparts. The most efficient UK firm was
Ford, but even this compared poorly with its international rivals. To many, the low
level of investment was indicative of management failure and labour intransigence. It
has been suggested that labour failed to accommodate itself to factory life, while
management proved unable to cope with manufacturing change. Lewchuk (1985,
1986) offers an alternative theory, based on the unique institutional development of
British car firms.
He argues that profit maximising behaviour in the interwar period created a series of
institutional constraints which inhibited investment and long term growth. The British
strategy was one of weak managerial control, low wages, low capital-output ratios,
low levels of machine integration and piecework payments systems. This strategy
allowed a relatively unproductive technology to generate high levels of return on
invested capital. As the system developed, a uniquely ¶British' institutional framework
emerged which was inconsistent with fordist methods. Bosses only addressed the
problem in the 1 960s, when a technological lag had already developed. British firms
then proved unable to manage the change to fordist technology, with dire
consequences.
Whatever the merits of Lewchuk's case, it does address the fundamental issue of
Britain's peculiar capital structure. Whereas our competitors invested heavily in new
machinery, British firms did not. This may be evidence of institutional problems, but it
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may also reflect short-termism. For our immediate purposes, it is enough to identif'
three phases of investment activity in postwar Britain.
The first and smallest occurred between 1950 and 1953 (Rhys 1972, p.368). Firms
were attempting to meet pent-up wartime demand and the government's export
targets. Expansion was based around existing locations, although the use of 'shadow
factories' produced some regional expansion. Between 1954 and 1958 there was a
period of more substantial activity. BMC expanded and re-equipped Longbridge,
Vauxhall did the same at Luton and Dunstable, as did Ford at Dagenham and
Woolwich Arsenal. Together these plans envisaged an extra 10,000 jobs, sited within
traditional car making areas.
The third wave occurred between 1960 and 1963, bringing total capacity up to
2,400,000 vehicles per year. This expansion was governed by government direction
and financial inducements. In 1960, Ford moved its commercial vehicle production to
a new plant near Slough; BMC moved truck production to Scotland; Ford, Vauxhall
and Standard brought their Merseyside plants into operation, and from 1963 Rover
operated a plant in Cardiff
These phases provide the focus for this study. In the 1940s and 1950s the Board of
Trade proved unwilling to use its location controls. In 1954 officials noted (PRO
1954c), 'Can we, or should we pit our amateur judgements about the effects of given
locations on costs against companies prepared to back their investments to the tune of
£25 to £30 million?' Only five years later, IDCs were systematically employed against
the motor firms.
Poor industrial relations have been characterised as the 'other' supply constraint
restricting British car production. The basis for this claim is that strikes and other
disputes have disrupted output, reduced investment and raised unit costs. Certainly,
the number of strikes rose in postwar Britain (Table 3.6), but it is difficult to isolate
specific causes or effects.
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TABLE 3.6
STRIKE ACTIVITY [N MOTOR MANUFACTURiNG, 1949-73









Source: Marsdon et a! (1985, p.12!)
Turner eta! (1967) analysed the period up to 1964. They blamed cyclical and seasonal
employment variations, together with high but unstable incomes for the increase. They
found that lost days tended to rise during recession, and that negotiators on both sides
'saw strike activity as a means of reducing output to avoid lay-offs' (Marsdon et a!
1985, p.121). The authors also echo Lewchuk's premise, suggesting that obsolescent
institutions aggravated industrial problems. Durcan et a! (1983) studied the years
from 1964-1973. They explained labour unrest through the hardening of product
markets and a long term loss of international competitiveness. Marsdon et a! (1985)
brought this work into the 1 980s. They identified two distinct periods of conflict: the
first (1977-79) focusing on pay, the second (1980-83) centring on effort levels and
working arrangements in modernised plants.
These studies explain the subject of disagreement, but not the cause. Disputes would
not have been possible without high-handed managers, militant unions and mutual
distrust. As the Expenditure Sub-Committee argued, 'While the causes of disputes
may be many, efficient and fast communications will minimise their impact' (HMSO
1 975b).
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Whatever their cause, strikes have always been used as a management alibi. The
employers' federation, the SMMT, outlined the traditional case in 1975, seeking to
deflect blame for the industry's plight:
The high level of industrial disputes in the motor industry has inevitably led to
losses of production that have not been made up. . . II is estimated that in
1973 the production of some 430,000 cars was lost due to industrial disputes
and that in 1974 this total was exceeded by 17%, to give total car losses of
540,000 units, of which 200,000 units were lost because of the miners' dispute
and the related three day working . . . Such losses of production for an
industry that had been forced to cut back its investment over many years,
caused severe supply shortages of British vehicles, particularly in 1972 and
1973. The shortages contributed to higher imports and lower exports than
could otherwise have been achieved. (HrvISO 1975b, p.379)
These arguments are important because of labour's regional dimension. Part of the
attraction of Development Districts was the lower wage costs. The congested West
Midlands offered the right infrastructure, but in an inflationary setting. Migrant firms
could benefit from lower regional wages, so long as other operating costs were
controlled. But if worker militancy was a concomitant of regional expansion, there is
an implied link between regional policy and industrial decline. Again, quoting from the
SMMT, 'Government restrictions of expansion in existing locations forced vehicle
makers to move from their traditional locations to areas where the labour force was
unused to the mass production techniques used in the motor industry. . . Higher costs
and labour problems have led to inefficient operations and this has undoubtedly had
major implications to the industry's competitiveness' (HMSO 1975b, p.382). These
issues will be explored in much greater detail in Chapter 8.
The final element of the supply equation comes under the heading of technical change.
This may be more appropriately labelled organisational change, since developments
relate to working practice rather than mechanical innovation. As far as the British
postwar motor industry is concerned, technical change traces the development of
fordist structures and the subsequent adoption of lean production techniques and a
1w/zen philosophy.
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Early cars were built by tradesmen. Because they possessed essential skills, workers
determined the pace of production and factory conditions. But this balance of power
was overturned by Ford's assembly lines. Before Ford, one skilled mechanic, plus a
few helpers, would construct an entire engine by hand. At Highland Park, engines
would be made by hundreds of unskilled workers, each performing specialist tasks.
'One would ream bearings, one every seven seconds, all day long; and the next would
put bearings on camshafts, one every 14 seconds, all day long' (Rubenstein 1992, p.
27). Frederick Taylor was the guru behind these moves, inspiring Ford to divide
factory operations into hundreds of discrete activities. Henry Ford boasted that by the
early 1920s, 85% of his employees could learn their jobs in two weeks, 43% in one
day' (Rubenstein 1992). These methods have been characterised as 'a relentless search
for productivity through de-skilling' (McKinlay and Starkey 1994).
In Britain, fordism was first imported through the Old Trafford plant in Manchester.
Though Ford cars had been sold in Britain since 1903, they came boxed, complete and
paid for COD. (Richardson 1977, p.67) At first the Trafford Park plant was an
assembly depot, but it was soon transformed into an impressive production facility.
The irresistible logic of fordism dictated that economies of scale should be exploited
to the full. In 1924, Ford acquired the 307 acre Dagenham site to do just this. With a
planned production capacity of 200,000 units per annum, it became the biggest
vehicle plant outside the United States. It provided 6,000 jobs when it opened in
1931, and over 12,000 by 1939 (Friedman and Meredeen 1980, p.22).
Fordism became the ruling idiom of motor manufacture. Scientific management raised
scale economies throughout the interwar period. But British manufacturers could
never match Ford America. The British market was both too small and too
fragmented to allow the full adoption of fordism (Bowden 1991, Bowden & Turner
1993). Import barriers protected home producers from overseas competition, and
mass producers like Morris and Austin returned acceptable profits, despite their size
and pay structures (Lewchuk 1986).
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In the postwar period, British manufacturers could no longer ignore fordist logic.
With the ending of boom conditions in the early 1950s, the British faced tariff
reductions and an invasion of foreign marques. Competition became increasingly
based around both cost and quality. Whereas competitors like Volkswagen had
eagerly embraced a fordist strategy (Bloonifleld 1972), British firms faced a
transformation crisis. Mergers, model rationalisation and pay disputes evidenced a
switch from traditional manufacturing techniques towards an American outlook.
This is important because regional expansion was conceived during the upheaval.
Halewood, Ellesmere Port and Linwood were all planned as integrated manufacturing
bases, borrowing best practice technology from around the world. Operating
problems could have been caused by either regional problems, or the switch in
manufacturing ideology. In either case, management faced a profound organisational
challenge.
Fordism did not survive into the 1990s. Instead, the Japanese system of 'lean
production' has become the ideal (McKinlay and Starkey 1994, p.191). Lean
Production refers to a participative labour structure, 'Just in Time' production,
compressed product development, and flexible work rules (Roos et a! 1990). It is an
integrated manufacturing process, spanning all levels of organisation (including its
supplier network) in pursuit of a rapid response to demand. 'It is this novel
combination of simultaneous gains in efficiency, innovation and quality which has
exposed the weakness of Western manufacturers' reliance on strategies which define
scale economies and product variability, cost and differentiation as irreconcilable
alternatives' (McKinlay and Starkey 1994, p.191).
The success of Japanese manufacturers has forced British firms along similar lines.
Ford UK introduced its 'After Japan' (AJ) strategy in the 1980s, whilst Rover sought
partnership with Honda. This produced the second major manufacturing switch since
World War Two. It resulted in a new wave of closures and strikes, as plants were
redesigned along Japanese patterns.
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§3.6 Conclusion
From this discussion, it seems that the British car industry has been in constant
turmoil. Early pioneers fell by the wayside, to be replaced by men of vision like Austin
and Morris. The interwar years introduced the 'Big Six' to market domination. Tariffs
and the tax strncture allowed these firms to establish a stranglehold, and they looked
well placed to prosper in postwar Europe. But the insularity of British manufacturing
would elicit a heavy price. Domestic stagnation and the lifting of trade restrictions
forced firms into defensive mergers. The adoption of fordist methods became an
imperative rather than an ideal. The ensuing transformation crisis showed that British
firms lacked the organisational flair to respond to their competitive environment. By
contributing to a climate of uncertainty, both government and labour added to the
industry's problems. Lean production and Japanese investment provided an escape,
but not before thousands ofjobs had been lost.
This is the industrial context of our regional policy case studies. If the motor firms
faced regional problems, they also confronted wider organisational challenges. The





4 Labour's Regional Policy 1945-51: a Question of
Efficiency
§4.1 Introduction
If it can be assumed that the industrialist himself has made ajust appreciation
of economic advantages of different sites open to him, it must be supposed
that manufacture on an alternative site which he has not chosen will in
general be commercially less efficient. Any decrease in efficiency in an
industry must at all times have disadvantages for the industry itself. . . and
thus upon the whole economy of the country.
Board of Trade Evidence, Barlow Commission 1937.
Despite these misgivings, the Board of Trade found itself in nominal command of
industrial location in Britain until 1964. This chapter examines the wartime
planning and postwar administration of regional policy. The aim is to investigate
how a coercive distribution of industry programme was reconciled with concepts
of entrepreneurial freedom, private industrial costs and market based economic
solutions.
While there has been much recent interest in economic performance and policy
constraints under Attlee, this has been dominated by macroeconomic issues and
the debate over Keynesian demand management. The recent controversy over
industrial efficiency has done little to address this gap, becoming polarised
between the Broadberry/Crafis (1996) focus on possible negative long run
microeconomic consequences of Labour's macroeconomic platfonn, and the
Tiratsoo/Tomlinson (1993) view that Labour's policies were responsible for
strong productivity growth in the late 1940s. In both cases regional instruments
have been mainly ignored, reflecting a situation where 'whole areas of government
activity have tended to remain unexamined, largely imagined rather than
established' (Tiratsoo & Tomlinson 1993, p.19).
Existing work by McCallum (1979), Parsons (1986), Heim (1987a, 1987b) and
others suggests that the Labour government pursued a forceful mix of building
controls and material rationing in an effort to steer industry to depressed areas.
This chapter builds on Rosevear (1998), and argues that the extent and radicalism
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of postwar regional policy has been exaggerated, and that there was substantial
continuity in approach under Labour. This consistency was the result of wartime
negotiations which granted a discretionary regional policy portfolio to the Board
of Trade.
Despite the efforts of critics such as Douglas Jay, the Board's understanding of
regional policy reflected market based rather than interventionist thinking.
Departmental philosophy centred on competition and productivity issues, and
betrayed a limited conception of externalities. This approach contrasted with other
departments, where notions of 'efficiency' embodied wider economic and social
domains. Wartime negotiations and macroeconomic constraints ensured that the
Board's thinking dominated the regional policy machinery. As a result, businesses
were able to circumvent location controls by appealing to narrow 'efficiency'
arguments. This bias was intensified because the Board lacked the economic
education to challenge such claims. If firms were to be dispersed without
compromising 'efficiency', the Board needed to understand the implications of
industrial relocation. Instead, officials and ministers became involved in a
bargaining process where they were unable to counter manufacturers' assertions.
Frustration eventually led to a government sponsored academic study (the Clay
Committee), but it reported too late to affect regional policy in the 1 940s.
The chapter begins by re-evaluating the regional policy debate within the wartime
coalition. There follows a case by case study of important location decisions,
before the focus shifts to informational problems and the role of financial
incentives. The analysis ends with an outline of policy developments during the
early years of the Korean War.
§4.2 Reviewing Policy
The best treatments of regional policy planning under the wartime coalition remain
in Booth and Parsons. Both maintain that war conditioned officials and politicians
to the possibilities of a strong distribution policy.' According to Parsons (1986, pp
46-57), the Defence Regulations of 1941 provided a bridge between the Barlow
Commission's recommendations and the successftil peacetime application of
'See also Loebl (1988) and McCalluin (1979).
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industrial steering. Booth (1982, pp 16-17) argued that wartime planning proved
more than a passive accelerator, breaking the Board's faith in market solutions.
In its final report the Barlow Commission had rounded on two themes, a belief
that large conurbations were undesirable, and explicit acceptance of government
control as a means of securing a 'satisfactory distribution of industry,' although
this term was never defined. As the opening quotation suggests, the true home of
free market orthodoxy in the 1930s may not have been the Treasury, but the
Board of Trade. War did provide a discontinuity, but only because it allowed the
concept of efficiency to be debated within a regional policy context.
The Board of Trade's concept of 'efficiency' reflected its interwar brief as a
custodian of industry. Following a departmental inquiry in 1918, the Board had
formed an Industries and Manufactures department to oversee the 'development
and stability, production, and economic strength' of British manufacturing
(Foreman 1986, p. 94). This marked a new departure for the organisation, which
had traditionally been concerned with elements of commercial policy, trade
statistics and company law. 2 Industries and Manufactures underwrote reports on
overseas markets, industrial relations and the textile and metal industries, helping
to frame the ill-fated Cotton Industry Reorganisation Act of 1939. But these were
consultative rather than regulatory duties, and they reflected the words of Lord
Ashfield, the Board's first interwar president, 'The great task of assisting in the
restoration of our trade and industries after the war, which will largely fall on the
Board of Trade, depends for its success on the closest co-operation with the
business community' (Foreman 1986, p.94).
While it is clear that the Board's officials came to accept the general principle of
intervention, there are reasons to believe that these historic links with business
conditioned policy administration. Yet it was precisely these links that allowed the
Board of Trade to placate a sceptical cabinet, and secure the regional policy
portfolio from the Ministry of Labour.
The evidence for this view is quite straightforward. It is clear that the impetus for
change can be traced to the appointment of former LSE economist Hugh Dalton
2 Smith (1928) outlines the Board's pre 1914 duties.
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as President of the Board of Trade and the establishment of the Reconstruction
Department in 1942 (Pimlott 1985, pp. 392-407). By this time the Board had
already assumed control of industrial location through its Factory Space and
Storage Premises division (Meynell 1988, p 205). Nevertheless, it was not until
1943 that Dalton's views could be articulated within the Cabinet's reconstruction
machinery. The surviving papers from relevant committees clearly identif'
efficiency as the key operational concern. 3 Memoranda and minutes relating to
distribution are dominated by the efficiency question, and Dalton is continually
forced to field questions from both sides of the ideological divide. 4 On the one
hand, the Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Town and Country Planning
favoured a proactive policy, promoting the notion of 'community efficiency' over
private interest; while on the other, the production ministries, Economic Section,
Treasury and Ministry of Supply derided any attempt to impose 'unjustifiable
disadvantages' on industrialists. 5
 The opposition to distribution of industry policy
was founded on deep seated ideological convictions, but it was the Board of
Trade's emphasis on private costs which marked the department as a champion of
the market optimists.
The Barlow Report itself had called for both decentralisation and dispersal
(HtvISO 1940, pp. 197-98). Explicit within this view was a focus on the social and
economic externalities of industrial concentration. But in both the final
recommendations and dissenting memoranda, a clear distinction had been made
between the national position and private industrial interests. As a whole, the
Commission was in sympathy with notions of community efficiency. This was the
view promoted by the Ministries of Labour and Town and Country Planning. But
the report also included commitments to safeguard 'the conditions of successftil
industrial growth'. This reflected the Board of Trade's more traditional view of
The relevant committees include the Committee of Reconstruction Priorities, Reconstruction
Committee, Distribution of lndustiy Committee and Lord Presidents Committee. For details see
Allord et al (1992), pp. 26-29.
For representative memoranda see: PRO (1944c, 1944d, 1943g, 1943d, 1943e). Minutes of the
key meeting to articulate these fears can be found in PRO (1944b).
The term 'unjustifiable disadvantages' may be found in PRO (1943e). It continues, 'In general,
a policy of banning would penalise the efficient and enterprising, and if effective would involve
those sections of industiy which can make the greatest contribution to the general economic well-
being'. The term 'coirnnunity efficiency' is promoted in PRO (1943d).
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externalities, with an inherent focus on competitiveness and market based
solutions.
Discussions within the wartime coalition focused on this distinction. The fact that
Dalton secured acceptance for his distribution policy cannot be separated from
these administrative rivalries, or the battle for the regional policy portfolio.
Doctrinaire opposition from the right had to be squared with a widespread
realisation that something had to be seen to be done. 6 Board of Trade stewardship
offered a compromise with which the right could live, and the left could survive.7
This compromise was based on the historical links between business and the Board
of Trade. As Lord Woolton made clear in April 1944'... it should be recognised
that it [the Board of Trade} approaches the question of location of industry from a
special angle. Indeed, it must continue to do so if it is to carry its responsibilities
effectively' (PRO 1944d). The 'special angle' revolved around private industrial
interests and the maintenance of competitiveness.
Many departments were unhappy with this compromise. The Ministry of Labour in
particular never quite came to terms with the arrangements (PRO 1 954q). The
question of overall responsibility for distribution policy had split the Barlow
Commission, and was to provide a wedge between the Ministry of Labour and
Board of Trade until the mid 1950s. Lord Woolton's decision to favour the Board
of Trade had been defended by the need to provide a single contact for business
(PRO 1943-44h). However, the Board was to enjoy a status somewhat above
primus inter pares (Table 4.1). Given Woolton's reservations about any form of
distribution policy, there seems little doubt that safe-guarding efficiency was a key
concern.8
6 Fears of postwar regional unemployment were noted by wartime officials; ' . . . all the classes
in the North East, and especially the working classes, are obsessed with the fear that the
Government are not making effective plans to avoid the North East coast becoming a depressed
area when the war and its immediate allermath of productive activity are over' (PRO 1943a).
Middleton (1985) argues that these fears were deeply embedded, identit'ing 'metropolitan
prejudices' and 'deficient expertise' as constraining forces in the interwar period.
The alternatives were for an Industrial Commission or the Ministry of Labour or the Ministry
of Town and Country Planning to administer the new location policy.
8 Woolton went on to explain'.. . it is sometimes suggested that the Govermnent by one method
or another should control the actual location of all new factories. Apart from its obvious political
difficulty, such a degree of state control would, in our opinion, react most unlavourably on
initiative and efficiency. . . It would also tend to involve the Government in a wholly undesirable
responsibility for the success of particular undertakings which, if they were unsuccessful, would
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TABLE 4.1
THE BOARD OF TRADE'S POSTWAR POLICY PORTFOLIO
Functions of Board of Trade under Chapter 3 of the White Paper on Employment Policy:
• General co-ordination of industrial policy (para 30)
• Assisting basic industries towards efficiency and exports (para 24)
• Dealing with applications for the establishment of new factories and for transfer of
existing factories (para 26)
• Dealing with applications for industrial building licences (para 26b)
• Disposal of government factories (para 26b)
• Erection of government factories and trading estates in Development Areas (para
26d)
• Dealing with applications for financial assistance for new enterprises in
development areas (para 26f)
• Development of basic services in Development Areas (para 27)
• Organisation of research to determine suitable industries for Development Areas
(pam 27)
• Delimitation from time to time of Development Areas (para 28)
Other new Board of Trade Functions:
• Sifting information on restrictive practices
• Study of regulating hire purchase transactions according to the state of trade
• Dealing with applications for facilities to prepare for postwar trade by assisting
factory scale testing of new inventions
• Oversight of proposed Industrial Design Council
• Arrangements for proposed Industrial Development Boards
• Control of civilian production while resources continue to be scarce, involving
dealing with applications for materials and manufacturing licences
Source: PRO (1944e)
The undertakings given by the Board of Trade and the subsequent record of
achievement qualifies Barnett's notion of New Jerusalem triumphant. 9 The debate
over industrial efficiency witnessed the triumph of a distribution policy based on
entrepreneurial freedom and the interests of individual manufacturers. In no sense
claim that their failure was due to the Government having forced them to set up in bad location'
(PRO, 1944c).
Barnett (1995, p.340) bases his discussion on a perverse interpretation of this evidence. Taking
five cases, GEC, Ford, Vauxhall, Champion Spark Plugs and De Havilland, he recognises that
'productive efficiency triumphed over the social aims of regional policy'. Yet Barnett (1995,
p.3&3) concludes that 'regional policy's real concern lay not [emphasis addedj with productive
efficiency, which it served to hinder, but with jobs. . .' Further, he identifies delay and
prevarication as constraints on entrepreneurial activity. But Chick (1992, p.77) has demonstrated
that excess demand for private investment persisted beyond 1947, and that resources were often
spread too widely to enable project completion. In this context, administrative delay cannot be
characterised as an additional constraint.
89
was 'social rescue' placed above competition or productivity issues. 1° The
immediate postwar need for output strengthened this trend. From 1945 to 1951,
Labour administrations struggled to balance their limited commitment to regional
policy with many other pressing macroeconomic goals.
§4.3 Applying Policy (1) 1945-49
As we have seen in Chapter 2, there were four regional policy tools available to
the government in 1945, financial inducements, advance factories, discriminatory
government contracts and location controls. The Distribution of Industry Act
(1945) had given Cripps the legal foundation for an energetic directional policy."
The usual portrayal of this period is in keeping with Barnett's interpretation.
Taking new industrial buildings as an index, one can see that the Development
Areas received over 50% of new building investment in 1945-47, though having
only 20% of the population (Table 4.2). This has been viewed as an indication of
the effectiveness and strength of Labour's regional policy commitment. However,
this notion is flawed.
'°Barnett (1995, pp. 252). Compare with PRO (1946k).
" The Act replaced earlier legislation and defined slightly enlarged Development Areas. The
Board of Trade retained its wartime role and was granted significant new powers. These
included:
1. The right to build factories in the Development Areas, buying land by compulsory
purchase if necessary.
2. The right to make loans to industrial (trading) estate companies.
3. The right to make provision for basic public services.
4. The right to reclaim derelict land.
5. The right to give grants or loans to assist specific industrial undertakings on the advice of the
Development Areas Treasury Advisory Committee (DATAC).
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TABLE 4.2
POST WAR BUILDING IN TIlE DEVELOPMENT AREAS
Million Sq. Ft of	 Development Areas as % Insured Population of DAs
Industrial Building	 of All GB Industrial 	 as a % of GB
Building
	
1945-47	 15.7	 51.1	 19.9
	
1948-50	 7.5	 17.2	 18.3
	
1951-53	 8.1	 21.7	 18.2
	
1954	 12.8	 18.1	 18.1
Source: McCrone (1969, p.112).
First, there is the general point that initial successes were based on persuasion
rather than coercion. It was during these years that the Board's 'Information
Room' first began providing businessmen and officials with new perspectives on
industrial location.' 2 Official papers from the time make clear an institutional
preference for communication (PRO 1946k). This is hardly surprising given the
background of the controllers responsible for the policy and their laissez faire
sympathies. The emphasis on informational failure also shows the extent to which
the Board internalised efficiency questions. There was little sense of the
externalities involved in site selection or any possible wider economic or social
issues.
The second qualification centres on the origins of the permit system. Building
licences had been introduced to manage scarce resources; it was only in 1943 that
a regional component had been proposed (Meynell 1959, p.15). The idea was to
speed reconstruction by linking location with the right to build. Arguably, this
equated distribution of industry policy with a form of rationing. While Cripps
firmly believed in Labour's regional commitment, location decisions point to
resource management rather than ideological fervour.
The statistics for industrial building in the late 1 940s and early 1 950s support the
view that the geographical pattern of material and labour shortages helped to
determine the distribution of new building. There were marked regional differences
in the time elapsing between official approval and the start of construction (Board
12 For a retrospective view of the Information Room's success see PRO (1957a).
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of Trade 1955, p.425). Nationally, 42% of all approvals from 1945-53 were
started within six months. The corresponding regional figures were 26% in
London and the South East, 37% in the Midlands and East, and 38% in the North
West. In Scotland, Wales and the North more than half of all approvals began
within the same period. This implies a closer match between resource availability
and building programmes in the outer regions than existed in either the Midlands
or the South East.
Resource availability centred on three questions, labour, housing and material
supplies. The shortage of building labour in Coventry and the South East certainly
hindered public works and factory construction (PRO 195 ii). Skilled and non-
skilled manufacturing labour was also at a premium in many towns. Housing
shortages were regionally variable, being dependant on both the supply of homes
and the demand from displaced workers.' 3 This was particularly acute in Greater
London and the Midlands, where bomb damage and economic growth combined
to create a housing bottleneck (PRO 1 949b). The shortage of steel also coloured
attitudes towards industrial expansion, and forced the government into a highly
discretionary allocation programme.
Although projects under 5,000 sq. ft avoided direct location controls, material,
labour and housing allocations to large industrial projects channelled resources
away from minor schemes. This helps explain the rising tide of businesses who
actively sought relocation during 1945-8. By default, sites in the South and the
Midlands were rationed to the government's perceived highest value use. Large
scale engineering expansions acquired government sanction and resources, the
heterogeneous mass of smaller projects competing on the domestic front faced
cancellation, delay or relocation. In many cases, relocation was the preferred
option, aided by government financed building projects which provided 9.4 million
square feet of industrial space by September 1949 (Scott 1996, table 1). This
conclusion is supported by Luttrell's (1962) study on the costs of industrial
location, which found that of a sample of 93 firms which chose Development Area
sites from 1945-52, 84 listed labour shortage or inadequate premises as the
13 For a discussion of Coventry's position, see Richardson (1972, p. 224). A general survey is
provided in Holrnans (1987, pp. 9 1-166).
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impetus for movement. These claims can be substantiated by referring to key
building cases.
The motor industry provides an ideal reference point for this exercise. In terms of
'efficiency', Labour promoted the sector as the key export earner of the late
1 940s. In terms of compliance, the industry had been unusually close to Whitehall
throughout the war (Morewood 1990). In terms of constraints, there was an
acknowledged need to expand and provide new production facilities as soon as
possible. The industry was also important because it demonstrated virulent
hostility towards government plans for decentralisation. While the ferocity of this
opposition may have been unrepresentative of general manufacturing, it serves to
highlight the ftindamental conflict between government and business created by
regional policy. Surprisingly, this conflict has received scant attention from
historians, warranting little more than footnotes in many industry and business
histories.' 4 This is regrettable, since a close examination shows how officials
consistently placed current production above distribution policy, and how
politicians ultimately abandoned the principle of coercion.
The first example is that of Jaguar, who submitted an application to upgrade their
Coventry plant in September 1946, and employ an additional 500 workers.' 5 Given
the labour scarcity within Coventry, an even-handed application of Barlow's
principles might have forestalled the project. However, the Board of Trade's
domination of regional policy administration and its officials' emphasis on securing
their own version of 'efficiency' ensured a passive response.
The issues facing government were deceptively straightforward. Coventry was in
an acute state of dislocation. Building labour and materials were in short supply,
raw materials for manufacturing were scarce and skilled labour was at a premium.
The motor industry had already been identified as a potentially 'propulsive'
industry, fonning part of Abercrombie and Matthew's strategic regeneration plan
E.g. Thorns & Donnelly (1985 p. 153); Rhys (1972, p.177) and Foreman-Peck et a! (1995,
p.205).
' 5The plan envisaged the erection of four new bays as well as additional canteen and office
facilities (PRO 1946d).
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for the Clyde Valley (Clyde Valley Regional Planning Comnnttee 1948). But
under the terms of its portfolio, the Board was to examine Jaguar's application as
an 'efficiency' issue. For its part, Jaguar mounted an effective campaign. Its
representations were based on the need to find an economic level of production to
procure export sales. Jaguar's case was argued through its sponsoring department,
the Ministry of Supply, which acted as the company's advocate throughout the
closed hearings. The dispute was channelled through Panel A to the Distribution
of Industry Committee (see Figure 4.1), where wartime debates over 'efficiency'
were rehashed within a new macroeconomic and administrative framework.
FIGURE 4.1
DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRY COMMITTEE STRUCTURE, 1947
Applicant
Regional Office of Sponsoring Department
prepares case on location
Regional Distribution of Industry Panel
C*5 OVER 5.000 .qft j CASES OVER 75.000 .q ft. LBims
Panel 'A' - official	 Distribution of
committee	 Industry Committee
Membership (1947)
Ferns Sec Board of Trade
Ferns Sec Ministry of Supply
Pcrm 5cc Ministry of Labour
Ferns Sec Ministry TCP
Penn Sec Ministry of Transport
Ferns Sec Scottish Office
Athuiralty, prodn depts & MoV
Membership (1947)
Pan Sec Board of Trade
Par! Sec Ministry of Supply
Pan Sec Ministry of Labour
Part Sec Ministry TCP
Pan Sec Ministry of Transport
Par! Sec Ministry of Works
Jt Under Sec of Slate
for Scotland
The minutes of relevant meetings clearly emphasise departmental divisions. While
ministries were not pro or anti-efficiency, their recommendations were based on
their particular conceptions of the issue. Hence the Ministry of Supply and
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production departments internalised the problem, focusing on competitiveness and
cost criteria, while the Ministries of Labour and Town and Country Planning
emphasised the repercussions for Coventry's economy and the potential wider
benefits of Development Area relocation. But outcomes were mediated through an
administrative system which favoured conservatives. Of the three major ministries
with economic briefs, only the Ministry of Labour was prepared to recognise the
wider economic and social costs of industrial location. The Board's refusal to
countenance these ideas created a natural majority in Jaguar's favour.
While the administrative setting was decisive, the macroeconomic environment
also helped determine negotiating posture. Regional policy was neither conceived
nor administered in a vacuum. Although Jaguar's case came before the sterling
crisis, dollar exports were already at a premium. The company succeeded in
characterising its application as a choice between competitive export performance
versus congestion and rising costs. As far as Jaguar was concerned, relocation was
unsuitable for a medium sized engineering firm facing production constraints.
Despite the lack of any quantitative evidence, this view was never seriously
challenged by the Ministry of Supply or Board of Trade. The former flilfilled its
role as advocate, the latter deferred to 'expert testimony'.
This case highlights a crucial point. When distribution of industry policy was
tested at either official or ministerial levels, the benefit of the doubt was habitually
given to the industrialist.' 6 This served to push resources towards the more
favoured industries. These arguments support Tiratsoo's claim that Coventry was
placed in a 'forcing frame' by Development Area concerns (1990, pp. 20-27). On
the one hand, officials and ministers wanted to decentralise footloose industry, on
the other, output losses in strategic sectors could not be tolerated. By allowing in
situ motor industry expansion and restraining competing developments, the
government was 'picking winners'. Space was allocated to strategically important
sectors in the same way that raw materials were channelled into export earning
16 Records show that up to the end of Jan. 1946 Panel A had deliberated on 801 building cases,
of which only 18 (2.2%) had been cancelled or refused (PRO 1946c). Although suimnaly
statistics are unavailable for the remainder of 1946, it is clear that the trend continued. For
example, from Oct. 1946 to Jan. 1947, when the Panel considered over 100 cases, only 2 refusals
were noted (PRO 1947a).
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firms. However, what Tiratsoo fails to appreciate is the crucial role of the
administrative structure and informational asymmetries in this process. The
regional policy machinery had evolved to police wartime agreements. While
officials were not anti-relocation, their 'efficiency' brief and the accompanying
macroeconomic constraints highlighted cost data. In these circumstances, the
government was ill-equipped to challenge business.
At this point, it is worth briefly considering the importance of the shadow factory
programme. Shadow factories were the result of close collaboration between the
Air Ministry and motor manufacturers throughout the late 1930s.' 7 Their aim was
to provide additional manufacturing capacity to meet the RAF's projected wartime
needs. The plants were run on an agency basis by individual motor firms, and were
co-ordinated through a system of managerial committees.
Although there was a commitment to placing rearmament work in the Special
Areas, much of this new capacity was centred in, or close to established
manufacturing areas. Indeed, when the shadow plant programme was extended in
1939, the Air Ministry insisted that new plants should be sited close to existing
facilities (Richardson 1972, p.67). Linkages and interdependence between plants
ensured that Coventry received a major part of this investment (Table 4.3). The
point is that many of these decisions were based on the same criteria as postwar
projects. Despite the danger of bombing, notions of efficiency dominated decision
making. In one celebrated case, a motor manufacturer was able to dictate its terms
to government, despite both parliamentary and public censure.'8
For details see Morewood (1990, Pp. 41-44), Thoins & Donnelly (1985, pp. 114-49), Collins
and Stratton (1993, pp. 50-5 1).
18 The controversy surrounded Rootes' decision to establish the Humber Aero-Engine factoiy in
the Reading area rather than in a 'distressed area'. Rootes warned that if the factory were placed
in either South Wales or Scotland, it would be out of the question for his organisation to nm it
'at such great distances from its nonnal centres of operation.' For a detailed account see
Morewood (1990, pp. 125-132). Eventually the company were persuaded to establish an
additional shadow factory at Speke in Liverpool.
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TABLE 4.3
SHADOW FACTORY EMPLOYMENT iN COVENTRY, AUGUST 1943









Hobson Aero Components Holbrook Lane	 590
Rootes No. 1	 Aldeinoor Lane	 n.a.
Rootes No. 2	 Ryton-on-Dunsmore	 5,528




Source: Richardson (1972, p.69).
The shadow factories provided a base for postwar expansion. One by one, the
motor manufacturers bought the sites on very favourable terms. According to
Morewood (1990, p.43), this option formed part of the original agreement
between owners and ministers. Postwar location decisions reinforced this compact.
They demonstrated that government continued to favour strategically important
firms, despite regional employment worries.
Our second postwar example is that of Ford, Dagenham. This spans two building
cases, illustrating the continuity of policy from 1945 until well after the sterling
crisis. The first application was submitted in 1946 for an extension of 100,000
square feet to house additional manufacturing capacity (PRO 1946e). The
application followed the same route as Jaguar's, although Ford mounted a much
more active campaign. The economic arguments were virtually identical to the
Midlands based firm, concentrating on the need to relieve congestion, secure
lower unit costs and underwrite export sales. Throughout, Ford stressed the
indivisibility of its investment plans, ruling out even partial relocation. Not
surprisingly, departments adopted very familiar bargaining positions, but the case
was distinguished by the Board of Trade's attempt to engage Ford in a process of
negotiated compliance.
Bargaining can secure mutual benefits for government and industry. For the
regulator, dialogue helps to secure intelligence which might be unavailable through
conventional channels. For the firm, discussion makes forced compliance less
likely and provides detailed insights into policy administration. In Ford's case,
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permission to expand was largely unavoidable given the focus on 'efficiency' and
exports. But the Board of Trade tried to impose conditions which would force the
company into a negotiating framework. In the first instance, a ceiling was imposed
on the numbers to be employed at Dagenham. This was set at 14,000, some 6,000
above the Ford target. Secondly, Ford were asked to prepare a study of dispersal
strategies and the costs of relocation. The Board hoped that these provisions
would force Ford into a closer relationship with planners, yielding new intelligence
and placating the Ministries of Labour and Town and Country Planning. For Ford,
the deal promised minimum interference and an opportunity to shape the policy
agenda. While the company's chairman, Sir Patrick Hennessy, was probably aware
that a labour ceiling was unenforceable, he may not have appreciated the Board's
total inability to challenge cost data. This became obvious in 1948.
Two years after the first scheme, Ford applied to expand its Greater London plant
once more (PRO 1948e). This time the scheme was to extend the foundry and to
erect two new manufacturing buildings at Dagenham, while taking over 300,000
sq. ft in a former Hawker factory at Langley. The aim was to provide
manufacturing capacity to support new models in the car, tractor and truck
markets. The company had already exceeded the labour ceiling imposed in 1946,
but nevertheless sought to increase Dagenham's workforce to 17,000. The plan
ran counter to distribution of industry policy, the new towns programme and local
planning regulations. Throughout the application, Ford used its contacts with the
Ministry of Supply and the Board of Trade President to push the government
towards approval. Of crucial importance to this strategy was the cost data which
had been gathered in conjunction with officials from both departments.
The economic case facing the government rested on social and economic
externalities versus quantifiable cost penalties. However, this episode was
distinguished because a portion of Ford's investment could legitimately be
regarded as 'footloose'. Fords' scheme involved increasing tractor production to
60,000 units per year, providing the first real opportunity to relocate a self-
contained motor manufacturing plant to a Development Area. The Board of Trade
hoped that a move would relieve the need for further expansion in London, and
provide up to 5000 new jobs in Scotland or the North West.
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Ford lobbied hard through Panel A to the Distribution of Industry Committee and
the Production Committee. Their offensive was based on a costing exercise which
computed a locational penalty of £22 per vehicle, should a tractor plant be
established in Merseyside. This was based on an output of 60,000 units, producing
annual losses of £1 .3m. These estimates were questioned by the Ministry of
Labour and the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, but officials lacked the
information to successftilly challenge such estimates. When it was suggested that
Ford should be willing to absorb extra costs in the interests of wider social and
economic concerns, the company countered that the 'resulting increased price for
their tractor would have a disastrous effect on overseas demand' (PRO 1948d).
They would only consider relocation if the government was prepared to provide
£1 million towards equipment and an option to buy the new factory at 1939 prices.
Ford admitted that these demands were both 'unreasona'b& and ultra vires under
British legislation.
Ford's manoeuvres adeptly illustrate how the government had become involved in
a bargaining environment where informational asymmetries benefited industrial
interests. Ford produced quantifiable data, which demonstrated an 'efficiency'
loss. They also implied that reftisal would affect dollar earnings and long term
production plans. With a selling price of £250, if Ford only sold 50% of their
tractors overseas, annual currency receipts would total £7.5 million per annum.'9
This was at a time when Ferguson were confidently predicting annual dollar sales
of106 million (MRC 1948). Given these potential penalties and the ascendancy
of the Board of Trade's regional policy paradigm, the company's victory was
almost inevitable. In the end only nominal restrictions were imposed, with
Dagenham's foundry expanding to provide hundreds of new jobs. 2° More
controversially, the company was also granted a very favourable lease on the
Langley site. Much to the disgust of the Scottish Office and Ministry of Labour,
the Development Area option was abandoned. In practice, this meant that Ford
retained the option of future expansion at Dagenham, whilst circumventing the
' 9 Price based on MRC (1946).
20 This was despite planned rises in employment by other motor manufacturing firms in the area,
i.e. Briggs Motors (PRO 1948c).
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Ministry of Town and Country Planning's London decentralisation plan (PRO
1949e). This was a deal that Patrick Hennessy could live with.
The Ford case highlights three points. First, the continued ascendancy of the
Board of Trade's policy criteria. This meant that when regional policy was put to
active discussion, 'efficiency' usually determined the outcome. Secondly, the
record suggests that companies were able to understand the Whitehall machinery
and use its contradictions to further their own agendas. Where the distribution of
industry was concerned, active lobbying clearly paid dividends. It was not a
question of business interests frustrating policy, but of intelligent managers using
the safeguards which had been built into the regional planning machinery. 21 Finally,
it seems that the Board of Trade was handicapped by a legislative framework that
militated against negotiated settlements. Whereas the French system would be
designed to deliver 'package deals', the British system had to consider each
application on its own merits. Given this brief, the results were inevitable.
These views are supported by surviving records at the Federation of British
Industries archive. From March 1945 to 1950, minutes of the Grand Council
betray a rather complacent attitude (MRC 1945-SOb). Although ideologically
opposed to any form of location control, the FBI did not feel that the Board of
Trade's efforts were 'unreasonable' (MRC 1945a). The Presidents Advisory
Committee considered the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act as a blessing in
disguise, reflecting the coalition government's preference for persuasion rather
than coercion. As Sir Peter Barnett noted, 'There would be some advantage in
having a moderate measure on the Statute Books, as it would make it less likely
that a more stringent view would be introduced by a later government' (MRC
1945a).
Even when the IDC was introduced in 1947, there was little opposition in
principle to the new measure. Conflicts centred on information and a perceived
lack of representation within the system. In the former case, businesses wanted a
clearer idea of proscribed areas and the reasons for individual rejections (MRC
1947,1950, and PRO 1949a). In the latter context, attention focused on the
21 On the general theme of institutional capture see Mercer (1995).
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exclusion of businesses from Panel A and the regional boards, together with a lack
of representatives on the Clay Committee. 22 None of these issues constituted
outright opposition. They reflected general satisfaction with a system founded on
the commercial idea of efficiency and the notion of persuasion, rather than control.
This raises wider issues relating to government/industry relations and regional
policy. In particular, the level of economic intelligence and the Board of Trade's
bargaining posture suggest fundamental weaknesses in the system. While the
Board favoured an even-handed application of distribution policy, it proved largely
incapable of mounting challenges to building cases in the South East and
Midlands. Heim' s examination of defence research establishments supports this
view (1987b). Quoting from a Board of Trade memorandum on the siting of the
Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, she highlighted a crucial intelligence
gap (1987b, p.379):
Our attitude to the scheme is not that we object to it at Aldermaston, but
that we want to see it in a Development Area. We can 'I prove to the
Ministry of Supply that this latter course is practical. We must either accept
their view that it isn't or we must refuse to accept it [emphasis added].
The Board was acutely aware of its limitations (PRO 1 947b). The problem arose
because the department's wartime role had precluded the management of
manufacturing industry. The accompanying theoretical gap reflected the late
development of regional economics in Britain. As late as 1949, a Board of Trade
paper could only list nineteen English language items in its bibliography of location
literature (PRO 1949b). Of these, ten were published in or before 1930, five
related explicitly to the United States, and only five dealt with current spatial cost
patterns in Britain (Table 4.4). The list also omitted several important works, and
reflected a general overseas bias in regional economic studies.24
22 On the Clay Conunittee see MRC (1949). On representation in regional boards and Panel A,
the sub-committee decided not to pursue this issue as they feared industrial membership would
lead to a breach of confidentiality between firms; 'an industrial representative might be put in the
invidious position of dealing with a confidential application from a competitor' MRC (1947).
23 Current is defined as post 1930.
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The departmental position reflected deeper problems within the British civil
service. Sir Warren Fisher's 'single service principle' had succeeded in creating
what was later called 'the cult of the generalist'. According to the Fulton Report,
the ideal administrators were too often cultivated as gifted laymen, moving
frequently from job to job, using their practical knowledge of government
procedures to solve problems (Chapman 1988, p.33). The report continued,
'Often they are required to give advice on subjects they do not sufficiently
understand or take decisions whose significance they do not fully grasp'. The
Board of Trade's economic inexperience imitated these failings, imposing a
bureaucratic constraint on policy efficacy.
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For the Board of Trade, neither theory nor experience offered practical guidance.
Officials and ministers had accepted a regional policy portfolio where their
responsibility was to secure a balanced distribution of industry and safeguard
competitiveness. They became involved in a bargaining process where firms
resisted relocation by stressing the additional costs of Development Area sites.
The Board lacked the ability to challenge these claims. 25
 If doubts existed, officials
and ministers were compelled by economic circumstances and their belief in
market based solutions to favour businessmen. Nowhere was this more clearly
illustrated then in the second Ford expansion.
A detailed examination of case papers and policy discussions reveals growing
disquiet over the situation (PRO 1947c, 1949d). In an early recognition of the
intelligence problem, the 1944 Employment White Paper had called for the
government to 'organise research with a view discovering what types of industry
will fit most naturally into the long term economy of each Development Area'
(HMSO 1944, para 27). But it was not until 1946, one year into its new role, that
the Board of Trade began composing a response. On the one hand, the Board
sponsored limited enquiries by regional sub-committees of the distribution of
industry panels into 'day to day' industrial problems in the Development Areas; on
the other, a more fundamental examination of the 'general problems' of regional
economic location was ordered (PRO 1946j). This latter study was entrusted to a
committee chaired by Sir Henry Clay, a professional economist with long
experience as a government advisor. The committee soon became the focus of one
of the most extensive research initiatives of the late 1940s.
The Board of Trade deliberately tried to separate government departments from
the research effort. It was thought that the work would prove exceptionally
onerous, and that the recruitment of additional personnel would exacerbate the
existing public sector skills shortage (PRO 1946j). Interestingly, the committee's
terms of reference were also left vague (PRO 1947c). This was because officials
25 Quoting from a Ministry of Town and Country Planning official, Tiratsoo (1990, p.25)
highlights this point: 'The difficulty is that, although Departments can readily agree on a general
policy to be followed. . . when this policy come to be applied to individual cases there are always
overriding reasons why the policy cannot, at the moment, be applied.. . And those reasons are of
such a character. . . that we as a department can hardly maintain our objections without being
quite unrealistic'.
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were unsure of specific research questions. Part of the body's duties was to
establish these questions, but this broad remit initially led to conflict. In a furious
exchange between an unnamed committee member and Hall of the Board of
Trade, the former complained vigorously that the majority of representatives
'tacitly assumed that Development Area policy was a settled thing, and that the
purpose of the research into industrial location. . . . would be merely to discover
what industries could be best set up in each area and to provide employment for
the people, of whatever sex, age, abilities and training, who might be found there'
(PRO 1948a). But this was the point of the exercise. The Clay Committee was not
designed to be a new Barlow Commission. It was designed to address specific
information gaps. As a result the committee's internal debates proved technical
rather than doctrinaire.
Notwithstanding the conflict surrounding Hall, the committee operated with
surprising unanimity. One of the first studies to be completed was a
methodological survey entitled 'Industrial efficiency and its measurement' (PRO
195 ig). This was intended to provide a common analytical framework for the
investigators' work, The paper championed 'unit cost' as the best spatial
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By the summer of 1949 two projects, both dealing with costs at alternative
locations were underway (PRO 1951 h). One was at the University of Birmingham,
and the other at University College London. By that time, Hopper's Cardiff based
study of the South Wales area was also in preparation. Luttrell's NIESR study
would be by far the most comprehensive, focusing on nationwide cost
comparisons between branch and parent plants (see Figure 4.2). This would
culminate in the publication of Factory Movement and Industrial Location in
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1962. But therein lay the problem. 26 Despite some heroic efforts, the results of the
earlier studies did not become available until 1951/2 (PRO 19520. As a practical,
short term guide for regional policy administration, the Clay Committee failed. By
the time that the evidence was analysed, the Conservatives were in power and
regional policy activism had been abandoned.
§4.4 Applying Policy (2) 1949-51
This raises the important question of what happened in the final years of the Attlee
administration. Traditional interpretations have stressed the importance of the
export constraint in conditioning policy relaxation. In the existing historiography,
1945-47 is seen as a 'policy-on' episode and 1948-51 as a 'policy off' period
(Loasby 1965, McCrone 1969). However, it is wrong to entirely discount the
dollar problem. As Scott (1996) has recently highlighted, the 1947 crisis did mark
a watershed. This was because regional policy expenditure cuts reflected both
economic stringencies and a growing belief that the local unemployment problem
had been conquered. But the nature of the location bargain remained unaltered.
Negotiations continued to centre on competitiveness, although the issues were put
into sharper relief. As the case studies show, the effect was to strengthen existing
trends, rather than create new ones.
An investigation into policy outcomes in 1950 revealed that 83% of all approved
building cases contained a dollar advantage (PRO 1950a). But the proximate
reasons for approval had not significantly changed since 1945. Table 4.5 provides
a summary of 64 firms who applied for building projects in the Southern region
during 1949. Of these, only 14 left Greater London, while the remainder provided
'acceptable' excuses. These ranged from a shortage of key workers (9) to pure
financial loss (1). The very same arguments had been deployed by firms in the
immediate postwar period. The important difference was that external constraints
had become more binding than domestic concerns.
26 Other publications to arise from the project included: Hague and Newman (1952), Picton
(1953), Dunning and Hague (1954).
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TABLE 4.5
FACTORS INFLUENCiNG THE LOCATION OF FIRMS IN THE SOUTHERN
REGION, BOARD OF TRADE SURVEY, SEPT., 1949
Reasons for choice of location: 	 No of Finns
Firm serving only local needs, e.g. food, garages & farm	 26
requisites
Proximity to major markets, other than purely local (e.g. London 	 9
and Midlands)
Encouraged by local authority 	 9
Suitable site available at reasonable price 	 7
Retention of existing labour force 	 4
Quick communication with a separate main works 	 3
Female labour available	 2
Availability of raw materials
	 1
Reasons for rejection of Development Area - advanced by firm
Necessary skilled/key staff would not move 	 9
Impossibility of training labour in time 	 9
Too remote from nwkets and business contacts	 4
Transport costs excessive due to Development Areas being 	 3
on perimeter of England
Duplication of management
	 3
Financial loss (costs of removal, lease too high)	 1
Reasons for rejection of Development Area - advanced by departments
Finn's employment potential too small to influence labour
surplus in Development Area
Reasons for leaving London (14 firms only)
Blitzimoved during the war	 4
Evacuation other than above	 2
New premises or other expansion too expensive 	 8
Lease expired	 3
Notes: Based on a survey of 64 firms who applied for industrial development
approval for projects other than expansion of existing works. The reasons




These arguments suggest a paradox. If regional policy controls remained stable,
how do we account for the falling proportion of industrial building in the
Development Areas from 1948-50? The answer suggested is that open favouritism
for dollar earning firms went hand in hand with separate (often unrelated) changes
in government policies and the economic environment. These included a nation-
wide squeeze on industrial development, cuts in the advance factory budget, a
reduction in the pool of potentially mobile firms and a changing regional pattern of
comparative advantage.
The nationwide restriction in industrial building can be traced directly to the dollar
shortage. Beginning in mid 1948, the government sought to reduce the strain on
builders and the use of raw materials. Particularly important was structural steel, a
key export commodity which remained scarce in both America and Britain (Scott
1996, p.23). At the same time, the sterling crisis forced general spending cuts. The
regional policy budget fell from £12.8 million in 1947/48 (0.1% of GDP), to £11.5
million in 1948/9 (0.09% of GDP), and to £7.1 million in 1949/50 (0.05% of
GDP) (McCrone 1969, p.1 14). As a result, the building of advance factories was
stopped altogether in 1947, and did not start again until the late 1950s.
Regional policy cuts were permitted because the government believed that the
domestic economic situation had changed. Whereas 1945-47 had been marked by
a postwar rush for new premises, from 1948 officials noted a shortfall in
applications (PRO 1949b). Although it was too early to speak of the loss of a
'sellers market', the Board of Trade became convinced that the failure was of an
economic and not of a locational character. There was little general concern
because Development Area unemployment continued to fall. According to Parsons
(1986, p.85) this 'success' was the underlying reason why policy ran down.
Arguably, changing patterns of regional comparative advantage offer the strongest
explanation for building trends. In the immediate postwar, the Development Areas
had provided businesses with an environment relatively free of labour, material and
housing problems. Loebl (1988) noted that the Trading Estates had little difficulty
attracting tenants during these years, since many businesses were happy for any
accommodation they could get away from the congested South. By 1948, many of
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these regional advantages were threatened by sustained development and national
restrictions. In 1949, the Board of Trade in Scotland was complaining vigorously
that 'quite a large number' of migrating firms had been put off by a growing
shortage of women workers (PRO 1949b). In other words, the uniquely
favourable economic circumstances aiding Development Area building from 1945-
47 began to dissipate by 1948-50.
Further evidence is provided by Brown (1972, p.292). He completed a systematic
test of changes in policy stance and the proportion of firms establishing in
Development Areas. By examining the moves in each pair of successive years from
1945-1951, he identified only two periods when there were statistically significant
breaks - 1946-47 and 1949-50. Both were falls in the proportion of firms moving
to peripheral areas. He concluded, 'It is not easy to connect these changes with
acts of specifically regional policy'. This supports Odber's (1965, p.342)
conclusion that 'a combination of circumstances, some of them temporary, made
the Development Areas seem particularly attractive to industrialists in other parts
of the country'.
It is unlikely that we will ever know the precise role or balance of these forces in
conditioning construction patterns. However, there is enough evidence to suggest
that interpretations focusing heavily on coercive regional policy are incomplete.
'Policy-off' was not preceded by 'policy-on'. Moreover, the complexities of the
investment decision and the extent of economic controls suggest a highly
conditional counterfactual. We do not know how investment would have behaved
in the absence of regional initiatives either in 1945-47 or 1948-50. At best we can
provide a well informed hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests a relatively passive
policy effect. This impression is supported by evidence relating to financial
incentives.
During the 1940s, the Board of Trade was highly ambivalent in its attitude
towards incentives. The 1945 Act had made a clear distinction between
commercially viable operations and uneconomic propositions. 27 According to the
rules governing the Development Area Treasury Advisory Committee (DATAC),
27 See PRO (1954n).
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incentives (both loans and grants) could only be entertained when the committee
was satisfied that the project had 'good prospects of ultimate financial success'
(PRO 1954n). As a general rule, applications had to satisfij the committee that
they could not obtain funds from established sources of finance. From 1947 to
1951, an average of 64% of loan applications failed to meet these criteria (Table
4.6).
TABLE 4.6
APPLICATIONS FOR DATAC LOANS, 1945-51

















The Board of Trade was under constant Treasury pressure to limit the extent of
assistance. So much so, that deliberate decisions were later taken not to publicise
the incentive package (PRO 195 Ic). Where payments were made, they were
designed to be of a temporary nature. This was entirely in keeping with the
Board's market based philosophy, and reflected a widely held view that assistance
should target transition rather than operating costs. It was only in 1949 that the
Board of Trade began arguing for an extension of its financial powers to cover the
'once and for all removal expenses' of work transfer (PRO 1949g). The proposed
powers included a contribution to the cost of removing plant, together with labour
training allowances.
There is strong evidence to suggest that the Board was motivated in part by its
unsuccessful attempts to persuade Ford to establish a manufacturing plant on
Merseyside. In addition to the buildings normally provided by the government, the
company had called for equipment worth £1,000,000, and removal expenses of
£50,000 to be met from public funds (PRO 19490. This was not possible under
existing legislation, and the plan received a hostile reception at both official and
ministerial levels. Nevertheless, by September 1949, the Board recognised that 'a
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contribution to the cost of removal might be a real inducement to firms to site new
projects in a Development Area' (PRO 1949g). Equally important was the Board's
acknowledgement that there would be little 'political difficulty in justifying an
amendment under this heading'. Eventually, the new measures were included in
the 1950 Distribution of Industry Act, although they were later emasculated by
Treasury pressure and the incoming Conservative administration.
The record and administration of regional policy incentives confirms several
important points. First, the emphasis on maintaining competitiveness. Even when
the new measures were proposed in 1949, the Board was keen to emphasise that
operational subsidies were excluded. As the Economist noted in April, 1950:
It is by no means clear that these powers will do any good. . . In practice it
seems that the argument of trading advantage will be bound to prevail in
most cases for some time to come, and this tendency could only be defeated
by a quite extravagant use of the money powers under this Bill. No one
supposes that the Government would be so foolish. But, that being so, can
the Bill have much effect?
Second, the record suggests that left-wing radicalism was constrained by the
ideological gap between Labour and the Tories. In the early years of the postwar
administration, agreements reached under the coalition government circumscribed
regional policy initiatives. In later years, policy makers favoured less controversial
legislative instruments which could survive a change of government. This helps
explain why the 1950 Bill was limited in scope.
Finally, the experience highlights the questionable role of the Treasury. In an effort
to control public expenditure, a strict series of financial restrictions were
introduced throughout the late 1940s. Regional policy was not excluded. But from
the very beginning, DATAC had applied stringent tests to its applicants. So long
as the Board of Trade and central government continued to place commercial
efficiency above other criteria, the Treasury's role reinforced existing practises.
This is a point ignored in traditional interpretations, which stress the exclusively




The end of Labour's tenure coincided with the beginning of the Korean War. With
pressure for rearmament and the need to convert civilian factories to military
production, the Board of Trade found itself operating in a completely new regional
policy environment. Generally, the rearmament programme is seen as a turning
point in Britain's postwar development. As Burnham (1995, p. 344) notes,
commentators as politically diverse as Hennessy and Aaoronovich have claimed
that rearmament robbed Britain of an export led recovery. More recently
Cairncross (1985) has argued that the depression of 1952 cannot be blamed on
Britain's efforts alone, but on world rearmament which created a commodity
boom and international raw material shortages.
Whatever the overall position, in regional policy terms the war changed the nature
of government industry relations. It created both an opportunity and a need for
further decentralisation, and in one case at least, allowed the government to put
additional pressure on conservative industrialists. It also illustrated the failures of
the previous five years of regional policy, highlighting local bottlenecks and labour
shortages.
The decision to rearm was taken in August 1950, eventually involving expenditure
of £3,879m between 1950/1 and 1953/4. As one would expect, the effort was
heavily concentrated on the metal goods and engineering industries, constituting
28% of total defence expenditure from 1950/1 to 1952/3.29 The geographical
concentration of mechanical engineering in the South and Midlands created
additional problems for policy makers, as they sought to match available resources
with regional patterns of industrial specialisation.
Given the reluctance to impose location controls and a need for early production,
the best way of matching resources to demand was through the procurement
system. As early as January 1950, Harold Wilson was pressing for open
favouritism for Development Areas in defence contracting. In a scheme originally
suggested by the Ministry of Supply, the Production Committee agreed that
preferred tenders must have a 25% Development Area content (PRO 1953b). If
this condition was not met, competing bids with significant regional content
28 See Odber (1965).
29 Calculated from Burnhain (1995, pp. 348-49).
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enjoyed a 5% price preference. This was an attempt both to increase regional
employment and reduce overheating. A far as the motor industry was concerned,
the dominant issue became overheating.
In Coventry, the initial symptoms of overheating were a scramble for labour and a
shortage of steel, but from early 1951, the situation deteriorated with small firms
unable to compete in the resources auction (Tiratsoo 1990, p.26). The inevitable
result was a city-wide increase in short time working. By August 1951, a Board of
Trade Working Party had concluded that, '. . . the only practicable solution to the
problem is the transfer of substantial blocks of work from Coventry to other areas'
(PRO 1951b). This policy was first applied in the case of Standard Motors.
In 1950, Standard were approached by the Ministry of Supply in connection with a
contract to supply the RAF with 650 Avon Jet Engines for the rearmament
programme (PRO 1951a; MRC 1951-56a, 1951-56c). For Standard, a company
heavily involved in Second World War aircraft production, the proposition made
good economic sense. The firm would enjoy 'super-priority' in materials supplies
and be locked into a cost-plus pricing deal which would guarantee 7.5% return on
capital employed, equal to a profit of £250,000 on the first 100 engines alone
(MRC 1951 d). For the Ministry of Supply, the work would demonstrate that
'British gas turbines could be produced, when needed, by able automobile firms
and that such engines would be to the standard required' (MRC 1955a).
Under Board of Trade guidance, Standard proposed to free space at its
Fletchamstead factory by centralising some activities at a new plant in Merseyside.
The rationale was to provide a self-contained machine shop responsible for the
manufacture of car and tractor spare parts (MRC 1951b). The plan envisaged a
workforce of 1,200-1,500, and was welcomed by the government as a 'precedent
which might enable departments to persuade more motor manufacturing concerns
to set up branch units in Development Areas' (PRO 1951 a).
This plan marked one of the few motor industry regional policy successes of 1945-
51. This was because it saw the concomitance of a financially viable programme
which was in the interests of both the firm and regional employment. It was a
special situation. As Burnham has demonstrated (1995, pp. 35 1-55), in less
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fraught conditions and under a different administration, companies were able to
manipulate the Korean crisis to win location concessions. As it was, Standard's
Liverpool plant was never completed. Throughout 1951-53 the engine order was
progressively cut to just two hundred and fifty units (MIRC 1954). The incoming
Conservative administration accepted the Merseyside plant's cancellation, and
Standard retreated to its Coventry base.
The Standard deal provides a fitting footnote to regional policy experience under
Attlee. It demonstrates that the will for an active distribution of industry policy
existed, but was constrained by the macroeconomic environment and notions of
commercial viability. In Standard's case, the Korean War changed the balance of
the location bargain. For the first time, the firm's interests coincided with political
will and employment concerns. With a lucrative government contract, Coventry's
predicament provided Standard with an incentive for relocation. Changing
economic and political circumstances ensured that this success was not secured.
§4.6 Conclusion
In January 1944, the Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade wrote, 'the
implication of the location policy is that it is worth incurring some economic loss
to prevent the concentration of unemployment in certain regions' (PRO 1946i).
This chapter has demonstrated that at the Board of Trade this idea was not wholly
accepted. This is not to say that officials and ministers rejected distribution of
industry policy, but that they kept notions of efficiency and market based solutions
at the forefront of their minds.
In many respects, the relationship between civil servants and politicians was co-
operative rather than confrontational. Dalton had used the Board of Trade's
reputation to secure a regional policy commitment from the wartime coalition.
This imposed constraints on postwar administration which Labour were happy to
accept. The only policy 'failure' related to informational problems, and the limited
bargaining power they created. These failings were linked directly to the
amateurish nature of the pre-Fulton civil service. Throughout the 1 940s,
bureaucrats acquired new responsibilities for which they lacked economic
knowledge. Board of Trade officials struggled to develop the understanding and
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analytical tools needed to successfully challenge industrialists. The result was that
regional policy became dominated by 'do-it-yourself economics'. 30
 In the words of
Peden (1996, p. 178), 'an amalgam of inherited ideas based on departmental
tradition, the interests of departmental clients and mercantalist attitudes' dictated
policy responses.
Traditional interpretations of distribution of industry policy have stressed the
importance of export constraints and domestic economic circumstances in
conditioning policy. In this scheme, the crisis of 1947 is said to divide a 'policy-
on' episode (1945-47) from a 'policy-off period. The evidence suggests that
'policy-on' was a myth. Economic constraints did affect regional policy, but the
constant stress on commercial efficiency and market based solutions was more
important. Inexperience and a lack of economic intelligence constrained Labour's
ambitions. By the time that these shortcomings were addressed, economic
conditions in the congested areas had eased, and the Conservatives were in power.
The regional policy window had closed.
This suggests that active regional policy in postwar Britain would have required
the concomitance of three factors - political will, a conducive macroeconomic
background (to provide a pool of footloose industry) and effective economic
intelligence on spatial cost patterns. Only with this third factor could the state
effectively challenge industry to relocate. As we shall see, it was not until 1959
that these forces finally combined.
30 A phrase borrowed from Henderson (1986)
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5 Conservative Regional Policy 1951-58: a
Question of Ideology
§5.1 Introduction
It must be sometimes difficult for the Conservatives, Liberals and Socialists
to agree about postwar legislation. In Town and Country Planning the
Socialist and Liberals will wish to extend State interference with private
trade and property much further than the Conservatives will think necessary
or desirable. Many Conservatives hold that State planning can easily be
carried to a point where it will impede development and impair freedom
without improving anything.
Lord Selbourne, Minister of Economic Warfare, June 1944 (PRO 1944a).
The 1951 general election heralded a change of government and a change of
direction in British politics. It is now widely accepted that the illusion of
Butskellism hid a wide range of philosophical differences between the major
parties (Rollings 1994). The historiography suggests that Conservative control led
to the emasculation of regional policy from 195 1-58. This chapter reconsiders the
period from a civil service perspective. It demonstrates how officials continued to
adhere to free market principles, and were unconvinced about the wisdom of
interventionist solutions. This meant that there was a flindamental continuity in
approach between the Labour and Conservative administrations, and that the
tactics of industrial intervention remained passive.
These arguments represent a departure from the established literature. While
commentators have rightly highlighted the macroeconomic environment and the
failure to adopt growth point strategy as defining characteristics of the period,
there has been little investigation into the nature of intervention or the ideological
reluctance to dictate location.' This reluctance was apparent at ministerial and
official levels, and related to the rejection of location control as a distortion of free
enterprise. On the one hand, the Conservatives recognised only one level of
market failure, informational weaknesses; on the other, the Board of Trade
remained wedded to a narrow definition of externalities. Neither officials nor
For example, Scott's (1996) focus is exclusively macroeconomic.
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politicians accepted an interventionist agenda, trusting in economic rationality and
the invisible hand to secure regional balance.
These beliefs were deeply ingrained at the Board of Trade. Officials were not anti-
regional policy and had strongly supported Labour's distribution of industry
programme, but this support had been based on simple notions of social justice
and an affinity with market based remedies. While officials doubted industrialists'
claims, they had rarely been asked to overrule businessmen. Conservative neo-
liberalism reinforced these trends. This was particularly important because
empirical work during the 1950s had begun to question the efficiency of market
solutions. However, buoyant economic conditions and the low profile afforded to
British regional science meant that these new ideas could be ignored.
The discussion follows the framework established in Chapter 4. It begins by
considering the legacy of the Attlee government and initial Conservative policy
reviews. Specific policy tests are then examined and the political consequences
assessed. Finally, the experiences of Dame Mix Meynell - permanent under-
secretary at the Board of Trade and the official most clearly associated with
Conservative regional policy administration - are used to determine the nature of
policy development by 1958.
§5.2 Reviewing Policy
When the Conservatives triumphed in the 1951 general election, one could be
forgiven for thinking that this marked the end of a meaningful regional policy. But
even before the election began, it is clear that Labour's commitment to regional
employment had been compromised. In May 1950, Wilson had produced a
memorandum which examined these short-comings. It argued that the growth of
employment in new industries scarcely matched the rate of displacement from
existing sectors in the depressed regions. Wilson concluded,
In these circumstances, full employment, the Ark of the Covenant in the
government's economic policy, is in danger of becoming a mockery. There
are already a number of areas where one cannot mention the phrase in a
political speech (PRO 1950d).
This malaise was partly a result of the efficiency-first standard adopted by Labour
and the Board of Trade. It would provide a mixed legacy for the Conservatives,
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supplying a strong institutional and legal framework, while denying the executive
an opportunity to control location. These points can be illustrated by considering
the role of financial incentives and the 1950 Distribution of Industry Act.
The 1950 Act extended the Board of Trade's loan and grant powers for firms
moving to Development Areas. The amendments arose from the Board's
frustration at manufacturers' claims for relocation expenses. But the powers failed
to have any worthwhile effect. This was because the government decided not to
publicise its new authority. 2 The decision may seem curious, but it reflected an
implicit distinction between discriminatory and general intervention.
The whole basis of Labour's approach was to selectively move suitable firms to
Development Areas. In the 1940s, the Board of Trade had decided not to publicise
DATAC' s activities for fear of encouraging speculative business enquiries. This
attitude was reflected in the Board's 1950 instructions to regional controllers,
which empowered officials to consider only 'exceptional cases' for financial
assistance (PRO 1 950c). Shortly after the 1951 general election, this attitude was
confirmed in a letter from Douglas-Campbell to Hyman, which explained that 'we
do not want to broadcast to industry in general an impression that a full reservoir
of easy government funds was available to dip into at the lightest wish' (PRO
1951c). All of this meant that in December 1950, the Regional Controllers'
Conference reported that the Act had hitherto had little effect. Up to this point
there had been only 12 applications for funds; 3 had been refused by the
Distribution of Industry Working Party, 3 had been rejected informally, 4 had been
advised that they had no case and 2 were still under consideration (PRO 1950b).
Section 3 had become a 'dead letter'.3
Judging from departmental papers, it seems that the Conservatives were only too
happy to continue with this practice. Indeed, the continuity of policy between the
2 An unsigned memorandum from Board of Trade headquarters to regional controllers argued 'It
is not considered desirable that we should take the initiative in offering to firms the inducements
in Section 3 or that they should in any way be widely publicised. It is for the firm to discover the
existence of the inducements and to ask for them' (PRO 1 952b).
The term 'dead letter' was attributed to Campling, who argued, 'I am not in the least worried
by the possibility of Section 3(1) becoming a dead letter. Possession of the power to spend money
on bribes does not mean that we would have failed in our duty if we did not exercise it. It would
surely be a virtue if we could achieve our objects without doing so and, consistent with the
achievement of our objectives, I would think our aim should not be to exercise it' (PRO 1953e).
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two governments is striking. As late as 1953, a meeting which discussed three
important aid applications (British Oxygen, Ransom & Makes and Super Seal Ltd)
confirmed Labour's general approach. In the face of faltering Board of Trade
opposition, Treasury officials succeeded in scaling down the financial requests.4
The Treasury successfully argued that large payments should be reserved for
potential 'whoppers' such as the motor firms, although officials conceded that no
funding existed (or was likely to exist) for such large projects. (PRO 1953d)5
The picture which emerges from late 1951 is therefore contradictory. A strong
superstructure existed, but policy execution had been impotent for some time. The
administrative machinery executed its functions in accordance with established
efficiency criteria. The effect on the Regional Distribution of Industry Panels was
substantial. By late 1951, they had degenerated into little more than gentlemen's
clubs, lamely examining and rubber stamping planning requests. The resulting
institutional complacency was documented by Sir Godfrey Ince in February 1952.
Commenting on his first regional panel meeting, he wrote:
The meeting lasted from 10.30 am to 12.45 p.m. the atmosphere was most
congenial and pleasant; all the members, including two Major Generals and
one Rear Admiral were most charming to the 'new boy', and we
accomplished absolutely nothing (PRO 1952c).
Labour's regional policy weaknesses bequeathed an awkward problem to the
Conservatives. In June 1951, the Scottish Council had commissioned a study
under the chairmanship of Alec Cairncross 'to recommend methods of promoting
economic expansion along appropriate lines in county towns and county mining
areas where more industrial employment is necessary and practical'. 6 Although
Cairncross was a highly respected economist, he was not a regional policy expert.
It seems that the lack of a strong British regional science tradition continued to
hamper policy discussions.
PRO (1953c). The applications included £66,800 for British Oxygen, £44,507 for Super Seal
Ltd, and £309,308 for Ransom and Makes Bearing Company Limited. £20,000 was finally
offered to British Oxygen, £60,000 to Ranson and Makes. Super Seal's request was rejected.
In fact, in 1954 only 4 applications for loans were approved. Treasury witnesses to the Select
Committee on Estimates in 1955 argued that financial incentives did not attract industry.
6 Cairncross (1952). See also PRO (19510.
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The Scottish Council's actions reflected a long held belief that Scotland had been
excluded from the major benefits of the postwar distribution of industry
programme. 7 As early as 1946, the Scottish Office had been advocating a much
more robust policy. The Scottish Office had frequently proposed more radical
measures than either the Board of Trade or production ministries would
contemplate, and the department frequently found itself outvoted in the regional
policy committees. An example is provided by a 1946 paper prepared by Tom
Fraser (Joint Parliamentary Secretary at the Scottish Office). This argued that the
Government should itself establish engineering plants in areas where firms could
not be attracted (PRO 1946a). Given the Board's efficiency concerns, Fraser's
proposal was pilloried. An official wryly commented, '. . . it seems to me that it
would be the worst possible advertisement for state enterprise, since the state
would be presumably entering the field at a disadvantage since private
industrialists do not regarded it as advantageous in these industries to go to
Development Areas' (PRO 1 946g).
Whether or not the Scottish Office's fears were justified is an interesting point. In
1946, Fraser estimated a male employment shortfall of 45,100 in Scotland (PRO
1946b). The country's share of national building starts was certainly unstable from
1945 to 1951, falling from an annual average of 14.9% in 1945/7, to 6.8% in
1950, before recovering to 11% in 1951.8 But as explained in Chapter Three, this
was probably due to changing regional patterns of comparative advantage rather
than policy. Whatever the truth, the Scottish Office's lobbying reflected a real
belief that the area was being neglected.
The Cairncross Committee argued for a much more active policy, based on growth
point strategy rather than employment. The report's key concerns were 'to
accelerate the growth of new communities in promising locations. . . to make
fuller use of manpower and national resources that are in danger of being wasted
and to . . . arrest the decline of communities and consequent waste of material and
In an unsigned letter to the Lord President the Scottish office maintained, 'It is of course true
that Scotland has suffered because the Board of Trade, who have all the cards in their hands
about industrial development, have not felt the full sense of responsibility for Scotland as they do
for Wales' (PRO 1946!).
8 Calculated from Board of Trade (1955, table 4).
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national assets' (Cairncross 1952, P. 41). It advocated much wider government
financial powers, flying in the face of established Board of Trade practice.
The Conservatives sought to bury the report while continuing to execute the
existing policy mix. Evidence suggests that officials tried to water down
Cairncross' final recommendations, attempting to dismiss the investigation as a
'damp squib' (PRO, 1952d). Nevertheless, Scott (1996) has recently suggested
that the report served to highlight previous policy weaknesses and an enthusiasm
for growth points within the Board of Trade. Cairncross' arguments certainly
featured in later policy debates, but it was departmental culture and notions of
entrepreneurial freedom which dominated these discussions.
The Conservative's initial regional policy response was linked almost exclusively
with the demands of the Korean War. In December 1951, an interdepartmental
policy review recognised that a potential long term regional economic problem
existed, but the investigation soon became bogged down in the details of
administrative control (PRO 1951d). A meeting on the 3rd of December outlined
the new government's approach (PRO 1951 e). The Wilson formulae for giving
locational preference to dollar earning firms was endorsed, as was the practice of
directing defence contracts to Development Areas. The Conservatives also
recognised that it would be 'politically undesirable' to deschedule any of the listed
areas. In part, these decisions reflected the exigencies of 1951, but the
continuation of Labour's do-nothing policy also hid a fundamental philosophical
shift.
Whereas Labour had been constrained by external concerns, informational
inadequacies and the commercial efficiency criterion, the Conservatives held
fundamentally different views about the legitimate role of the state. The new
President of the Board of Trade, Peter Thorneycroft, was to quote Seldon (1981,
p. 178), 'a liberal by nature . . . He felt strongly that it was not the job of
government to regulate or intervene in industry, but to lay down the ground rules
within which industry should make its own decisions'. This astutely summarised
not only Thorneycroft's views, but the Board of Trade's entire regional policy
position. While the Clay Committee had begun to plug the information gap, the
Board's narrow definition of externalities and emphasis on 'persuasion' above
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'coercion' found an immediate resonance with the Conservatives. Unable to
abandon its individualistic approach and unwilling to direct industrialists, the new
alliance held little promise for wider policy initiatives. The Board of Trade was not
asked to use its growing economic intelligence to challenge location decisions, and
its officials did not come into conflict with government. A regional policy truce
developed. These arguments are supported by an analysis of policy thinking in
195 1/2.
Scott's (1996) characterisation of the Board of Trade as a regional policy
advocate at this time rests on a number of questionable assumptions. First, that
officials recognised that a potential problem existed. Of this there is little doubt.9
Second, that the Board promoted a pro-active policy mix. This is debatable.
Finally, that there was a conflict between officials and the Conservative's national
economic agenda. The evidence does provide examples of clashes between
national and regional concerns, but these were secondary constraints (HMSO
1955, p.12). The overriding reality was that the Board remained wedded to the
same philosophical beliefs and tactics of industrial intervention that Dalton had
exploited during the early 1 940s.
Forward policy thinking during the first months of the Conservative government
was limited. A July 1952 memorandum has been identified as a key agenda setting
document (PRO 1952a). This provided five policy alternatives for the government:
business as usual, focusing on black spots, growth point strategy, efficiency first,
and follow the firm.'° The memorandum recommended growth point strategy in
the short to medium run, with a switch to 'efficiency first' in the long term. An
accompanying document entitled 'Skeleton notes on Development Area policies'
covered much the same ground, but included an important addition (PRO 1952e).
This recognised that while different strategic objectives were possible, tactics must
remain unchanged. Whatever the final policy aim, entrepreneurs must be left free
to determine their own location.
See Mix Meynell's oral evidence to the Select Committee on Estimates in 1955 (HMSO 1955).
When asked about descheduling areas she noted several potential blackspots (q 12).
'° 'Efficiency first' was not a conunercial argument, but promoted a geographical distribution of
industry which would achieve the most efficient combination of factors of production. This








According to Scott, the defining moment came when the government chose to
pursue 'black spot' policies. This denied the outer regions an opportunity to
modernise their industrial structures and foster long term stability. In short, the
Conservatives favoured a national economic framework at the expense of regional
initiatives. But given the Conservative and Board of Trade philosophy, this
outcome was inevitable. Intervention would be focused on information and
persuasion, and the Board would educate rather than challenge businesses. These
ideas were in operation by 1952, and hilly articulated by 1953.
The key document in explaining policy ideas was therefore not Ilet's 1952 paper,
but a 1953 internal document headed 'The future of industrial development policy'
(PRO 1953g). By this time, the Conservatives had succeeded in dismantling many
of the physical controls identified with the Attlee governments. Building licences
were not abolished until 1954, but they proved much easier to obtain after the
Korean armistice. In his 1953 budget speech, the Chancellor outlined this new
policy environment, 'No manufacturer should now find difficulty or delay in
getting a licence for productive work'."
TABLE 5.1
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Source: Dow (1964, p.150).
'The future of industrial development policy' was prepared for internal use at
Board of Trade headquarters. It was fifteen pages long, and carefully dissected the
"Quoted in (PRO 1953g).
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relationship between location control and entrepreneurial freedom. It examined
both the advantages and disadvantages of location control in relation to the special
problems of London and the Midlands. It asserted that so long as the Board
'continue to operate a nation-wide distribution of industry policy. . . the IDC
system must be continued in something like its present form' (PRO 1953i). This
position was justified not in ideological terms, but by the valuable information
which the system generated and the contacts it established between the Board and
individual manufacturers.
The paper continued by examining the case for altering the 5,000 sq. ft limit, and
restricting IDCs to certain areas only.' 2 Section 16 of the document ran to five
pages and dealt with the relationship between distribution of industry policy and
the New Towns programme. This conflict has been usefully summarised by
Cullingworth (1979, pp. 116-62) and Scott (1997), and the details need not
concern us. Suffice to say that the debate centred on the precise definition of
'reception areas', and the Board's belief that potential migrants were in short
supply. But in general, the discussion added little to current practice. It simply
outlined preferred IDC positions for most projects and areas. The document's
main proposals were that:
• all DC applications need to be considered on merit.
• IDCs should not be refused if the development can clearly not be carried out
elsewhere.
• IDCs may be refused if the applicant is 'quite obviously not prepared to go
elsewhere although we consider there are no valid reason against his doing so.'
• If the Board is satisfied that a development must be undertaken in London, the
Board should encourage the development as a good thing. Developments
should only be discouraged where the decision is 'sensible and capable of
defence'.
It is difficult to separate these tactics from those operating throughout Labour's
period of tenure. Even within the document, the Board recognised that the
previous rigid policy had produced few refusals (PRO 1953h). No regrets were
12 In the former case, it favoured greater flexibility by allowing limits to be established by
regulation rather than legislation. In the latter case, the document made some familiar points.
First, it recognised that 'many of the incidental advantages of an [DC arise not from the ability to
refuse an IDC, but from the act of considering an application and the opportunities for
consultation'. Second, it noted the potential political problems associated with descheduling
areas. In the light of these dangers, it recommended keeping controls on a national basis.
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expressed over this situation, and none of the proposals advocated substantive
change. Notwithstanding the loss of building licences, the emphasis would
continue to be on persuasion.
The entire policy exercise seems rather meaningless. It succeeded in merely
codifying existing practices within a tighter administrative framework. These
findings provide an interesting question for postwar policy analysis. If the Labour
Party had been more committed to industrial steering, and f there had not been
such a powerfiul export constraint, would politicians have been able to override
civil service conservatism? During the 1940s, this problem did not arise. In the
1950s a new truce developed based on common intellectual and political
philosophies. In Thomas' (1959, p.20) words, 'the Establishment' and its
'Victorian views and standards of judgement' remained inviolate. This impression
can be confirmed by a detailed study of key location decisions.
§5.3 Applying Policy
Once the Conservative guidelines had been established, an ideal candidate to test
the new system emerged. In the space of a few months, the motor industry
provided a wave of expansions which forced the government to confront business
leaders (see §3.5). These test cases were part of the second wave of postwar
motor industry investment beginning in 1954, with most major car manufacturers
announcing expansion plans. While the Nuffield-Austin merger had made it
possible for BMC to achieve substantial additions to output with little outlay,
other firms were not so lucky (Maxcy & Silberston 1959, p.182). Faced with the
end of the world-wide sellers market, Rootes, Ford and Vauxhall needed to
expand. The underlying logic behind these moves was fordist - best summarised in
a 1955 briefing paper prepared by the Ministry of Supply:
It might seem strange, having regard to much keener competition from
abroad, that an industry which is doing so well should want to enter into
such heavy additional commitments but, in fact, the volume manufacturers
had not got much choice. They were compelled to undertake this expansion
in order to retain their competitive power and the key to this was economic
volume production, or, in other words, the production of say 10 cars at the
cost of 7 today (PRO 1955c).
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The first companies to submit plans to the Board of Trade and Ministry of Supply
were Ford and Vauxhall. The Ford plan envisaged a total investment of £30
million spread over four projects (PRO 19540. The first was a new central spares
and distribution department, requiring approximately 300,000 square feet of
industrial space and 500 workers. Ford's preferred site was Aveley in south east
Essex, close to the London docks where 90% of Ford's imported spares arrived.
Ford also required a spares manufacturing unit, and proposed using 330,000 sq. ft
at Langley Airfield where the company already enjoyed a presence thanks to an
earlier location deal. The final two proposals related to overspill production units,
and a need to free floorspace at Dagenham. Ford wanted to lease three buildings
from the Ministry of Supply at Woolwich Arsenal in London, where the Royal
Ordnance complex had recently been closed following defence reorganisations.
Two units were nominated for transfer, involving some 2,200 workers.
Altogether, Ford's plans called for a total of 700,000 square feet and 3,000
additional jobs.
Vauxhall's scheme was far more dramatic. The proposal was submitted
approximately eight weeks after Ford's, and involved two projects. The first was
for an entirely new factory to be built at Dunstable, involving 1,150,000 square
feet and 5,500 additional workers. The second scheme called for an extension of
the company's existing site at Luton, with 500 new workers housed in an
additional 1,550,000 square feet of factory space. In total Vauxhall had requested
2.7 m square feet, and 6,000 additional workers.
Board of Trade officials noted with some alarm that these projects had 'far
reaching implications for distribution of industry policy' because all of them were
located within the Greater London area' (PRO 19540.
if we take Ford's proposals first, we can identify the individual issues which
concerned government. The first point is that the Aveley scheme was always
uncontroversial. This would have been true under both Labour and Conservative
administrations because it was a case of 'tied' development. 13 The Woolwich
Meynell explained the Board's position in these circumstances to the Select Comnuttee on
Estimates (HMSO 1955, q.70): 'We have to think of the economic considerations obviously:
whether it is economical to "hive-off' a unit and take it elsewhere, and the problem for an
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proposals were different. When the Royal Ordnance factory closed, the
government had reluctantly agreed to a trading estate. The understanding was that
the site should be reserved for 'non-conforming' local industry, which could not
find alternative sites because of local planning restrictions (PRO 1954d). The
decision to close the Arsenal had been extremely unpopular, and was only
sweetened by promises of further engineering employment and personal
assurances from the Minister of Supply (PRO 1954e). However, Ford's proposal
represented something entirely different - a move towards central London in
violation of distribution of industry and new town policies. The package therefore
offered a valuable test-case, pitching entrepreneurial independence against the
wider planning issues that had dominated postwar Britain.
The Vauxhall case raised similar, albeit less strident objections. Again, the
proposal was against general policy, but it was more sympathetic to the new towns
strategy. The suggestion was even made that Luton and Dunstable might be
redefined as an 'expanded town', should the government wish to capitalise on
Vauxhall's investment programme (PRO 1954r). But notwithstanding this
proposal, the area continued to display the very symptoms of overheating which
Barlow had railed against.
A note by M.A. Cross in December 1954 underlined Luton's critical labour supply
problem. Cross noted that small firms could not pay the large wages that Vauxhall
generated, while skilled apprentices often left smaller business to work in the giant
car plant. Summing up, she found worrying evidence of overheating and trade
dependency:
I think the general position in Luton is that everything is overshadowed by
Vauxhall, which is all right so long as they are booming, but if there should
be a slump in that direction Luton would have a very bad time. I was
recently told by a Luton resident that children who find their toys are not so
good or numerous as their play fellows are apt to ask their mothers, 'Why
doesn't my daddy work at Vauxhall's?'(PRO 1954s)
existing industry is much greater than if you are dealing with a new firm trying to come into the
London area or developing in the London area. . . what we try to do in discussion with the firm
is to discover whether there are real economic reasons why they should stay'.
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These arguments foreshadowed later complaints from the FBI. These centred on
physical building restrictions, including the sewage and water problems which
were crippling smaller Luton businesses (MRC 195 5-56b).
Subsequent discussions at the Board contained echoes of earlier location bargains.
Just as in the late 1 940s, Ford and Vauxhall emphasised the production efficiencies
generated by expansion, the two companies finding a willing advocate in the
Ministry of Supply. The Ministry's recommendations were unequivocal, it noted
that both companies faced, '. . . extreme competition on both price and quality.
Ford already has success, and consolidation will reap foreign currency and prestige
rewards. But we cannot ignore the fact that other countries have had the
advantage of building new facilities and any measures we might take that even
marginally reduced the competitive ability of a major exporting organisation will
damage our chances of securing that dividend' (PRO 1 954e).
Within these terms, the government devised a careful negotiating strategy. In
Ford's case, the Aveley proposal was to be agreed, and the Wootwich move
resisted (PRO 1954e). The preferred option was for one of the overspill
production units to be placed in Harlow or one of the other new towns, while the
Langley spares unit would be decentralised to a Development Area. Mindful of
Standard's recent Merseyside failure, a site at Southport was suggested for this
new facility. However, both the Board of Trade and Ministry of Supply adopted a
vital caveat: Ford should not be forced to change their plans. The government's
solution would be put to the firm, but coercion would not be used. A briefing
paper made the point succinctly, 'Can we, or should we, pit our amateur
judgements against about the effect of given location on costs against companies
prepared to back their investments to the tune of25-3O million?' (PRO 19541)
It was against this background that Thorneycroft met Ford's representatives, Sir
Roland Smith and Sir Patrick Hennessy, on 27 July 1956 at Millbank (PRO 1954,
g). Hennessy was permitted to make his case, explaining that Dagenham's design
limit was 800 units a day, but the plant was now running at 1250, and was still
unable to met demand. According to the official minutes, the President accepted
all that Ford had to say before mentioning location. Hennessy argued that the firm
'was aware of concentration diseconomies, and had also considered the defence
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argument.' Ford had examined South Wales, Merseyside and Northern Ireland,
and considered them all 'unsuitable'. Hennessy supported this argument with a
deception, noting how '. . . the company had originally been established at
Manchester and had intended to set up production on large scale at Southampton,
but had been persuaded in view of the housing and labour position at Dagenham to
set up there instead'.14
Hennessy and Roland Smith were obviously very well briefed, but their efforts
were largely wasted. This was because Thorneycroft had no intention of forcing
the location issue. A similar strategy was used with Vauxhall (PRO 1954h). Here
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government wanted the firm to consider
establishing a satellite manufacturing plant in a London New Town. Vauxhall Vice
Chairman, Hill, replied that a feasibility study had already identified Stevenage as a
likely candidate for transmission manufacture. But Hill added that Vauxhall would
prefer not to build the plant at the present, 'but f pressed would comply with the
President's wishes'. Thorneycroft's reply was simple. He told Hill that the
government would not press the company 'to do anything that was uneconomic'.
The DC for Luton was approved, and the opportunity for decentralisation was
lost. Unlike the 1940s, the location bargain had been sabotaged by philosophy
rather than informational problems. Vauxhall was a reluctant but willing migrant; it
was the government that resisted relocation.
Throughout both the Vauxhall and Ford applications, officials stressed the long-
term implications of the decisions. Minute papers recognised the need for IDCs to
be applied 'equitably and effectively', and they suggested that government
sanctions would make future DC administration difficult. One official asked (PRO
19540 'If these large firms cannot face the cost of one unit outside the Greater
London area, how are we to argue that smaller firms can?'
But this did not create a crisis. This was because government and civil service
moved in step. There are two key exchanges which illustrate the predominantly
conservative Board of Trade ideology. The first was between Dame Alix Meynell
and Thorneycroft, and centred on administrative implications. Meynell suggested
14 See Nevins and Hill (1957) for a more accurate account.
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that the time had come to make a change in general policy, since there was both
low unemployment and much government building work in the Development
Areas. She suggested that IDCs should be removed from the Town and Country
Planning Act when it came to the Lords in October. The Board would then rely on
persuasion, where progress was possible, although 'it was blatantly not going to
be as effective' (PRO 1954i).
Meynell's own recollection confirms the official record (1988, p268). She explains
how she argued that the size and influence of firms should not affect IDC
decisions and that if the policy was only applied to smaller firms, it would be
ineffective. This prompted her to call for the abandonment of the whole scheme.
The second key exchange occurred at the same meeting and involved the Board of
Trade's Parliamentary Secretary, Henry Strauss, and his boss, Peter Thorneycroft.
On the general question of location, Strauss betrayed the Conservatives' very
narrow conception of externalities. He argued that IDCs had predominantly social
aims and cut across economic considerations. Accordingly a strident distribution
of industry programme, along Barlow's lines, 'could only be afforded by a richer
nation than this' (PRO 1954i).
These arguments mirror those of the Conservative members of the wartime
coalition who refused to accept that private location decisions had wider economic
implications for social overhead capital, congestion costs and resource allocation.
There was an implicit belief that decentralisation caused private economic
penalties, and that these were unacceptable in a free market economy. This was
the very argument that former economist Douglas Jay had challenged throughout
the 1940s, and one which he pressed upon Thorneycroft to little effect:'5
It has always seemed to me that great as the social effects of the
Development Areas policy are, the real case for it is mainly economic. To
put it briefly, it rests on the fact that the cost of building a factory for, say
1,000 people to work in, is far less than that of building the houses, roads,
schools, etc. for the families of those thousand people to live in.'6
15 Jay had joined the Board of Trade in September 1943 as Dalton's personal assistant and
special advisor on postwar reconstruction.
16 PRO (1953f), Jay continued, 'Therefore we must get greater economy and greater productivity
over the whole country if we locate in areas of unemployment those enterprises which can
operate equally economically in one of several places. In periods of restricted investment and in a
country with localised unemployment, this argument is surely very strong'.
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Although Jay later commented (1980, p.1 12) that he encountered 'mercifully little
doctrinaire opposition in the Board of Trade to the idea of some government
steering of the location of industry' during the Attlee years, this was because
commercial efficiency remained inviolate. Under the Conservatives, philosophical
considerations strengthened the laissez faire proclivities of officials. Whereas
Labour favoured intervention when conditions allowed, Thorneycroft rejected all
suggestions of coercion. The record shows how officials backed his approach.
The Ford and Vauxhall episodes ended with Conservative ideology enshrined in
policy practice. The President had decided that the government would not refuse
IDCs and would not force firms to relocate. There would be no formal end to the
control, but it would become 'a dead letter' in all practical terms (PRO 1954i).
Little did Thorneycroft realise that within a few months this decision would be
tested to the full when the Rootes organisation submitted an application for vast
new building works in the already congested Luton and Dunstable area.
The Rootes proposals shared all the characteristics of the Ford and Vauxhall plans.
Based on the same fordist logic, it was a three stage scheme involving the addition
of five new manufacturing bays within a year, and a new building for spares
manufacture and storage soon afterwards. Stages one and two would add 3,080 to
the workforce and stage three a further 5,500 (PRO 1954j).
In preliminary meetings, the Rootes brothers produced as compelling a case as
either Ford or Vauxhall. They argued that their schemes were vital for the long
term future of the Rootes organisation, and that labour bottlenecks could be easily
overcome.' 7 When pressed over decentralisation, Rootes noted that Northern
Ireland and Newcastle had already been considered as possible sites, but the
company had concluded that 'it would be impossible to set up a press shop
efficiently so far away from their main centres'(PRO 1954j).
The minutes noted how Reginald Rootes argued that the motor industry still faced labour
bottlenecks, but that it had always managed to secure additional labour. He argued that
Coinmers, the Luton finn, 'were still receiving applications, and the manager was sure that they
were not poaching workers. This was because workers were coining from as far away as
Leicester to Coventry' (PRO 1954j).
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As far as the government was concerned, this case created real problems.
According to Thorneycroft' s criteria, Rootes had shown that decentralisation
would be uneconomic. However, expansion in Luton and Dunstable would create
severe physical problems, particularly in relation to labour, housing and water
(PRO 1954o). Although these were strictly local planning issues, ministers wanted
to present a consolidated front to businesses. Moreover, problems of housing and
water supply could easily be interpreted in terms of overheating and congestion.
This division between physical planning and distribution of industry policy has
been highlighted elsewhere (Self 1961, pp. 141-42), but in Luton the issues
clashed head-on.
However, there was another important complication. Rootes was a wholly owned
British company, Ford and Vauxhall were American subsidiaries. To refuse Rootes
permission to expand while simultaneously allowing the other schemes would raise
serious policy issues. Not unreasonably, this 'patriotic' element was forcefully
stressed by the Rootes brothers (PRO 1 954t).
Since the 1950s, several authors have focused on the British government's attitude
to American car companies. Hodges (1974) and Wilks (1984) concentrate on the
I 970s, but Reich (1990) takes a much longer term view. Reich contrasts Britain's
welcoming attitude with that of postwar West Germany, and this is used to
account for the different fortunes of the indigenous motor makers. Reich suggests
that British governments seriously damaged domestically-owned firms by their
open-door policies. The DC issue adds another dimension to this argument.
Minute papers show that ministers and officials were mindful of Rootes objections
(PRO 1954k). Two elements need to be considered when analysing these events.
The first is that foreign multinationals were quite capable of threatening the Board
of Trade with overseas relocation. GM, Vauxhall's parent, did just this in 1954,
informing Thorneycroft that they would lay down another production line in
Germany should their proposals be blocked. As a briefing paper noted, 'This
warning cannot be dismissed in the light of General Motors imperial outlook and
resources' (PRO 19540. However, such threats were not beyond British
companies. The earliest record of such an ultimatum was in 1946, when Morris
Motors threatened to relocate from Oxford to Europe, 'if the labour position were
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not improved by the provision of housing on a very large scale' (PRO 1946h).
Happily, this threat was forestalled by the departure of nearby Pressed Steel to a
Royal Ordnance Factory in Scotland (SRO 1946-60).
The second point is the apparently different attitudes towards government
relations in American-owned firms and their British counterparts. An official
remarked in 1954 that, unlike Ford or Vauxhall, 'Rootes do not bring their
problems to us until they are pretty well hatched out' (PRO 1954u). Moreover,
the whole Rootes approach was more confrontational, presenting the Board of
Trade with a fail accompli, rather than engaging officials in (albeit spurious)
negotiations and site studies. This raises many questions about business practices
and the suitability of British business structures for government negotiations. It
also focuses attention on Chandler's (1990) much repeated charge that British
firms continually failed to develop managerial hierarchies as deep or as well trained
and professional as those in America. Whisler makes the point well (1995, pp. 16-
17):
It could be expected that as a corporation grew from its small
entrepreneurial origins administration would evolve from the 'one man
show' into, first, a centralised, integrated, ftinctionally-departmentalised
structure and, then, if it diversified, into a multidivisional organisation.
Similarly corporate strategy would be increasingly delegated by the
entrepreneur or dominant figure to the 'technostructure' composed of the
Board and senior managers. However, the histories of the Nuffield
Organisation, British Motor Corporation and Standard Triumph [not to
mention Rootes] illustrate the persistence of personal management
throughout the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s.
In terms of this thesis, the important issue is the location bargain. Although
serious, these issues find their ultimate test in the third wave of postwar motor
industry investment. This is because in the mid 1950s the Conservative
government and Board of Trade proved unwilling to challenge even the Rootes
brothers' claims, acquiescing to demands despite the physical problems.
The anatomy of the Rootes decision is familiar. Objections from the Ministries of
Labour and Housing were forwarded to the Cabinet's Economic Policy
Committee (PRO l954p). However, the greatest weight was placed on the Board
of Trade submission, which argued that the case should be decided on its own
merits. The Board also maintained that relocation would be uneconomic, and,
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given the favourable treatment received by Ford and Vauxhall, Thorneycroft
favoured approval.' 8 In a clear reference to earlier precedents, the Ministry of
Supply added, 'If such an expansion implies change in location of industry policy,
then that change has afready been made' (PRO 19541). Even before the
Economic Policy Committee debated the issue, Henry Strauss had confidently told
the Commons:
It is impossible to keep a great industry in a strait-jacket, or to ignore its
existing location. . . I am sure that the House should never make the
mistake of assuming that we can drive an industry into another area merely
by refusing it permission to expand where it wishes to expand. An industry
which has proved itself efficient is not the worst judge of the conditions of
success (PRO 19541).
By the 21st of December, the President had approval to issue an IDC to Rootes.
But there was never any intention of refusing the firm (PRO 1 954m). The pattern
had already been established by the Ford and Vauxhall cases. It would be Luton's
smaller businessmen who would have to live with the economic consequences of
this decision.
Here again, the role of the FBI is instructive. Ideologically opposed to economic
controls, it nevertheless displayed a marked ambivalence toward IDCs. By the mid
1950s, location controls were the only remaining physical restraint on investment
(Dow 1964, pp. 144-77). But from 1953 onwards, the FBI's attention was
focused on the Government's national economic policies. According to Blank
(1972, p. 126), the FBI's basic theme was that persistent inflation in postwar
Britain resulted from an excess of demand created by public spending. From 1947
onwards, it argued for budgetary restraint and the reallocation of resources to the
private sector. These macroeconomic concerns mirrored the growing Conservative
stress on national issues.
However, the regional policy relationship was much more complicated than this
suggests. Mercer (1995) has convincingly demonstrated that historians,
particularly Middlemass, have consistently underestimated the role of employers
organisations and trade associations in the policy community. In her study of
18 See PRO (1954v): 'We have approved Vauxhall and Ford, and Rootes have been in the area
longer and are British. First come first served is not a way out of the difficulty'.
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postwar competition policy, Mercer shows how powerful business interests and
organised labour were the real forces shaping legislation. Within this framework,
the business veto was the most critical factor. Extending this analysis to regional
policy, it is surprising that the FBI put so little pressure on Labour and
Conservative governments to abandon IDCs. The explanation is that the FBI were
willing to tolerate a control which had proved impotent long before 1954.
The evidence for this view is contained, not in official Board of Trade papers, but
in the CBI Predecessors Archive (MRC 1950-1960b). Surviving documents show
that businesses were well advised of Thorneycroft's decision to relax DC
administration (MRC 1 957a). Although private correspondence was an important
communication channel, ministerial statements and first hand experience had
already convinced the FBI of Thorneycroft' s passive intent.' 9 Thus a draft circular
produced for the FBI's Distribution of Industry Committee in January 1956 noted
that, 'a feeling is current in some industrial circles that the location of industry
policy pursued by the Board of Trade, sound enough in itself, does not go far
enough to meet the requirements of an industry in search of new locations in
which to expand' (MRC 1956a). Here one sees that coercion was never an issue,
and that businesses reflected the Board's view that information was the most
important locational commodity.
FBI committee documents dating from 1955-8 testify to the generally passive
effect of IDCs. It was already well understood that while refusal might be used as
a threat, '. . . if the applicants kept on long enough the certificate was granted'
(MRC 1951e). The business lobby's main concern was the relationship between
certificates and local planning. Echoing Peter Self, FBI members seemed unable to
19 For example; 'The use of this (DC) control cannot compel industiy to particular places. It
would be quite wrong if it could. All that we can do is, in the last resort, to refuse permission to
expand or start an industiy in a given area. The power must surely be carefully used, because it
would be a very serious thing to say to an industiy "you cannot build here". The proper location
of a factory is something far more complex than it looks on a planning map. There is an infinite
variety of factors involved, such, for example, as transport, access to raw materials, markets, the
type of labour, availability of skilled management or managerial staff and technicians, and the
nearness to other processes. These factors should never be, and have not been brushed aside, and
for that reason we have got to be quite sure when we refuse Industrial Development Certificates.
In our view far more is achieved, and far more goodwill is created in the Development Areas, by
persuasion than by compulsion'. D. Kabery, Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade in the
House of Conunons on 2nd May, 1955. Quoted in MRC (1955c).
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separate location of industry concerns from planning responsibilities. The
overheated situation in Luton raised particular worries, but rather than criticise the
laissez faire distribution programme, local board members pressed for housing
development to relieve labour bottlenecks (MRC 1956b).
The FBI's South West Regional Council probably summed up the employers'
position most succinctly (MRC 1957b). While recognising that political needs
required the retention of control, it advocated larger exemption limits and a link
with local planning rules. These proposals represented a changed emphasis rather
than a changed philosophy. They also disguised the fact that the government's
negotiating position had been fundamentally compromised. Since Board of Trade
threats were no longer deemed credible, businesses viewed 1M6 as a nuisance,
rather than as an adversary. The results can be seen in the record of refusal rates
(Table 5.2) and inter-regional industrial movement (Table 5.3).
TABLE 5.2
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CERTIFICATE REFUSALS, 1954-59
Year	 No of	 Area	 Male	 Total
Schemes	 '000 sq ft Employment Employment
South East Region	 1954-56	 4	 109	 370	 680
	
1957	 5	 326	 500	 980
	
1958	 37	 1,893	 3,330	 4,680
	
1959	 88	 2,060	 2,060	 3,710




1958	 8	 201	 570	 740
	
1959	 38	 1,509	 960	 1,930
Source: Statistics provided by Brian Ashcroft.
The first set of statistics provide details of IDC refusals by district, and although
they are incomplete, the dataset clearly shows the passive policy stance of 1954-
57. A total of 13 refusals during these three years in the South East and West
Midlands regions clearly marks the period as a continuation of 'policy-off'.
Moreover, these projects involved a total of just 1,920 jobs and 673,000 square
feet, suggesting that it was only a small proportion of the smallest schemes which
were targeted.
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Statistics on industrial movement support this view (Howard 1968). These show
that the share of the 'peripheral areas' in the national total of moves declined from
a yearly average of 49.6% in 1945-5 1, to an average of 24% in 195258.20 The
equivalent shares for associated employment were 64% and 30.3% respectively.
Although superficially convincing, these figures have strong limitations.2'
Moreover, they say nothing about the policy effect. In keeping with previous
analysis, it is possible to argue that they show nothing more than changes in
regional comparative advantage over time.
TABLE 5.3
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, REGIONAL MOVES BY DESTINATION,
1945-58
Perinheral Areas	 I	 United
Year	 Employment (000's)	 Employment (000's)
Established No. of Cases
	
Male	 Total	 No. of Cases	 Male	 Total
1945-51	 463	 133.8	 237.3	 933	 218.7	 373.2
1952	 22	 4.7	 7.0	 79	 23.9	 35.5
1953	 33	 10	 18	 122	 27.8	 43.4
1954	 27	 3.4	 6.3	 118	 21.8	 35.6
1955	 25	 6.2	 10.1	 147	 31.6	 44.6
1956	 36	 7.9	 12.6	 149	 23.3	 38.7
1957	 25	 7.8	 12.5	 90	 17.4	 28.1
1958	 22	 6	 8.1	 84	 14.4	 20.2
Source: Howard (1968, p.39)
But these statistics do reinforce the anecdotal evidence from FBI records. They
suggest that the administrative precedents established by Conservative ministers
emasculated an already weak coercive regional policy. The suggestion is that this
mirrored shared philosophical beliefs amongst officials and politicians. It is
therefore vitally important to justify the implicit view of civil service orthodoxy.
This can be done by examining the career and beliefs of Dame Alix Meynell, the
20 Howard's peripheral areas included Scotland, Wales, the Northern Region, the North West
and Devon & Cornwall.
21 For example, the figures do not include the opening of an establishment by an entirely new
firm. To qualify as a move, the firm had to employ ten or more people. A move was only
registered if the move crossed one of the specified boundaries between 50 designated areas. To
quote Howard (1968, p.5), 'The data analysed here do not therefore cover all new establishments
opened by existing firms in new locations and the total amount recorded would have been
different if a different set of boundaries had been adopted'.
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official most clearly associated with distribution of industry policy throughout the
mid 1950s.
§5.4 Policy Developments
Dame Mix Meynell was a career civil servant, with over ten years of Board of
Trade experience by 1939 and a solid public school education. Her involvement in
the distribution of industry programme began in 1942, when she was transferred
from the Import Licensing Branch to the Control of Factory Space and Storage
Premises (C.F. & S) section. A period in the Board's Reconstruction Department
soon followed, during which Meynell helped to frame legislation for Dalton's 1945
Distribution of Industry Act. After periods of dealing with clothes rationing and
the GATT negotiations, Meynell was seconded to the Monopolies Commission in
January 1949. She returned to the Board in March 1952, when she assumed
control of 11M6 with the rank of under-secretary (Meynell 1988).
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Her experience spanned policy formation and policy administration. On the one
hand, she originally suggested linking building certificates to ]DCs, on the other,
she assumed ultimate responsibility for regional policy execution from 1952-5 5.
Meynell's views therefore provide a unique insight into Board of Trade ideology.
Internal working papers, periodical articles, and Dame Alix's autobiography
conlirm the Board's status as a conservative regional policy advocate.
Meynell always favoured an industrial location programme. Her initial involvement
with C.F. & S was enthusiastic, and on receiving her 1M6 appointment she
commented, 'The job was one in which I could put heart as well as head. Indeed,
it commpnded the enthusiasm, even a sense of mission of all the staff' (Meynell
1988, p. 266).
Meynell justified the Board's location interests in terms of informational failures
and entrepreneurial reluctance. In a paper prepared for an international conference
on regional development initiatives, she noted how interwar attempts to attract
industrialists to the Special Areas had failed. Her report described how 5,800
companies were contacted in an attempt to promote new locations, but only 700
bothered to reply, and of these, only 12 undertook 'even to consider the possibility
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of establishing a branch in the Special Areas'. Quoting from the Commissioner's
report, she added, 'There is little prospect of the Special Areas being assisted by
the spontaneous action of industrialists now located outside these areas' (PRO
1957a).
In these terms, IDCs fulfilled a critical role. Although designed to control
congestion around London and the Midlands, they made it impossible for firms to
contemplate expansion without coming to the attention of the state. A recurrent
theme throughout Meynell's writing was that this allowed the Board of Trade to
exert pressure on industrialists to look further afield. Meynell was particularly
keen on the role of information. Quoting from Lord Chandos, she stressed this
point in a 1959 article in Public Administration.
We have collected a great deal of information regarding the relative
advantages of different sites in different parts of the country, and of the
facilities available there with regard to local labour supply, housing
accommodation, transport facilities, electricity, gas, water drainage and so
on, and as a result are now able to offer to industrialists a service of
information which has never been available before (Meynell 1959, pp. 13-4).
Meynell made a clear division between coercion and persuasion. She favoured
positive inducements while recognising their limitations. But she was very
reluctant to countenance IDC refusals. Her views were reminiscent of
Thorneycroft's:
Experience has shown that both sets of powers are needed to give full effect
to the government's distribution of industry policy. . . the two powers need
to be used in conjunction and can be a valuable means of persuading
industrialists to consider expanding in a Development Area rather then
elsewhere. . . bare refusal, might well be followed by the industrialist
acquiring existing industrial premises where he is at the risk of overcrowding
or even of postponement of his expansion (PRO 1957a).
As head of 1M6, these opinions reflected departmental policy. It is also interesting
to note that the only conflict between Meynell and Thorneycroft concerned the
former's wish to abandon IDCs in the wake of the Ford decision (Meynell 1988, p.
268). But whereas Meynell was a civil servant and concerned with administrative
simplicity, Thorneycroft was a politician. Conservative Central Office had realised
long ago that it would be politically impossible to formally abandon Labour's
distribution of industry measures.
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Meynell's views dominated Board of Trade thinking throughout the mid 1950s. At
her retirement dinner, she emphasised the importance of viewing distribution of
industry policy 'as a service rather than as a control' (PRO 1955b). This fitted in
perfectly with Conservative ideology. It is therefore ironic to discover Dame Alix
claiming credit for the dispersal of the motor industry to Scotland and Merseyside
in the 1960s. As we shall see, these successes relied on coercion and a successful
ideological challenge to postwar orthodoxy. Both of these concepts remained
anathema to Board of Trade officials before 1958.
§5.6 Conclusion
The previous chapter ended by arguing that active regional policy required the
concomitance of three factors - political will, a conducive macroeconomic
background, and effective economic intelligence on spatial cost patterns. This
chapter has suggested that political will - embodied in Conservative philosophical
convictions - explains the passive policy stance from 1951-58.
Negative controls involved a degree of intervention which officials and politicians
were unable to accept. The constant stress on persuasion betrayed a reluctance to
enforce solutions on entrepreneurs. The wartime policy discussions had
demonstrated that this was a natural consequence of Conservative ideology. For
Board of Trade officials, the reluctance to dictate location represented a form of
doublethink. On the one hand, civil servants recognised both the informational
failure which afflicted location decisions, and the social benefits which relocation
afforded; on the other hand, they remained wedded to the idea of market based
solutions.
These arguments challenge traditional interpretations of Conservative regional
policy administration. 22 They suggest that McCallum (1979, p.9) was right to
stress Thorneycroft's ideological 'predisposition' in explaining government
actions. While the macroeconomic environment permitted 'policy-off' to develop,
the most important long run constraints were economic orthodoxy and an
individualistic outlook. These issues were only addressed during the third wave of
motor industry investment which began in 1959.
22 E.g., Odber (1965), Parsons (1986), Scott (1996),
141
6 Conservative Regional Policy 1959-64: a
Question of Expediency
§6.1 Introduction
Our policy, which is out of date, is governed by a number of Acts which
greatly confuse the public. The problem is what powers do we need on the
assumption that an overall deficiency in demand leading to massive
unemployment will not reoccur and that technical change will create, in the
future, more rather than less local unemployment. . . There is new ground to
be broken here. It is a fascinating subject and one on which the Conservative
Party could prepare something really striking and worthwhile.
Letter from David Eccles, President of the Board of Trade, to Harold
Macmillan, May 1959 (CPA 1959).
The period from 1958 to 1964 witnessed a transition from passive regional policy
to full scale interventionist solutions. The incongruity of a Conservative
government, nominally committed to free enterprise capitalism, endorsing a
coercive regional policy formed an important part of Brittan's (1971) concept of a
'great reappraisal' in Tory thinking. Subsequent writers have readily identified
with Brittan's characterisation,, focusing on the triumph of planning solutions
associated with the Brighton Revolution.
This chapter uses recently released archival evidence to examine these claims. It
argues that there was an upheaval in the tactics of industrial intervention. This
centred on the Board of Trade's acceptance of coercion as a legitimate policy tool
- an element ignored in existing accounts. A reluctance to enforce solutions on
entrepreneurs was overcome by political pressure from the regions and a growing
body of empirical evidence which changed the nature of location bargains. This
paved the way for later policy initiatives, and replaced a tradition of negotiated
compliance with interventionist methods. This meant that regional policy became
less discretionary, and officials surrendered their elective powers.
If this sounds excessively Whiggish, it is because it constitutes only two thirds of
the story. By itself, economic intelligence and political will would not have secured
an active regional policy response. The macroeconomic environment had to
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provide a pool of potentially mobile industry. The third wave of postwar motor
industry expansion provided this footloose investment. It is not an overstatement
to say that motor industry expansion became regional policy execution. From
1960-62, this sector's building programme accounted for 78% of total grants and
87% of building grants payable under the Local Employment Act (PRO 1963a).
But as well as providing a unique insight into policy administration, the motor
sector also allows us to scrutinize the behaviour of industrial capital. The third
wave of motor industry expansion provides a valuable opportunity to test the
questions of professionalism raised by Chandler (1990), together with Reich's
(1990) provocative view of state/industry relations. This chapter suggests that the
location bargain discriminated against the British-owned firms. BMC in particular
was disadvantaged by its federated structure and spread of production facilities.
The company's negotiators needed to secure expansion for several Southern and
Midland sites, and this eroded their negotiating strength. By contrast, Ford and
Vauxhall could contemplate larger single site projects, and were able to exert
greater pressure to secure the best Development Area sites.
This process was enhanced because the American-owned subsidiaries proved
better briefed and prepared than their British counterparts. Ford and Vauxhall
were willing to submit their plans earlier, and in much greater detail than either
BMC or Rootes. In doing so, the foreign-owned subsidiaries drew on a wealth of
American managerial experience. In turn, the indigenous firms were handicapped
by uncertainty deriving from the frantic merger activity of the late 1950s. While
managers became distracted by boardroom politics and the possibility of hostile
take-overs, rationalisation plans were delayed and production planning suffered.
As a result, UK firms were at a competitive disadvantage throughout the
negotiation process.
§6.2 Reviewing Policy
In September 1957, The Scotsman ran an article which argued that the country
was losing its place in the distribution of new industrial building.' Within one year
of the Scotsman 's piece, the paper was confronted by significant increases in local
'The Scotsman, 18 Sept. 1957.
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unemployment. These reflected the first significant downturn in the performance
of the traditional sectors on which Scotland, Wales and the North West depended
(coalmining, shipbuilding and railway equipment).
From the late 1940s to the mid 1950s, these industries had benefited from strong
demand and buoyant order books. But in the five years between 1958 and 1963,
they shed over a quarter of a million employees (one fifth of their total). The
explanations are various, but centre on the clearance of the postwar backlog in
shipbuilding, competition from alternative fuels, and deflationary pressures in the
wider economy. Figure 6.1 gives an indication of the impact of these forces.
FIGURE 6.1
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Despite McCrone's arguments (1969, P. 117), the decline of the traditional
industries was not 'almost totally unforeseen'. While Scott (1996, p.45) has
demonstrated that officials were aware of potential problems, it is also clear that
Board of Trade witnesses mounted a vigorous defence of the existing
Development Areas in their evidence to the Estimates Committee in 1956.2 But
Scott's contention that officials became active regional policy advocates is flawed;
it ignores the fact that the dominant ideology remained market based and anti-
regulation. As political pressure for a more active regional policy increased,
economic orthodoxy was only grudgingly abandoned. The Board of Trade was
forced into a period of intellectual gymnastics, as officials conducted a policy
review which was designed to justify a more rigorous programme. This culminated
in the 1958 Distribution of Industry (Finance) Act and a much stronger use of
IDCs.
From 1956-58 the government faced countervailing economic arguments. On the
macroeconomic level, inflationary concerns questioned the commitment to full
employment; on the microeconomic level, the dissemination of research on spatial
cost patterns and industrial movement strengthened the case for a regional policy
response.
The macroeconomic critique related to a continuing debate on the dangers of full
employment and creeping inflation. These fears reached their peak when
Thorneycroft became Chancellor in 1957. As Brittan argues (1971, p.128),
'Thorneycroft's reign is quite correctly associated with the first lurch towards
deflation, in which the postwar objectives of full employment and economic
expansion to which Butler and Macmillan had both been dedicated seemed for a
time to be abandoned'. Although initially unwilling to sacrifice domestic demand
for price stability, the chancellor later embarked on a series of deflationary policies
which culminated in the famous 'September measures'.
It is somewhat ironic that inflationary fears threatened regional policy initiatives.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, similar concerns led to calls for a stronger
distribution programme. By this time, economists were examining regional Philips
2 The same point is obvious in HMSO (1955), questions 1141-1 164. For the Board's view of the
proceedings PRO (1955a).
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curve relationships, and had discovered that persistent disparities in unemployment
could easily lead to wage inflation in high employment areas. 3 Economists
suggested that institutional structures allowed these pressures to be transmitted
elsewhere, and that a successful anti-inflationary policy should discriminate
between regions. Thus regional policy was characterised as both 'a useful weapon
in containing inflation and in obtaining a more efficient utilisation of manpower'
(Hart & Mackay 1975, p. 281).
Although these ideas were not unknown to economists in the 1940s and 1950s,
they were not fully articulated until empirical data became available and testable
hypotheses could be developed. 4 Once again, economic intelligence lagged behind
policy issues, reflecting Parson's view that economists had 'abdicated their
responsibility to provide a theoretical rationale for regional policy to geographers
and planners' (1986, p.131).
By contrast, the countervailing microeconomic evidence had been slowly
accumulating since the commissioning of the Clay Committee in the late 1 940s.
After 1951, the programme resulted in a string of publications. 5 In the wider
academic community, Nicholson (1956) produced an article based on the Census
of Production, and many overseas based studies were completed. 6
 However, the
Board of Trade was principally concerned with the British mainland, and 1M6 had
already accumulated a wealth of practical experience. By itself, this suggested that
many firms could be relocated without encountering significant long term losses.
Although officials recognised evidence of informational failure and entrepreneurial
irrationality in this data, they had not yet been prepared to coerce firms into
moving. But when a new political imperative was determined, the Board was
forced to re-examine its position. Once officials abandoned their preconceptions,
they realised that the evidence supported a much more interventionist stance.
a sununary of these ideas, see Brown (1972, PP. 237-42).
Cowling & Metcalf (1967, pp. 33-4) provide an excellent discussion of the data's limitations.
Although Luttrell's work was delayed, he was nevertheless able to produce a preliminary report
by 1952.
6 E.g. Cotterill (1950), Craig (1957), Greenhut (1956), Isard and Capron (1949) Kennelly (1954,
1955a, 1955b), Lindberg (1953), Rodgers (1952) Tiebout (1957). For a review of this literature
see Smith (1981, pp. 284-355).
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Decisive political pressure came from a number of sources. First, there was the
opposition's calls for a 'return' to industrial steering; second, there was increasing
pressure from the regions for a more dirigiste policy; third, the professional
planning community had found an effective voice; and finally, Harold Macmillan
had succeeded to the Tory leadership.
The basis of the Labour Party's call was a return to the strategy it had pursued in
1945-51 (Parsons 1986, p.1 10). The appeals were led by Douglas Jay, who
highlighted the rising tide of regional employment from 1956 as evidence of
Conservative economic mismanagement. Unfortunately, Jays's policy prescriptions
failed to ignite either public or professional interest (Self 1959). Labour's lack of
new ideas effectively sidelined the issue, allowing the Conservatives to focus on
the national economic position. 7 During the subsequent election campaign, the
Tories developed this theme, characterising unemployment blackspots as curable
'local phenomena', and adopting the slogan 'Life's better with the Conservatives -
don't let Labour ruin it'. 8 The Distribution of Industry (Finance) Act was crucial
to this strategy, since it demonstrated Tory concern without detracting from
national economic achievements.9
But while opposition demands were important for the initial policy response, in the
longer term, regional pressure became vital. Lobby groups were more active
In a debate on unemployment (Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Mar. 18, 1959, col. 437),
the Minister of Labour and National service, lain Macleod was able to produce the following
quotations:
The Financial Times - ' My Jay presents his proposals with a flourish. But in
fact they differ only marginally from what the Government is already doing.'
The Economist - 'He has to strain fairly hard to make the broad policy he has
in mind look veiy different from the one he is attacking.'
The Manchester Guardian - ' The only real difference between them is that
Opposition would like the bullying and the bribing to be done more
vigorously.'
8 Butler and Rose (1960, pp. 75-97) provide an analysis of the television and radio campaign.
During five television election broadcasts, both Labour and the Conservatives twice featured
fears of increased local unemployment. The Conservatives described blackspots as 'pockets'
which were taken seriously by government ministers, whereas Labour used local unemployment
differences to highlight the government's faltering commitment to full employment. See also
(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Mar. 18, 1959, col. 437).
Butler and Rose (1960, P. 138) argue that unemployment was an important issue in several
places, especially Scotland. One Conservative candidate with 8% of his electorate out of work,
was forced to modi1y the Conservative's national 'prosperity' theme.
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throughout the 1950s, and the progressive decline of the Conservative's Scottish
vote helped to convince politicians that a more robust approach was needed.
The Scottish lobby enjoyed natural cohesion. As well as a distinct national identity,
Scottish interests had long opposed Whitehall's weak regional policy response. In
1944, Tom Johnston, the wartime Secretary of State, had persuaded local
authorities to commission an industrial plan for Clydeside. When this study was
published, it criticised the existing Distribution of Industry Act for being too weak.
It suggested that postwar measures amounted to little more than short term
reliance on shortages of building materials and factory floor space, and advocated
industrial restructuring throughout the Clyde Valley.
The Cairncross Committee explored similar themes (albeit within the context of
growth point strategy), and the ideas were further developed in the Toothill
Report of 1961. Both of these studies were commissioned by the Scottish Council,
which provided a rallying point for industry, the trade unions and local
authorities.' 0 Allied to a strong local press, these sectional interests made regional
policy an important local concern. They were also adept in mounting single issue
campaigns, as seen in the Ravenscraig decision of 1957.
As far back as 1955, the Iron and Steel board had recommended the building of a
new strip mill. In 1957, the Scottish Council convened a conference to mobilise
public opinion, winning support from the Scottish Trades Union Congress, the
Secretary of State for Scotland, and most Scottish MPs. The new strip mill was
coveted by several Development Areas, and sites in South Wales and Lincoinshire
were also proposed. But by far the greatest furore was raised in Scotland, dulled
only slightly by the opposition of local steel producers (Payne 1985, p.96).
The final decision reflected political rather then economic concerns, and was
settled through informal negotiations with Sir Andrew McCance, chairman of the
Scottish steel makers Colvilles. Sims and Wood (1984, p. 20) provide a useful
summary of events:
10 The Scottish Council (Trade and Industry) was fonned from the merger of the Scottish
Council on Industry and the old Scottish Development Council in June 1946. See Saville (1985,
p.45).
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McCance fiercely rejected any suggestion that the Welsh company Richard,
Thomas and Baldwin (RTB) might build a mill in Scotland. To obviate this
competition, he proposed a split development for both regions [Wales and
Scotland]. This compromise allowed Colvilles to retain their monopoly in
Scotland and RTB to increase capacity. Minister of Power Lord Mills
endorsed the McCance plan which the Cabinet ratified in 1958. This formula
appealed to the Conservative government, not only because it focused public
attention on their regional strategy prior to the General Election, but also
because it shared public resources between two of the most deprived areas
of the UK.
The Ravenscraig decision was taken at Cabinet level, avoiding the Board of
Trade's location machinery. But the decision had important implications for 1M6,
since it demonstrated that a new political force was at work.
TABLE 6.1
LABOUR AND CONSERVATIVE SHARES OF THE VOTES IN SCOTLAND
AND ENGLAND, GENERAL ELECTIONS 1945-87
Conservative (%)	 Labour (%)
	
SNP (%)































































































































Source: Kendrick and McCrone (1989, p.50)
The decline of the Conservative's Scottish support has been well documented. In
1955, the party had secured half of Scotland's available votes, by 1987 this figure
had dropped to one quarter (Table 6.1). The decline began in the mid 1950s, with
the Tory's share dropping from 50.1% (1955), to 47.2% (1959). The turning point
is more apparent in the 'combined gap' between Labour and Conservative voting
in Scotland and England (Table 6.2). This is calculated as the Labour gap - the
149
Labour share in Scotland minus the Labour share in England, plus the
Conservative gap - the Conservative share in England minus the Conservative
share in Scotland. The trend shows a swing towards Labour, beginning in the late
1950s and interrupted only briefly by the SNP's electoral success from 1966 to
October 1974.
TABLE 6.2
DIFFERENCES IN LABOUR AND CONSERVATIVE PERFORMANCES iN
SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND 1945-87
Labour advantage in Scotland	 Conservative shortfall in	 'Combined gap'
Scotland
1945	 -.0.9	 -0.9	 -1.8
1950	 0.0	 -1.0	 -1.0
1951	 -0.9	 0.2	 -0.7
1955	 -0.1	 0.3	 0.2
1959	 3.1	 1.7	 5.8
1964	 5.2	 3.5	 8.7
1966	 1.9	 5.0	 6.9
1970	 1.1	 10.3	 11.4
Feb. 1974	 -1.0	 7.3	 6.3
Oct. 1974	 -3.8	 14.2	 10.4
1979	 4.9	 15.8	 20.7
1983	 8.2	 17.6	 25.8
1987	 12.9	 22.2	 35.1
Source: Kendrick & McCrone (1989 P. 591).
Analyses of these figures have focused on several elements, including devolution,
the religious cleavage between Protestantism and Catholicism, regional economic
performance and attitudes towards nationalisation (Kendrick & McCrone 1989 pp.
594-96). The literature is complicated, and disagreements have arisen over both
methodology and results. But what is clear is that the Conservative downturn
coincided with increasing economic hardship. Ever since Kramer's (1971) work on
American voting behaviour and Goodhart and Bhansali's (1970) seminal paper, a
large literature has argued that voters reward governments for good economic
news and punish them for bad." This appears to be true at both national and
constituency levels, and Seawright and Curtice (1995) have suggested that it was
" See also Sanders eta! (1987).
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the government's short-term economic record which determined the Scottish
Conservative's poor showing in 1959.12
Whatever the real explanation, the Conservatives recognised the need for a
'regional dimension' in their policies. As a result, fear of electoral failure helped to
determine the new political environment in which the Board of Trade was forced
to operate.
Before considering the third source of political pressure, it is interesting to
consider how the electoral arguments fit in with Gordon's (1990) regional policy
critique. Gordon argued that the persistence of British regional policy reflected an
attempt to 'maintain the class based dual party system of national politics by
minimising the importance of other elements of political preference' (1990, p.427).
According to Gordon, the Downs-Hotelling model predicts that a stable multi-
party equilibrium is only possible with the emergence of multiple dimensions of
political conflict. Viewed in these terms, the late 1950s sees a successful Tory
response redirecting attention towards two-party issues. The Labour Party's class
based campaign, famously dissected in Abrams and Rose's Must Labour Lose
(1960), seems to reflect similar concerns.
The third component forcing administrative change was the strengthening voice of
the planning community. The postwar divide between planning and distribution of
industry policy has already been discussed. By the late 1950s, this schism was the
subject of growing professional and academic concern. Parsons (1986, pp. 129-
51) suggests that the gap was bridged during the early 1960s thanks to renewed
academic interest, the development of growth point theory, and the higher profile
given to macro-planning solutions. An example is provided by the Town and
Country Planning Association and the Town Planning Institute, who proved to be
effective lobbyists in support of integrated regional planning.'3
Unfortunately, many of Parsons' observations post-date the Board of Trade's
distribution review. But it is possible to trace the origins of these trends
throughout the 1950s. For example, growth point theory had been discussed in the
12 On the wider issue of constituency voting see Gibson (1992), Johnson & Pattie (1992), Owens
& Wade (1988).
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Barlow Commission, and Cairncross had resurrected the concept in 1952. The
idea received academic respectability with the publication of Francois Perroux's
Pole de croissance in 1955, while Allen, Odber and Bowden (1957) used the
technique in their studies of the North East. Similarly, Cherry has described how
planners coveted a greater political role, culminating in wider participation in
Parliamentary enquiries and an increasingly critical professional literature.' 4 As
greater recognition was paid to the profession, it became harder for the
government to dismiss its criticisms. The planners' calls succeeded by adding
substance and respectability to the existing pleas from hard-pressed Development
Areas.
The final element underlying the Conservative's new approach was Harold
Macmillan. The crucial issue here is what Brittan labelled 'the economics of
Stockton on Tees' (1971, p. 124). Macmillan himself commented that 'I was
constantly accused. . . by somewhat cold-blooded commentators, of being far too
concerned about the personal tragedy of unemployed families. This was, it was
alleged, a survival from the traumatic experience of Teesside in the years of the
Great Depression' (Macmillan 1972, p. 218).
Certainly Macmillan regarded unemployment and the depressed areas as
synonymous terms, but his memoirs suggest a curious modesty. Although he
clearly favoured an interventionist stance, both Pointing the Way and Riding the
Storm contain very few references to 'the regional problem'. The difference
between Macmillan and his predecessors was a willingness to contemplate
coercion. This was transmitted to the Board of Trade through the appointment of
David Eccles, and the Prime Minister's personal intervention in key location
decisions (i.e. Ravenscraig). Together with the other three factors, Macmillan's
For example, in March 1960, the Town and Country Planning Association organised a
national conference to discuss the 'crisis in regional planning' Parsons (1986, P. 134).
' Cherry (1974, p. 159), quoting from Sir Frederic Osborne in a speech to a 1951 Planning
Institute Summer School:
'As officials you have muzzles on your lips and chains on your anides. But they are not a tight
fit; you can still mumble common sense and shuffle towards the light. . . If there are not padlocks
on your hearts as well, it may well be that the immediate hope for a re-emphasis of the social
purposes of planning lies largely with you, if you can contrive to have all the issues put clearly to
the public in the publicity of your draft plans'.
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interest created the political imperative necessary for a wide-ranging policy
review.
The Board of Trade seems to have been under pressure to re-examine its
distribution policy as early as 1956. In June of that year, a meeting between the
Parliamentary Secretary and two senior 1M6 officials, Levine and Fish, expanded
its brief on financial inducements to consider the wider implications of stiffening
DC policy (PRO 1956). The Parliamentary Secretary argued that it might 'now be
the time' for more positive industrial steering, and recommended a more rigorous
sifting of 1DCs at Millbank. Officials responded with some very well rehearsed
arguments, including the possibility of uneconomic production, the threat to
exports, and possible loss of new investment projects. Nevertheless, the
Parliamentary Secretary pressed his case, and ordered an investigation, the
Andrew Report, into policy alternatives and current administrative performance.
This meeting predates both the Macmillan premiership and the appointment of
Eccles to the Board of Trade. But the official files omit any reference to the study
until April 1957. In a discussion paper which closely mirrored the Andrew brief, a
research officer (Hallam) called for 'a toughening out of policy'. Amongst his
proposals were:
•	 more scrutiny of applications
•	 an acceptance of 'reasonable delay' in cases where there is the opportunity
to influence location
•	 an undertaking to make it clear that the Board will rethse certificates- 'if this
were known the firms might take us more seriously'.
changing the burden of proof in cases where firms claim they are tied to an
area (firms should have to demonstrate that ties exist, rather then the Board
being forced to show that they do not).
•	 a recognition that 'lock stock and barrel' moves are the best opportunities to
get employment into the regions
•	 official acceptance that 'movement from a more congested part of a region
to less congested part is still increasing congestion' (PRO 1957b).
This approach was justified in both political and economic terms. The paper noted
that, 'On the one hand, there is the interest recently shown by the Opposition in
the House of Commons and interest generally shown in the House of Lords: on














building' (PRO 1957b). In the short term, this view of factory development proved
inaccurate. It was not until 1959/60 that new building (proxied through DC
approvals) exceeded the levels of 1956 (Figure 6.2). But the notion of a new
political imperative was absolutely correct.
FIGURE 6.2
FACTORY BUILDING APPROVALS, 1952-64
0	 20000	 40000	 60000	 80000	 100000
Thousand Square Feet
Source: Board of Trade (1955), DC statistics supplied by Brian Ashcroft.
By June of 1958, there is evidence that the Board of Trade was ready to capitulate
to this political pressure and contemplate a much tougher regime. The consequent
review of policy illustrated that very little had changed since the Attlee period:
Our present policy is to grant permission to expand where the project could
not reasonably be carried out elsewhere. There is no scientific test, and at
present we use the 'persuasion principle' in any situation of promise. In the
last resort we have not been prepared to refuse (except perhaps where a
major expansion is involved) where the firm is adamant that it could not
move (PRO 1957b).
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The document continued, '. . . The light rein has become known, and the policy of
persuasion and bluff has become less effective' (PRO 1958). However, the paper
was ambivalent towards policy responses. It noted that the amount of steerable
projects was quite low, and that officials were far from confident in their ability to
select vulnerable firms. The solution was to apply a universal control, where
discrimination was not permitted unless a point of policy was involved. The
measures would apply to both congested and neutral areas, and would allow very
little latitude in individual case management. In effect, these proposals removed
civil servants from the decision-making loop. This reflected legal advice, and a
perceived institutional need to force lower level bureaucrats to challenge
entrepreneurial freedoms.
The paper concluded in a cautionary manner. Although it described strict policy as
a 'gamble', for the first time it hinted at broader conceptions of efficiency.
The conclusion is that the inauguration of a more rigorous policy would
have more far reaching consequences and would be a gamble. One would
have to announce it to assuage the first victims, and there would be great
interest in getting it reversed in all cases. The size of the gamble is measured
in very rough and ready terms by the value to the economy of the approvals
which we are present giving in the congested areas. A restrictive policy
would tend to bear particularly harshly on progressive and enterprising
firms, as in general, these are the ones which are expanding. However, the
measure of the cost is also, in obverse, the measure of the opportunity (PRO
1958).
These quotations demonstrate some fundamental truths about the Board's
changing approach. Officials recognised that there were difficult administrative
problems associated with controls. Nevertheless, they were willing to offer
practical solutions. Political circumstances were forcing officials to re-examine
their free market ideals. They had already accepted that informational failures
dominated location decisions, the next step was to accept coercion as a legitimate
device in securing the most commercially efficient distribution of industry. This
idea would take many years to germinate, but the political imperatives of the
1950s made this process inevitable. Hallam summarised the changing mood:
The Midlands is itself one of the greatest industrial concentrations in the
world, and its expansion from 1953-56 must have been good for the UK
economy, but if the area is to continue to make a contribution, the expansion
must at least marginally be halted. We have hitherto overlooked the fact that
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limiting congestion might well be a creditable aim in itself. The question is
do we want a control, do we want to make the operation of Section 14(4) of
the Town and Country Planning Act a purposeful instrument of policy? At
the moment we are not operating a control in the Midlands. We have powers
and we are not using them, but reading the debate in the House of Lords on
March 27, it seems that the public expect us to (PRO 1957b).
§6.3 Applying Policy
The new regional policy approach was embodied in changing administrative
arrangements and the passing of the 1958 Distribution of Industry (Industrial
Finance) Act. The Act was reactive rather than proactive, extending financial
assistance to pockets of high unemployment and increasing the scope of existing
payments.
At this time, the Board's attitude towards financial assistance was transformed. As
we have seen, the 'efficiency first' criteria had previously denied assistance to
many firms considering relocation. The Board had also displayed an almost
pathological aversion to face to face negotiations. This was because officials were
keen to avoid case conferences where businesses could prolong negotiations and
demand unfair concessions. According to the Parliamentary Secretary, the Pressed
Steel case of 1956 had been'. . .a good example of the difficulties under which the
Government's negotiations were conducted. The firm had asked what assistance
could be offered and had then sought to negotiate for more assistance starting
from that basis; it seemed this process would go on and on' (PRO 1956).
By 1959, Macmillan's political commitment and the results of the Andrew Report
had begun to change official perceptions. In January, 1M6 launched a campaign to
publicise DATAC's facilities; in July, the Chancellor conceded that greater
incentives could be made available in the Development Areas (PRO 1959a). The
results were palpable. From July 23rd, 1958, to February 3rd, 1960, DATAC
received 1,350 preliminary enquiries, these produced 527 'eligible applications', of
which 165 were recommended, 238 were rejected, and 124 remained under review
(Table 6.3). A total of £9,102,595 was allocated to these schemes, providing
support for approximately 13,500 additional jobs (HMSO 1962).
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TABLE 6.3
APPLICATIONS FOR FiNANCIAL ASSISTANCE UNDER TIlE













Total number received	 279	 66
Recommended by DATAC	 94	 16
Rejected by DATAC	 147	 29
Still under consideration	 38	 21
Source: PRO (1962d)
Although similar approval rates were recorded during the 1 940s, there was still a
massive increase in scale. Under Labour there had been an average turnover of 30
applications per year; in 1959/60, the number of bids had increased seventeen fold.
The finding was also much greater, attracting £3.1 million in 1959/60, compared
to an annual average of £580,000 between 1946/7 and 1950/51. Total regional
policy spending remained below Labour's record only because of the factory
building programme, which had fallen steadily from its peak of £12.5 million in
1947-8 to £1.5 million in 1958/9 (HMSO 1973a, p. 457).
However, the important changes in regional policy were reserved for IDCs. In
Randall's words (1973, p. 30), the government became guilty of oversteer, '. . . an
excessive swing of the pendulum that in some cases frustrated sensible industrial
developments in the Midlands and South East (often outside the big cities) which
could not have taken place in the Development Areas'.
The statistics on DC refusals support this interpretation. The year 1959 can be
identified as a turning point, separating periods of active and passive
administration (Figure 6.3). This is also apparent from Figure 6.4 which shows
how restrictions began to bite on a much lower level in 1959/60.
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FIGURE 6.3
PERCENTAGE OF BUILDING PROJECTS REFUSED AN IDC iN THE
SOUTH EAST REGION, 1956-77
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Source: DC statistics supplied by Brian Ashcroft
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This harsher approach occasioned complaints from both ministers and business
leaders. At a regional controllers' conference in March 1959, the Parliamentary
Secretary thought it necessary to remind officials to respect efficiency defences.
The problem was that 1M6 officials and their regional staff had adopted a very
rigid administrative code. At this stage, distribution of industry policy was
politically driven, and most bureaucrats had not yet fully abandoned their free
market sympathies. Under acute ministerial pressure, top officials developed a
framework which guaranteed results. While policy studies continued in the
background, civil servants had been forced to surrender their elective powers.
It is here that the motor industry becomes especially relevant. Its third wave of
postwar expansion coincided with the change in location policy. Between 1959
and 1960, it became the focus of the entire distribution programme. Although the
negotiations were completed at ministerial level, the associated empirical studies,
regional lobbying and theoretical developments forced the Board of Trade to
finally abandon its laissez faire approach.
At the time, all the major British based motor manufacturers were contemplating
expansion. Their strategies were mixed, but, in general, they derived from the
same fordist motives which had driven previous waves of growth. From 1958 to
1960, seven large proposals were submitted. Each bid had its own logic, but all
reflected a renewed confidence in the motor industry's prospects.'5
The earliest approach was made by Chrylser. For some time, the American
company had been contemplating further European expansion. Unlike Ford and
GM, Chrysler had traditionally shunned overseas based manufacturing. The
reasons were complex, but related to operating scale, internal rivalries and design
In 1958 there was a change of policy. After taking advice from the
McKinsey Company, Chrysler developed an Anglo-French investment strategy
(Moritz & Seaman 1981, p. 84). The company acquired a 25% stake in Simca, and
targeted Rolls Royce, Standard and Leyland for take-over. Chrysler was
' 5 Brief details of these schemes may be found in Goodwin (1962).
' 6 Mori & Seaman (1981) Ch 3. provides a useful summary of these issues.
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convinced of both the European sales potential, and the importance of the
Commonwealth market.
Unfortunately, the company's British approaches were rebuffed. As a
consequence, the board was forced to adopt a fall-back position. Chrysler
proposed a UK operation catering exclusively for the export market (PRO 1959g).
The scheme was in two stages, with a pilot plant operating from existing premises
in London, to be superseded by a large scale assembly shop. No location had been
determined for this larger plant.
Ford's scheme was the next to be submitted (PRO 1960g). The company wanted
to expand its production from 400,000 to 700,000 units per year. Ford preferred
to stay in the Dagenham area, concentrating production around Basildon New
Town, while freeing space at its main plant. Their investment was costed at
approximately £15 million, and, like Chrysler, was aimed squarely at the
Commonwealth and European markets. Vauxhall's scheme shadowed Ford's
proposals, with a planned increase in passenger vehicle production and an
expanded model range.'7 Again substantial new installations were needed, and the
company favoured sites close to their existing facilities in Luton.
BMC's proposals were the most ambitious of the seven. The Board intended to
increase production from 750,000 to 1,000,000 units a year (Vauxhall Motors Ltd
1973, p.463). BMC planned to export at least half of these vehicles, valuing the
current account benefit at £200 million per year. The programme involved
considerable reorganisation, but it was not a unitary development. There were six
separate elements, ranging from tractor production to washing machine plants.
This was a legacy of the company's federated structure, and it succeeded in
making BMC particularly vulnerable to distribution policy. Whereas Ford and
Vauxhall could concentrate on single issues, the British firm needed to secure
agreement on a variety of proposals. This gave Ministers more scope to influence
the company's location.
'' Very few details are provided of Vauxhall's original proposal in the official records, although
it is clear from later submissions to the Expenditure Committee that their preferred site was in
Luton (Vauxhall Motors Ltd, 1973, p.463).
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Unlike the other programmes, Standard Triumph's plans were largely defensive.
Standard's chairman, Alick Dick, had long recognised that the company was too
small to survive in a competitive market (Langworth & Robson 1979, p.188).
After merger negotiations with Rootes (1957), Rover (1954,1958) and Massey
Ferguson (1959) had failed, Dick embarked on an ambitious plan to secure long
term economies of scale (Whisler 1995, p23). He planned a new model range,
spearheaded by volume production of the Triumph Herald. Parallel with this plan,
the chairman aimed to secure far greater control over component supply. As the
Group Development Plan explained, 'It is essential that if the Standard Triumph
Group is to maintain its position as a major motor manufacturer, reduce its costs.
and increase its profit margins, it should control a far higher proportion of its
sources of component supply' (MRC 1959a).
Standard's first steps were to acquire Mulliners Limited and Fisher & Ludlow in
Coventry. This increased body making capacity to 185,000, still well below the
corporate target of 300,000 per year. 18 So in 1959, Standard also acquired Halls
Engineering of Liverpool. This went some way to completing Dick's plan, but it
was clear that a new site would eventually be needed. The company wanted to use
premises in Coventry, but soon encountered the Government's new DC policy.
The Rootes proposals have been the most documented of the seven.' 9 From 1955,
a team of company designers had been exploring the option of adding a small car
to the Rootes line-up. This was a clear departure from the existing strategy, which
had specialised in producing dozens of medium sized, family vehicles (Hillmans,
Singers and Sunbeams). Nevertheless, the proposals gained the personal backing
of the Rootes brothers, and became the centre of the firm's long term planning.
Geoffley Rootes explained why:
Rootes decision to expand in the late 1 950s was because of the growing
importance of the small car market in the UK . . . and this was a sector in
which we were not represented. We had for many years been working on the
design of a vehicle to fill this gap and the Hiliman Imp was in advanced state
of design and prototype testing. It was for this reason that we wished to
18 Body making capacity at this time was: Triumph Herald 120,000, Vanguard 25,000, Triumph
Sports 28,000, Atlas Commercial 12,000.
' Sims and Wood (1984), Henshaw & Henshaw (1988); Young and Hood (1977), Waymark
(1983).
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expand our manufacturing capacity which was necessary to fill the gap in
our model range.2°
The Imp was a revolutionary vehicle, and its production required new capacity.2'
Rootes earmarked land at Dunstable and Coventry for expansion, and soon began
designing modern facilities (Young & Hood 1977, P. 75). Sims and Wood (1984,
p.28) suggest that Rootes delayed announcing their project 'in the hope that the
larger firms would take up regional locations.' Certainly, Rootes submitted their
plans later than their competitors, but this was part of an established pattern. It
reflected a culture where the Rootes brothers had traditionally dictated their terms
to government. They had grown used to presenting officials with afait accompli,
locking civil servants out of the planning process, and using patriotic appeals to
secure results. This strategy had worked before 1959, but in 1960 it would prove
dangerous.
Pressed Steel's expansion proposals derived from the other motor industry
projects. Pressed Steel was a body builder which maintained a number of other
manufacturing interests. In 1960, the company was seeking permission to expand
in three, possibly four locations. The company already operated plants in Swindon,
Oxford, Theale and Linwood. Linwood had hitherto been the only long term
motoring regional policy success, although Pressed Steel had used the plant to
manufacture rolling stock rather than car bodies (Sims & Wood 1984, pp 16-17).
Pressed Steel had recently won a contract to supply car bodies to BMC at Cowley,
and requested an expansion of 820,000 square feet at Swindon, employing an
additional 1,400 men. The firm also proposed a new tool making plant in the
North East employing 1,000, as well as a further expansion of their refrigerator
plant at Swansea (PRO 1960k). In addition, the company wanted to expand its
Linwood factory by 700,000 square feet, should Rootes decide to expand in
Scotland. 22 Together this package represented a potential employment package of
nearly 10,000, with more than 60% of the jobs in high unemployment areas.
20 Quoted by Allan (1991, p.3).
Henshaw & Henshaw (1988) provide a detailed outline of the car's design and marketing.
Pressed Steel estimated additional employment Linwood of approximately 5,000 (Sims &
Wood 1984, PP. 16-17)
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The final proposals were submitted by Rover. At that time, the company was one
of the smaller British manufacturers, employing about 10,000 people with an
annual output of 50,000 vehicles (PRO, 1960j). The company relied on Land
Rover sales, constituting over two thirds of its output in 1959/60 (Austin Rover
1985). Rover planned to expand production to between 80,000 and 100,000
vehicles, with the new P6 2000 spearheading its sales campaign (Robson 1984, pp.
144-47). To facilitate this, the board applied for 1 million square feet of new
buildings at its Solihull factory, estimating that 2,000 extra jobs would be created.
All the schemes shared certain characteristics. They revealed a preference for in
situ expansion, they reflected optimistic market forecasts, and they illustrated the
search for greater economies of scale. However, the subsequent government
negotiations underlined crucial differences in managerial behaviour. These
negotiations were divided into three phases; the first centring on attempts to
secure approval, the second focusing on alternative locations, with the third round
relating to compensation deals. It is worth examining each stage.
Within weeks of the 1959 election, Macmillan had ordered the formation of a new
Distribution of Industry Committee. The membership consisted of the President of
the Board of Trade (Reginald Maudling), his department's Parliamentary
Secretary, the Secretary of State for Scotland, the Minister of Housing, the
Paymaster General, the Minister of Labour, and the Treasury's Economic
Secretary. The committee's terms of reference were straightforward, 'To consider
problems arising from distribution of industry policy and local unemployment'. In
practice this meant that it would vet the motor industry's plans, and oversee the
introduction of Macmillan's new regional policy.
Initial committee meetings concentrated on establishing guidelines for motor
industry negotiations. As President of the Board of Trade, Maudling enjoyed a
much stronger mandate than his predecessors. His views on distribution policy
were unrecognisable from those of Thorneycroft's. Using the analogy of a small
boat, he explained how
all those in her may rationally calculate that the seats in the stern are
most attractive, but if they all rush simultaneously to get there, the result is
disaster. In just the same way the rush of industry to the Midlands and the
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South East was threatening the stability of our economy. . . Either we had to
run the economy too hard to make sure enough jobs were created in the
North and Scotland, or we had to restrain growth in the South and Midlands
at the cost of persistent unemployment and wasted resources in those other
areas. The simple fact is that people are not movable like pieces on an
economist's chess-board. Heaven forbid that they should ever become so
(Maudling 1978, p.81).
In general, the Distribution of Industry Committee endorsed these views. But the
body also recognised a need to safeguard commercial efficiency. In a meeting on
17th December 1959, a broad policy was established. First, the committee took a
firm stand against the expansion of existing installations in the South and
Midlands. Second, it recognised that 'in an integrated industry such as motor
manufacturing, it would be unrealistic to forbid altogether expansions in existing
installations.' It concluded, 'On these grounds it might be more reasonable to try
to use approval of a modest expansion of existing installations as a means of
persuading the industry to undertake major new developments elsewhere' (PRO
1959h). This approach was much more in keeping with the French system of
Agrément.
By November 1959, Maudling had already attended preliminary meetings with
several motor makers. He had told both Chrysler and Ford that expansion in the
South was unacceptable. In both cases he indicated that Development Areas
should receive the largest share of new investment. It was this policy which the
Distribution of Industry Committee ratified. The pattern was repeated with all the
major manufacturers, who were told that their existing plans were inconsistent
with 'the proper distribution of industry'.
It is difficult to say whether the Conservatives would have been willing to forego
investment if the motor makers had refused to relocate. The Board of Trade was
certainly aware of the risks, having studied the possibility during its 1958 review.
But the motor firms were desperate to expand. Given the various market forecasts
and individual corporate priorities, the balance of negotiating power clearly rested
No refusal certificates were issued, instead Maudling informed the chairmen personally.
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with the state. Any remaining qualms about imposing 'uneconomic' locations were
allayed because Maudling could offer an improved compensation package.24
In their 1959 manifesto, the Conservatives had promised that 'Our first major Bill
in the next Parliament will be one to remodel and strengthen our powers for
coping with local unemployment' (Butler & Rose 1960, appendix). The
subsequent Local Employment Act has been variously been described as a 'tidying
up' act, a 'first aid' package, and 'a natural dividing line in the development of
postwar regional policy'. 25 Its immediate aim was to end some of the confusion
surrounding current legislation. The Act retained the main features of existing
loans and grants, and extended their eligibility. But the significant changes were
administrative.
In the 1 950s, DATAC's activities had been limited because a) projects had to
demonstrate that they were financially sound, b) firms had to show that they could
not raise funds from other sources, and c) Treasury officials retained a veto. The
1960 act removed these constraints. Conditions (a) and (b) were replaced by a
general statement requiring 'a reasonable chance of success'. At the same time the
Treasury lost its supervisory role when DATAC's functions were transferred to a
Board of Trade Advisory Committee (BOTAC). For Sir Frank Lee, this was a
welcome move. In a memorandum submitted to the Plowden Committee, Lee had
railed against the Treasury's stifling influence (PRO 1960m). Lee was a
conservative, who naturally disliked the idea of location planning. Nevertheless,
his department was committed to tackling unemployment blackspots. While there
was conmion intellectual ground between departments, the Board's regional policy
portfolio and the Treasury's public expenditure brief generated antagonism. This
24 A briefing paper for the Secretary of State for Scotland examined these issues: 'It seems
inconceivable that, if BMC or any other car maker stick to their guns and refuse to cany out
their major expansions anywhere but in the place of their choice, any govermuent would in the
last resort refuse them an DC there. To do so would mean forbidding the expansion of an
industry that has probably done more than any other to keep the country afloat during the last
recession and that is one of the principal export earners. Moreover, in the case of Ford and
Vauxhall, the big stick might have the effect of driving expansion out of the UK into our
common market competition. The refusal of an DC should therefore be backed up by substantial
positive inducements' (SRO 1959d).
See McCalluin (1979, p11), Parsons (1986, p. 111) and Randall (1973, pp. 30-32).
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only surfaced in the late 1950s, when political pressure forced a policy response
from 1M6.26
The Local Employment Act enabled the stick and the carrot to be combined for
the first time since 1945. But whereas Labour had concentrated on providing
factory space, the Conservatives targeted incentives towards socially desirable
projects. This provided a powerful bargaining tool, 'sweetening the pill' for
prospective migrants. As an internal document from Standard motors explained:
It would not be in the interests of the company or the Group to establish a
major unit over 100 miles away from its main production centre unless the
financial assistance forthcoming from the Government considerably offsets
the cost of establishing new buildings, plant and equipment in Development
Areas far removed from the industry's traditional centre of manufacture and
supply (MIRC 1959a).
Once the government's refusal had been communicated to the firms, the
bargaining process entered its second phase. This involved the industrialists' own
site surveys, together with active lobbying by regional interests.
The Scottish Office and Scottish Council had been targeting motor firms ever
since the Clyde Valley Industrial Plan had been published in the 1940s. In 1950,
Lord Bilsland had visited Patrick Hennessy to discuss investing in Scotland (SRO
1959e). The bid failed. In December 1959, Scottish Labour MPs met the STUC to
organise a new campaign to attract motor manufacturers (Sims & Woods 1984,
pp. 21-24). Although Sir Robert Maclean, Chairman of Scottish Industrial Estates
Limited, reported that all the major companies had recently visited the country, he
could find little cause for optimism. The perception grew that Scotland would lose
out to Merseyside and South Wales because of personal prejudices and undefined
cost penalties.
Chrysler was the first company to consider Development Area locations. In
March, Sir Robert Maclean had visited the firm's Detroit headquarters to promote
Scottish sites (SRO 1959a). This was before the Board of Trade was even aware
26 
ambivalent attitude of Board officials and the key role of political pressure is illustrated in
the following quotation'.. . we seem to be committed by what Ministers have said and done and
especially by the moves initiated by Ministers themselves around about the end of October and
the beginning of November. If you should look for a nigger in the woodpile I think it was the
Scottish election result' (PRO 1960b).
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of the company's interest. In April 1959, Chrysler's representatives were given a
tour of Scottish locations which left officials bullish. As one noted, 'If the project
comes off it will be of immense importance to the industrial future of the area.
With the subsidiary activity and employment a project of this size would generate,
we should have a very big change in the employment and industrial position in the
Lowlands. Conversely, if we do not land the project, the frustration and bitterness
caused will be intense' (PRO 1959b).
By May, the Board of Trade's headquarters had become involved. This coincided
with the completion of Chrysler's full-scale study which forecast 'in-built cost
disadvantages' for Scottish locations (PRO 1959c). The study identified several
alternative sites, including Wigan and Liverpool. From the Scottish Office, it
seemed that Millbank had poisoned the deal. These feelings were fortified when
Chrysler's officials reluctantly returned to Scotland for a final inspection. An
accompanying civil servant noted:
The day started off with the representatives making it quite clear that the
visit to Scotland was a waste of time . . Mr Clem in particular made no
attempt to disguise that this was so and he succeeded in maintaining that
attitude throughout the day. He could find nothing favourable in Scotland in
any shape or form, but it emerged that he is the most fanatical of fanatical
soccer followers and that a life which does not permit visits to Craven
Cottage and Stanford Bridge on alternative Saturdays is just not to be
contemplated (PRO 1959d).
The truth was rather different. As the Scottish Office suspected, in a direct
comparison between Merseyside and the Lowlands, the English site 'promised'
lower costs and greater proximity to suppliers. If Renfrewshire could boast
Ravenscraig, Merseyside had Summers (sheet steel), Pilkingtons (glass) and
Dunlop (tyres). In July of 1959, Mackay began lobbying Eccles for more generous
incentives to counter these disadvantages. The discussion mirrored a wider debate
between the Board of Trade and Scottish Office over the contents of the 1960
Local Employment Act. This discussion bore fruit when Maudling agreed to
operate the Bill with a Scottish bias 'when the right kind of project turns up'. A
Scottish Office minute interpreted this as straightforward commitment: 'He clearly
meant that the inducements will be screwed up to the point of bribes if there was a
completely worthwhile reason for doing so' (SRO 1959b).
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As well as demonstrating the need for a flexible incentive package, the Chrysler
case once again proved the need for effective economic intelligence to counter
industrialists' claims. The Clay Committee's findings were useful, but industry-
specific figures were required. Consequently, the Scottish Council commissioned a
report into prospective sites, component suppliers, transport facilities and cost
patterns. Using a variety of assumptions, the study identified potential suppliers for
80% of the gross component weight. Freight costs were calculated for 100
vehicles, and set against the potential savings accruing from Renfrewshire's
proximity to export ports. The exercise computed an extra cost per one hundred
vehicles of £8 7/-, and an extra cost per vehicle of 1/- 8d (Table 6.4).
TABLE 6.4
SCOTTISH COUNCiL TRANSPORT COST ESTIMATES
Assumptions:
The following balance for 100 vehicles assumes that 50 vehicles would go for export and 50 to
the home market
UK Transport:	 £:s:d.
To distribute within the UK (50 units)	 97: 10: 0
To transport of supplies (100 units) 	 60: 0: 0




From lower transport to ports (50 units)
	
(162: 10: 0)
Balance against Scottish location	 8: 7:0
Extra cost per vehicle in Scotland 	 0: 1: 8
Source: SRO (1959g)
As we shall see, many of the assumptions were hopelessly optimistic, but they did
provide the Scottish lobby with verifiable data. They also allowed government
negotiators to raise the possibility of countervailing labour cost savings. This issue
dominated talks with Pressed Steel, although pay was rarely mentioned during
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meetings with the other companies. One explanation is the lack of published
information on regional earnings. Apart from the attempts by Deane (1953) to
construct regional indices of earnings for the late 1940s and an article by Hill and
Knowles in 1956, no systematic data was available until 1962. Later estimates by
Hart and Mackay (1975) confirmed a stable regional earnings hierarchy, with
Scottish and Merseyside levels converging, but remaining well below the national
average (Table 6.5).
TABLE 6.5
ENGINEER[NG WEEKLY EARNINGS (Shillings) 1948-60
1948	 1951	 1955	 1960
Coventry	 184	 233	 323	 447
London Area	 151	 183	 262	 336
Liverpool	 143	 175	 251	 305
Scottish	 138	 139	 243	 302
Weighted Mean
	
148	 183	 257	 327
Notes:
Based on a sample of 28 Employers Engineering Federation local
associations.
Source: Hart & Mackay (1975) Table Al
Another potential explanation for pay's low priority was a stress on labour
'quality'. Lord Stokes' view that the 'inability to get labour into the Midlands was
a myth' was echoed by all the manufacturers (Stokes 1971, p 200). Throughout
the postwar period, the Midlands remained a popular destination for migrants. For
example, a 1963 Department of Environment survey estimated that inward
migration accounted for 44.5% of population growth in Coventry between 1951
and 1961.27 Turner's work (1963, pp. 122-35) identified higher wages as the
principal attraction, although executives admitted that many newcomers were ill-
suited for factory work. The thirst for workers led to an important labour relations
problem. As Eric Wigham of the Engineering Employers Federation explained:
Motor manufacturers tended to be freebooters. Their attitude was that if
anyone was to go short of labour it would not be them, and they would
27 A Ministiy of Labour study (Hariis & Clausen 1967, p. 27) confinned that the South East and
Midlands were the second and third most favoured destinations amongst migrants.
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often give way to a sudden demand from a group of workers rather than risk
loss of production.28
In this context, low wages were less important than maintaining good industrial
relations. Above all, motor bosses were keen to secure suitably qualified labour
while avoiding possible disruption. If in situ expansion was ruled out,
Development Area sites offered a chance to create new workplace environments.
Scotland, Merseyside, and the North East all stressed the adaptability of their
workforces, while seeking to downplay evidence of labour militancy. 29 In the first
years of operation, this 'flexibility' issue would dominate management thinking.
Throughout 1959, all the Development Areas actively lobbied for motor industry
investment. The shepherding of top-level executives from site to site became a
familiar ritual for Board of Trade officials. Chrysler's experiences illustrated the
issues which would dominate these discussions. All the firms were concerned
about transport costs, labour availability and communications. In most cases, this
lead to a direct preference for Merseyside. The Manchester-Liverpool corridor
offered proximity to the Midlands, development potential and good rail and road
links. But even here, the issue of compensation was critical. All the motor firms
sought to secure the greatest contribution possible under the Local Unemployment
Act. These settlements would go a long way towards meeting each firm's location
objections.
Not surprisingly, Chrysler was the first case to be resolved. Once Scotland had
been eliminated as a location, the Americans pressed for approval in London and
Wigan. In a letter to David Eccles, John Mackay argued for a transport subsidy to
push Chrysler northwards (PRO 1959e). But by late 1959, the firm was already
questioning its European strategy. On the one hand, an American steel strike was
threatening US production, on the other, there was great uncertainty about
Britain's future in Europe (PRO 19590. Chrysler's poor financial results
compounded these issues, and forced the project's abandonment. 3° Although
28 Quoted by Sims & Wood (1984, p. 24).
° This proved particularly difficult in Scotland where the Daily Record and Scottish Daily
Express ran a series of articles on 'strike happy' Clydeside workers. See Sims & Wood (1984,
p.23).
° Chrysler recorded losses of $73m in 1958-9 and $lOm in 1959/60 (White 1971, p.16).
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Chrysler returned to the UK in 1965, this was through a predatory take-over,
rather than direct manufacturing investment.
Ford's negotiations proved much more satisfactory. The Distribution of Industry
Committee ruling meant that Maudling could allow expansion in the South East
only if the majority of new jobs went to Development Areas. Ford's revised
scheme called for limited development at Dagenham, the transfer of its tractor
plant to Basildon, and an entirely new Development Area factory. According to
Ford's 1973 Expenditure Committee evidence, the company examined three sites
for the new plant: Northumberland, Teeside and Merseyside (Ford Motor Co. Ltd,
1973, p.'78). However, officials privately recognised that Ford would 'not even
contemplate' going to the North East or Scotland. Ford's rejection of the Clyde
Valley had a sound empirical basis, since the company had recently completed a
relevant cost study. But the rejection of the North East is more perplexing. All the
motor firms rejected the region as unsuitable with little or no explanation. The area
offered the same facilities as Merseyside, South Wales and Scotland, and proved
very attractive to foreign investors in the 1980s. In 1960 however, geography
seemed to handicap its appeal.
Ford's plans were announced on 21 January 1960. Merseyside's local press was
euphoric, with the Liverpool Echo and Evening Express speculating on the likely
benefits: 'The fact of the matter is that Ford is not so much of a factory as an
industrial estate in itself. The arrival of a bustling, pushfiil, look-ahead car industry
on the city's outskirts will be one of the biggest things to affect the lives of the
citizens for many a year'. 3 ' As part of the settlement, Ford sought a substantial aid
package, calling for all 'the appropriate benefits under the Local Employment
Bill'. 32 The aid details will be examined shortly, but of far greater significance for
the other firms was Hennessy's attempts to block further Merseyside
developments. This led to a very public row between Ford and the Board of
Trade.
The Liverpool Echo, 9 Feb. 60.
A phrase repeated by Maudling during the Distribution of Industiy Committee's discussion of
the Ford expansion (PRO 19601i).
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The row was precipitated when both Vauxhall and Standard identified Liverpool
as their preferred sites. According to Standard, a Merseyside plant would secure
reasonable returns (MRC 1959b). The plan called for an extension of the Halls
plant, together with additional pressing, assembly and paint and trim capacity at an
adjacent site. This would involve an extra 4,500 workers, with total expenditure of
£7.1 million over seven years. Future expansion was conditional on finance, but as
company documents noted ' . . . if it is possible to obtain sufficient government
assistance . . . the Group is prepared to direct all future development into this area.
The scheme presented below could therefore be regarded as a first step towards
the establishing of a major manufacturing unit in the Liverpool area' (MIRC
195 9a).
Standard's announcement was made on 12th February; Vauxhall's statement
followed two weeks later. After Maudling had refused IDCs for Luton and
Dunstable, the Bedfordshire company had been pushed towards either Scotland or
the North East. Under the auspices of General Motors, Vauxhall conducted
detailed surveys, but the firm had decided that 'they could not go further away
from Luton than Merseyside' (PRO 19601).
It is not surprising that Ford and Vauxhall favoured Merseyside locations. Both
companies drew on significant American expertise in location planning. In the
United States, the industry had undergone several expansions where branch plant
location was critical to business strategy. 33 James Rubenstein describes how
postwar planners, '. . . embraced neo-classical location theory to determine where
new assembly plants should be built. GM officials even appeared before a US
Senate investigating committee in 1955 armed with maps depicting the market
areas surrounding each of the company's branch assembly plants and financial data
justif,'ing why the locational model was optimal' (Rubenstein 1992, pp. 87-8).
When Standard's and Vauxhall's plans were announced, Ford reacted furiously,
'suspending' its Halewood plans and launching a strident press campaign. Patrick
Hennessy told the Daily Telegraph that he had been assured that 'Merseyside
Between 1945 and 1960, General Motors opened four new US plants (Kansas, Delaware,
Atlanta Doraville, Arlington), Ford built nine, (Atlanta, New York, San Fransisco, New Jersey,
Los Angeles, St Louis, Detroit, Lorain), and Chrysler finished two (Delaware, St Louis).
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would not be allowed to become another crowded Coventry', and that he now felt
'misled'. 34 It was left to the Financial Times to provide a more balanced
assessment. The paper recognised that although Vauxhall would be a strong
competitor for labour and materials, '. . .The motor industry is anyway keenly
competitive, and it would be in Ford's interests to force Vauxhall into a less
favourable site. But when all is said and done, Ford will most likely move.
Dagenham is at full capacity, and Anglia delivery dates are 12 months.' 35 This
analysis proved spot-on.
Although the Standard and Vauxhall plans caused consternation in England, in
Scotland the response was vitriolic. The Scottish Office had written off their
chances of attracting Ford in mid-1959, but Ministers had highlighted Vauxhall as
one of their best prospects. When it became clear that GM favoured Merseyside, a
deputation led by Tom Fraser met Maudling to argue for increased incentives.
Maudling replied that it was not a question of money, and that if it was he 'would
be battering on the Chancellor's door' (SRO 1959f). Vauxhall simply refused to
consider Scotland.
The Scottish Council was not privy to these discussions or the lengthy defence
which Maudling provided. As a result, Lord Polwarth immediately condemned the
Board of Trade. In an interview with The Scotsman, Polwarth argued, '. . . that
the operation of the government's policy has quite clearly failed to take into
account the respective needs of the various areas in terms of unemployment'.36
Polwarth's attitude was entirely understandable, but not necessarily correct.
Maudling had promised Vauxhall significant incentives, but the American
controlled firm had proved intransigent. For the moment, it seemed that Scotland
must rely on British investors.
At this stage BMC's expansion plans were as advanced as Ford's and Vauxhall's.
Following the initial refusal, the company submitted an alternative scheme. The
plan involved reorganisation in Birmingham and new developments in Scotland,
South Wales and Merseyside. Their blueprint called for:
Telegraph, 23 Feb. 1960
35 i Times, 29 Feb. 1960
36 Scotsman 27 Feb. 1960.
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• A new tractor and heavy commercial vehicle plant in Scotland to employ 5,700.
• A new press shop in South Wales and an extension to their radiator factory at
Llanelli, employing an additional 4,200.
• Transferring their washing machine plant to Merseyside, with 1,000 new
Development Area jobs.
• Building a depot at Swinnerton to employ 1,000 people on crating and
packaging duties.
• 1.4 million square feet of new buildings in Birmingham as part of the
reorganisation package, involving no increase in employment.
• A new nightshift at Oxford to employ 1,900 men. (PRO 1960h).
Maudling was very enthusiastic about this plan; it involved 11,000 new
Development Area jobs and a massive increase in output. Although it remains
difficult to identify the selection criteria, it is clear that BMC's negotiations were
handicapped by the firm's existing geography, and the failure to rationalise in the
1950s.
The main part of BMC's expansion would free space at Longbridge, and nominally
raise capacity to 850,000 cars and 150,000 tractors. This would allow Longbridge
to replace truck production with the 1100/1300 and mini ranges, and centre small
car manufacturing in the Birmingham area. But because of the chaotic way that the
company had developed, Leonard Lord faced other location priorities. BMC's
components subsidiary, Fisher and Ludlow, illustrated these constraints. Although
the Midland's firm specialised in body pressings, it also produced a range of
domestic appliances. The company's ideal solution would have been to secure in
situ expansion for both activities, but the government and BMC knew that
washing machine production was inherently footloose. As a result, the project was
targeted for relocation. In Llanelli's case, BMC already owned a local radiator
plant, and the proposal to establish a new press shop could be characterised as
consolidation rather than displacement. In both cases, BMC's federated structure
offered opportunities for relocation which the Ford and Vauxhall schemes
necessarily excluded.
Sims and Wood (1984, p.25) have characterised the BMC plan as a clever
circumvention of state control by 'relieving present factories of their marginal
functions'. This is only partly correct. BMC's structure did afford a greater
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opportunity for decentralisation, but only because the firm was more diverse.
Unlike the American-owned producers, BMC had grown through amalgamation
and merger, and was consequently more vulnerable to discriminatory policies. On
the one hand, there was a greater spread of production facilities, on the other, the
corporate culture encouraged internal and geographic division. This meant that
whereas Ford and Vauxhall would not even countenance Scottish locations, BMC
considered a northern move acceptable, if appropriate compensation was
forthcoming.
The Bathgate project was nevertheless controversial. Officials had warned the
Scottish Secretary that 'a tractor factory would not be regarded by Scottish
opinion as a satisfactory substitute for a car factory' (SRO 1960a). The Minister
of Housing and Local Government had also criticised the principle of a 'package
deal', but his criticisms were dismissed in committee. When BMC's plans were
announced, there was a mixed reaction. While the local press welcomed the deal,
the STUC's general secretary George Middleton launched a scathing attack on the
Board of Trade's impotence, 'If BMC get away with a tractor factory - which uses
light plate rather than strip steel - the Board of Trade cannot put much pressure on
other firms to build motor cars in Scotland'. 3' For his part, Leonard Lord
emphasised the social benefits of the project, arguing that the plan would, '.
serve the national interest in two ways - by enabling the expansion to be achieved
and by raising the prosperity of some of the less buoyant areas of Britain' (Sims &
Wood 1984, p.25). While Lord's words may indicate support for a general
relocation policy, Sims and Wood go too far in suggesting that Lord supported
interference with his own company. Rather, Lord appreciated the opportunities
which relocation afforded within a second-best world.
Rootes was the last of the Big Five car manufacturers to choose a Development
Area. As outlined above, the company had delayed becoming involved in detailed
negotiations until the other firms had selected sites. In 1958 however, Rootes had
made contacts with development agencies in the Scotland and the North East. By
' Daily Herald, 21 Dec. 1959, an article entitled 'Jobs by Tractor', argued that a tractor plant
was a much more realistic prospect for a Scottish location because 'tractors are a lot less
complicated than cars and have fewer components'. Middleton is quoted in Sims & Wood (1984,
p. 26).
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July of that year, it seems that Rootes already favoured Scotland, and detailed
surveys were commissioned for sites in Brookfield, Georgetown, Linwood and
Longhaugh. A detailed account of subsequent negotiations is provided by Sims
and Wood (1984, pp. 26-32).
The tide of events was certainly slow, with the Rootes brothers securing a number
of guarantees from local government before signing contracts. Indeed, it was only
when the company had raised the necessary finance that direct negotiations began.
As the Henshaw brothers note, '. . . it seems that one factor above all others
influenced Lord Rootes to opt for a Scottish location' (1988, p.24). This was the
personal interest of Harold Macmillan.
Under acute political pressure, Macmillan had established informal contact with
the Rootes brothers in 1959. In November, the Prime Minister joined a shooting
party at the family's Perthshire estate. Macmillan's aristocratic tendencies had
been the subject of press criticism for some time, but this was not a social call. It
seems that Macmillan used the opportunity to persuade William and Reginald that
the Midlands was not an option. Macmillan had good reason to press for a
Scottish option. Still mindful of the Conservative's poor election showing, the
Prime Minister wanted to secure the benefits of 'downstream' industrial
development around Ravenscraig. A large car plant at Linwood would go a long
way towards absorbing the steel plant's output.
A formal announcement was not made until September 1960. The long delay was
caused by protracted negotiations over incentive payments. These talks led
Scottish Office and Board of Trade officials to question the company's sincerity
(SRO 1960b). Nevertheless, a substantial aid package was agreed. At one stroke,
the Pressed Steel expansion was confirmed, and Scotland gained the automotive
complex demanded in the Clyde Valley Plan. Unfortunately, the Rootes brothers'
hesitation was indicative of a wider deterioration in business confidence (see3 .4).
This was occasioned by a sharp downturn in the motor industry's prospects.
Rover's position is instructive here. Having been refused permission to expand in
Birmingham, the company submitted new proposals in February 1960. These
envisaged a new engineering and research block in Birmingham, together with a
176
972,000 square foot development in Cardiff to employ 3,700. Even at this stage,
Rover was undecided about which activities to relocate. Tentative plans centred
on a second Land Rover production line, but this was conditional on maintaining
strong sales growth (PRO 1960j). The priority for Spencer Wilks remained
additional space in situ to allow a re-organisation of his plant's cramped Solihull
facilities. But once the Distribution of Industry Cormnittee had sanctioned the new
plans, Rover found itself facing very different circumstances. The depression of
1960/1 and selective hire purchase controls dramatically cut the demand for new
vehicles. While total UK motor vehicle production dropped from 1.9m in 1960 to
1.5m in 1961, Solihull's output fell from 51,584 in 1959/60 to 47,345 in 1961/2
(Austin Rover 1985). This proved more than enough to force the cancellation of
Rover's Welsh adventure.
The point is that the motor industry expansion plans were based on distinct market
forecasts. In 1960, an article in the Economist had warned that the motor firms
might not be able to sell all the cars they wanted to produce in the new factories.
The piece argued that, 'All methods of forecasting future home and export sales
are largely hit or miss'. 38
 For smaller firms such as Rover, even small fluctuations
could spell disaster. For larger firms such as BMC, these fluctuations hindered
cost recovery, but were not allowed to derail long term expansion. 39
 As George
Harriman explained:
Never in the past, viewed over a reasonable period, has our industry in
general, or have we in particular, been wrong in pursuing a policy of
expansion. All previous advances in productive advances in productive
capacity have been quickly justified. The world is still hungry for motor
vehicles, and what we are now spending can be considered as the premium
necessary to insure the future.4°
Standard's predicament confirmed the trend. Crippled by mounting losses and a
huge bank overdraft, Alick Dick finally succeeded in engineering a take-over by
38 The Economist, 'The motor map redrawn', 5 Mar, 1960.
See Williams eta! (1994, pp. 146-5 1) for a discussion of the cost recovery issue.
40 BMC annual report 1960, p.15. Compare this confident statement with the following extract
from Standard's Board Minutes Dec. 5 1960: 'The directors have been able to fulfil by a good
margin the forecasts they made in August 1959, when the tractor assets were sold to Massey
Ferguson Limited. A few months ago however, a very sharp and adverse change came over that
section of the British motor industry in which Standard is engaged. Although this may be a
passing phase, Standard, being one of the smaller units in the industry, are less well placed to
bear the brunt of reduced sales' (MRC 1960a).
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Leyland. 4 ' But the carefully prepared Group Development Plan was already in
turmoil. By February 1960, overproduction was running at 500 cars per month,
and the board was forced to sanction a wave of redundancies (MRC 1960b). By
May 1962, a feasibility study was recommending the abandonment of the Speke
#2 project 'until such time as we have fully exploited our present resources' (MRC
1962b). This proposal was agreed by the board of directors within 24 hours, who
resolved that 'there was no case economically for the Speke #2 site' (MIRC
1962a). For both Rover and Standard, cyclical downturns and competitive
pressures had brought expansion and modernisation into question. This would
produce a troubled legacy for the British Leyland Motor Corporation.
By December 1960, Macmillan's new distribution policy had borne fruit. Under
the government's direction, the majority of new motor industry investment had
been successfully diverted towards Development Areas (Table 6.6). With the
exception of certain local industrialists and the Scottish press, these investments
had been warmly welcomed. Both officials and ministers expressed the hope that
they would lead to further regional industrial development.
TABLE 6.6
MOTOR H'DUSTRY EXPANSION, 1960-63
Date of	 Company	 Site	 Anticipated	 Anticipated
Announcement	 Capacity	 Employment
21 January 1960	 BMC	 Scotland,	 250,000	 -	 5,600
S. Wales,	 3 4,200Liverpool	 1,500
3 February 1960	 Ford	 Halewood,	 200,000	 8,000
Liverpool
12 February 1960	 Standard	 Speke,	 50,000	 4,500
Triumph	 Liverpool
26 February 1960	 Vauxhall	 Ellesmere Port	 100,000	 7,000
20 September 1960 Rootes
	 Linwood	 150,000	 7,000
Source: Wilks (1984, p.77)
Yet within the new approach there were certain contradictions. Initial DC refusals
had been followed by a free-for-all in which businesses were left to select their
preferred locations. This led to a situation where the British-owned firms of
Barclays had granted Standard an overdraft of £9 million by January 1961, Whisler (1995,
p.24).
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Rootes and BMC had secured apparently marginal locations in Scotland. The
American-owned subsidiaries had both established in Merseyside, where cost
expectations were lower and component firms were closer. There is nothing to
suggest that this reveals any bias in government/industry relations, nor that
foreign-owned firms were able to exert undue influence. But there is reason to
suggest that the American companies benefited from a more professional
approach. Ford and Vauxhall demonstrated greater resolve in excluding Scottish
options and more alacrity in selecting final sites. In part, this was because the
subsidiaries were better run than their British counterparts, but there were other
factors at work.
These factors may be highlighted using a game theoretic framework. Traditionally,
economic history and game theory have been uneasy bedfellows. While economists
eagerly embraced the ground-breaking work of Von Neuman and Morgenstern
(1947), historians have been less willing to adopt these new methods. A brief
survey of core economic history journals (Journal of Economic History,
Explorations in Economic History, Economic History Review) confirms this
impression. 42 But even where game theory has been applied to historical problems,
a great deal of controversy has been aroused. One such example is an article by
Carlos and Hoffman (1986) on the early nineteenth century North American fir
trade. This used newly developed models of bargaining under incomplete
information to explain why the Hudson's Bay Company and Northwest Company
failed to conclude a profit maximising agreement despite operating as a duoploy
'unhindered by antitrust legislation'. In a perceptive comment, Nye (1988, p.680)
outlined the limitations of their approach:
Models of bargaining and co-operation among small numbers of individuals
are difficult to develop because so much depends on crucial assumptions
about individual behaviour. The literature on bargaining that Carlos and
Hoffluian cite does little more than demonstrate that 'tough bargaining' can
lead to negotiation breakdown. The models have limited predictions, are
difficult if not impossible to test, and rest on more stringent assumptions
than are common even in rarefied formal theory. Given the limitations of our
theoretical knowledge about individual response in small numbers, it is not
42	 notable exceptions are Griefs (1996) recent survey of medieval family firms and Treble's
(1989) examination of pay negotiations in the early twentieth century British coal industry.
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surprising that formal modelling of complex arrangements has not proven
more fruitful.
In terms of the motor industry case studies, it is clear that the same qualifications
apply. Many of the assumptions necessary for a formal analysis are untenable.43
Nevertheless, the ideas and terminology associated with game theory can help us
to conceptualise the situation. For example, if we consider the strategies available
to the motor firms, we can clearly identify three options: compliance, compromise
or withdrawal. But whereas the American-owned firms possessed creditable exit
strategies, British firms faced a number of constraints. Chief amongst these was
the impossibility of relocating abroad, and the need to secure expansion on a
number of Midlands and South East sites. Moreover, firms did not face a simple
two player game involving government and producer, but rather a six-cornered
struggle with imperfect information and a distinct first-mover advantage. Since
suitable locations were limited, the companies with the most creditable bargaining
position and the keenest negotiators were liable to get the best sites.
Viewed in these terms, BMC was a prisoner of its history and geography. Its
federated structure weakened its bargaining position and made peripheral locations
more acceptable. Rootes suffered because its dictatorial owners devised a flawed
bargaining strategy. Previous location bargains and close ties with the state led the
Rootes brothers to believe that they could engineer a compromise. They failed to
recognise the new rules governing state-industry relations. When William and
Reginald realised their mistake, Scotland remained the only viable Development
Area location.
In many ways, the Rootes' error could be seen as evidence of a failure in the
British system of personal capitalism. This system allowed individuals to dominate
decision making, removing the checks and balances which might have corrected
policy mistakes. In a similar way, BMC's plight can be linked to the tardy
development of organisational capabilities and integrated plant structures in
These include the existence of common knowledge, the belief that individuals must be
optimisers, and the notion that each player must be capable of unlimited computational ability.
For a survey of these ideas see Binmore and Dasgupta (1986).
Church's recent examination (1996) of the managerial culture in BMC makes many similar
points.
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postwar Britain. But this should not be read as a wholehearted endorsement of
Chandler's thesis. Rather it demonstrates that at one moment, and in specific
circumstances, British capitalism was outmanoeuvred by American interests. This
meant that the marginal firms of Rootes and BMC secured marginal locations. In
these circumstances, the issue of compensation was vital.
In November 1959, the Scottish Secretary offered the following instructions to the
newly formed BOTAC:
I realise that it is intended to operate a much tougher 1DC policy, but I do
not think that this negative pressure is likely to succeed by itself. We must be
able to hold out a really substantial positive inducement. . .which would go
some way towards offsetting the real economic disadvantages of Scotland. I
would accept that it must be limited to a very few large projects which
would be of particular benefit in forming points of wider industrial growth
and such limitation would amount to discrimination in favour of the few. But
the whole essence of our policy is to offer discrimination by favourable
treatment in a variety of ways to firms who are prepared to take the risks.
(SRO 1959c)
As we have seen, the Scottish Office was successifil in securing certain assurances
on the scope of financial incentives. During negotiations, Maudling himself
stressed the potential benefits available to relocating industries. According to
evidence presented to the Estimates Committee in 1962, BOTAC was 'under
instructions' to sanction awards to the motor firms. Board of Trade under-
secretary Welch's evidence hinted at a schism between politicians and officials,
suggesting that, '. . . the instructions of Ministers in effect precluded us from
considering the reasonableness of the cost per job' (HMSO 1962, p. 60).
According to Welch, once the decision had been made to render assistance,
BOTAC was reduced to a mechanical assessment of relocation expenses. Once
again, civil servants had been removed from the policy-making loop.
For their part, the motor firms were adamant that financial incentives should fully
compensate them for extra locational costs. 45 Under the Local Employment Act,
the Board of Trade was empowered to:
For example, on 12th October 1960 BOTAC minutes made the following observation on
BMC's attitude: 'After the visitors had left, the Committee discussed the matter and were of the
opinion that the company had regarded it as a basic principle that it should be compensated for
all costs in excess of those which would have been incurred by expansion in the Midlands' (PRO
1960a).
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• acquire land and buildings and to build factories and other premises for sale or
leasing
• make building grants to undertakings providing their own premises
• make loans and grants to undertakings for their general purposes.
In the case of the motor industry, finance would be provided through repayable
loans covering building/equipment costs, and Section 4 grants to reimburse
'unusual initial expenses' arising from relocation. In both cases, BOTAC would
examine applications to verify the legitimacy of the claim. Building loans proved
easiest to assess. This was because the Board of Trade was responsible for site
construction. Loans for plant and equipment were more problematic, and involved
a greater degree of negotiation. A typical loan settlement would involve a two
year deferral of repayments charged at an annual interest rate of 5.5%, with fixed
yearly repayments. However, the most animated discussion centred on grants.
The motor firms' attitude was aptly summarised by a Board of Trade dispute with
BMC in 1960. When the company acquired the Bathgate site, the National Coal
Board charged the firm a £1000 'sterilisation fee' to pay for mineral rights. As
Macbeth explained:
You might think that £1000 is a pretty small sum for a large motor
corporation to be worrying about, but our problem is that there is a whole
series of transactions of this kind and that BMC, apart from being compelled
to do something they don't really want to do, are rather under the
impression that people are trying to milk them in the process (SRO 1960c).
During negotiations, the firms supported their grant claims with detailed schedules
and documentation. Again, Standard's submission was typical (Table 6.7).
46	 figures are based on records contained in MRC (1960-63c) and PRO (1960e).
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TABLE 6.7
STANDARD TRIUMPH - ESTIMATE COST OF LIVERPOOL
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Note: each heading was supported by a detailed schedule of expenditure.
Source: MRC (1960e).
But in all cases, BOTAC managed to exercise a measurable degree of control.
Negotiations reduced grant assistance from the requested £13.81 million, to just
under £3.4 million (Table 6.8). This figure represented the maximum allowable
expenditure which the Board's officials were willing to sanction. There was
however a Scottish bias in the aggregate cost per job. The Rootes and BMC
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projects returned figures of £2,700 and £1,890 respectively; the corresponding
amounts for Ford and Standard were £1,360 and £1,190 (HMSO 1962, p.57).
Table 6.8 provides details of the total aid package agreed by July 1962. These
payments represented a substantial capital injection into the motor industry. When
combined with sales forecasts, the figures projected profits in the short to medium
term. The long term expectation was that prime costs would fall into line with
established sites and that component firms would migrate to the regions (MIRC
1959a). Although motor industry bosses later criticised the deals, the
compensation packages persuaded firms to relocate rather than shelve investment
plans. 47 The commercial judgement was that the projects remained viable and
worthwhile. It is a mistake to claim, as Scott (1996, p.55) does, that efficiency was
ignored in favour of short term employment. For the industry, the short term
attracted compensation, the longer term promised commercial success.
TABLE 6.8
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE GRANTED TO THE MOTOR INDUSTRY
(JULY, 1962)
Firm	 Grant applied for Grant offered Total assistance offered
£ million	 £ million	 £ million
Standard Triumph, Liverpool	 1.21	 0.52	 5.37
BMC:
Bathgate	 6.0	 1.03	 10.73
Kirkby	 *	 0.22	 5.02
Ford, Liverpool	 1.0	 0.05	 10.33
Rootes, Linwood	 1.5	 0.45	 9.65
_Vauxhall, Liverpool	 4.1	 0.65	 335**
Notes: * Kirkby application included in Bathgate total.
** Preliminary figure only.
Source: HMSO (1962, p. 116). Figures and firm identity verified in PRO (1960d).
Typical of later criticisms is the following extract from Geoffrey Rootes' memoirs (1991, pp.
75-6):
'Another factor which caused us difficulty during the late 1950s and early 1960s was the
government policy of endeavouring to disperse industry to Development Areas, where
unemployment was high. This would have been well if - metaphorically speaking the
government had used the carrot rather than the stick. In other words if government had given
sufficiently attractive inducements to persuade industry to go the Development Areas, but in fact
the inducements in the way of loans and grants were not sufficiently attractive, and the
Government therefore resorted to refusing IDCs in the main industrial areas and by this means
forcing companies which wished to expand to go to Development Areas'.
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According to Parsons (1986, p.11 1), the Local Employment Act and motor
industry initiative arrived between policies. The Act fell 'between the end of
economic management and the introduction of economic planning in the following
year, and the 'Brighton Revolution' of 1960 . . . neither here nor there: neither
expansionary or disinflationary, 'muddling through' or 'regional planning". In
practice, Maudling favoured an approach founded in real politick. This allowed
industrial steering away from the congested South and Midlands, but imposed few
controls on reception areas. 1M6 had adopted procedures to match these
ambitions, but the department remained fundamentally insecure when challenging
entrepreneurial freedom.
It is worth focusing on the years between 1958 and 1960 for three very important
reasons. First, this period witnessed the Board of Trade's earliest moves towards
accepting a coercive distribution programme. Henceforth, the tactics of industrial
intervention were flexible, and the government's threats more credible. This paved
the way for the strategic rethink associated with growth point theory and allowed
the acceptance of an interventionist agenda. The second reason is that motor firm
negotiations became part of a process of forced ideological realignment. While
civil servants remained opposed to coercion, motor industry intervention educated
Board of Trade officials to the possibilities of market challenge. Finally, the
negotiations had an impact on motor industry performance. By studying these
talks we can appreciate the nature of the financial bargains and the historical
context of relocation. Too often these details have been obscured by inaccuracy
and political propaganda.
§6.4 Policy Developments
Policy developments after 1960 have attracted much more comment than the
tactical realignment in 1958. During 1960, political expediency continued to
dictate policy. 1M6 took its lead from Maudling, and policy remained unfocused
and ad hoc. In subsequent months, this approach was challenged on three levels:
internal, operational and theoretical. This challenge forced the adoption of macro-
planning solutions more than twenty years after Barlow had first reported.
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The internal challenge began in 1961. Doubts were expressed because of the
economic downturn and the reduction in steerable projects. A letter from
Whitehouse to Welch caught the mood of the time, argurg that the stream of
industry moving to Scotland was slowing down to a trickle, and that although,'.
.we are always trying to bring some reason to the minds of those who expect a
BMC or British Oxygen every week, bodies like Scottish Council and the local
authorities soon grasp the fact that were are now showing Scotland to very few
people' •48 In this context, a coercive approach rekindled important questions about
policy costs. The principal concern was not locational inefficiency, but project
cancellation. While officials had become reconciled with the production question,
they remained unwilling to jeopardise potential investment.
These doubts culminated in the commissioning of a study into 'the real damage
done by a IDC policy' (PRO 1962a). The project centred on an analysis of 87
firms who had been refused IDCs between 1 July 1958 and 30 June 1962. The
results are summarised in Table 6.9.
TABLE 6.9
PLANS OF 87 FIRMS WHOSE IDCs WERE REJECTED
	
Number of	 IDCs rejected
	
firms	 Area (Sq Ft)
Decided to move to a new location 	 34	 2,460,992	 57
Decided to develop in same area	 36	 781,555	 18
Still seeking new location or approval in same
area	 10	 223,900	 5
Project abandoned or deferred 	 7	 862,300	 20
Total	 87	 4,328,747	 100
Source: PRO (1962b)
As can be seen, only seven firms were known to have definitely abandoned or
cancelled their expansion plans. In no case was it possible to confirm that an
industrial company's plans were frustrated by the lack of an IDC. Of 70 firms
whose plans were known, half decided to move production to a new location, and
48 Welch's reply highlighted an important truth. He countered that '. . . successes in the last
eighteen months had depended to a very considerable degree on the motor industiy, but informed
opinion seemed to be that the new capacity would not be filly used before 1970' (PRO 196 ib).
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half found means of developing at or near their intended site. In total, ten firms
had decamped to development districts, and eleven firms moved to overspill
reception areas.
The study demonstrated two things about regional policy operation. The first was
the continued lack of performance monitors. In July 1972, the House of Commons
Expenditure Committee was to comment that, 'There must be few areas of
Government expenditure in which so much is spent but so little is known about the
success of the policy' (1-UvISO 1972, para. 172). This problem plagued policy
administration and, on occasion, left 1M6 struggling to defend its existence. But
the need for a study demonstrated something far more important - doubt. The
Board's acceptance of the regional policy portfolio had been based on
informational asymmetries between the state and entrepreneurs. Where businesses
lacked full knowledge, it was 1M6's duty to correct these failings. The coercive
element had been added in 1958/9 by political pressure. Although officials had
dutifully followed ministerial leads, this sat uncomfortably with their free market
sympathies. Despite the accumulation of research and experience, officials still
sought reassurance.
The second element which contributed to the reorientation of policy was
operational: how to persuade industrial capital to relocate. The Board of Trade's
failure to capitalise on its motor industry projects, or attract alternative
enterprises, raised serious questions about the Local Employment Act. The
intention had always been to use the motor industry as a springboard for economic
regeneration. While Liverpool was sufficiently close to the Midlands to draw on
existing suppliers, Scotland faced a different problem. Although BMC could boast
of 28 Scottish components suppliers in 1963, the truth was that indigenous capital
was either unwilling or unable to compete with Midlands suppliers. 50 Conversely
English firms expressed little interest in relocating north of the border. On the one
hand, Scottish companies were wary of committing resources to a demanding and
potentially volatile customer, on the other, Midlands based firms were able to
A similar, but larger scale project was later completed as part of the 'Inquiry into location
attitudes and experience' (DTI 1973b).
50 TheScots,nan, 13 April, 1963.
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undercut their Scottish competitors without relocating (Sims & Wood 1984 pp
3 6-45). As Cameron and Clark noted (1966, p.41):
The motor industry, in which technical linkages are said to be of prime
importance, has sited in Scotland without attracting the expected component
complexes, because the scale of production is too small to allow the
components manufacturers the economies of scale achieved within their
Midlands plants. For the motor industry, as a whole, Scottish development
represents de-concentration, and it is cheaper for Scottish based firms to
import components from England, where the economies of scale and
concentration are so pronounced that they can absorb the transport costs of
components to Scotland.
The failure to attract new industry was a concern for both ministers and officials.
By 1962, the Board of Trade was already considering possible remedies. A
memorandum prepared in January 1962 made a scathing judgement on the current
system. A seven point critique concluded that inducements should be made more
attractive (PRO 1962c). This was because current policy assumed that firms
would be willing to meet extra costs themselves to secure new premises. In
prevailing circumstances, this was deemed unrealistic (PRO 1963c).
With Maudling now Chancellor following the Proftimo reshuffle, there was a
strong regional policy constituency in Westminster. Officials accepted that existing
payments were inadequate and a series of proposals culminated in the 1963 Local
Employment Act. This introduced reforms ranging from a standardised grant
system to accelerated depreciation allowances. From this point on, businesses
would be ftilly informed of potential benefits while the principle of selective
financial assistance was abandoned. In his address to the British Institute of
Management, Courtaulds' chief economist A.M. Alfred spelt out what this meant
for investors:
The effect of these two provisions means that in a Development Area in
Great Britain 60% of the investment is recovered in the first year after
investment, and 73% by the second year. . .When a change of plan to locate
a factory in a G.B. development is made, it may involve extra capital or
running costs; but the financial provisions are such that you can afford to
have your gross capital profits on plant raised by perhaps a third, or your
profit reduced by a quarter; or a combination of the two. If you in fact incur
no extra capital or running costs then your profitability . . . would rise by
30% for a Great Britain Development Area. . .The Government whether it
realises it or not, have [sic] provided some powerftul financial incentives. It is
up to industry to make ftill use of them (PRO 1 963b).
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The theoretical challenge came from the regions, and was keenly associated with
growth point theory. The key document was the Toothill Report, which promoted
a practical blueprint for regional planning success (Scottish Council 1961). Like
the Cairncross report of 1953, the study had been commissioned by the Scottish
Council, and was aimed squarely at policy makers. Its terms of reference were
straightforward, 'To examine the position and prospects of the Scottish economy
and the factors which influence the growth and location of manufacturing
employment and to make recommendations'.
Parson's study links the report to the 'revolution in business thinking' occasioned
by the Brighton conference (1986, p.1 15). Viewed in these terms, the document
reflected a shift within the business community towards the acceptance of limited
government planning in the private sector. Its recommendations ran to nine pages
and eighty one measures, and centred on area development, communications,
R&D, education and training, fiscal policy, housing, industrial relations,
management and rating. The report suggested that the government should be
involved less in industrial steering, and more in infrastrncture development. It
advocated an integrated planning effort to create the right conditions for sustained
economic recovery.
The Toothill Report enjoyed a mixed response. Board of Trade officials were
pleased to see that a private survey had pre-empted 'the flill dress official enquiry'
which some departments had mooted (PRO 1960c). But the report achieved such
public notoriety that the Cabinet felt obliged to act. On 15 December 1960,
Maclay circulated a paper to the Economic Policy Committee advocating an
official inquiry into Toothill's findings. A detailed resume of the inquiry's work
can be found in Culingworth (1979), suffice to say that it endorsed a move
towards growth points together with more powerful financial inducements (PRO
1961a). When the cabinet reviewed these recommendations, the decision was
taken to concentrate regional policy towards development nodes in the North East
and Scotland (PRO 1961a). On a practical level, this meant that the Board of
Trade's ad hoc methods were given a firm direction and new impetus.
The theoretical challenge resulted in several important initiatives. Soon after the
Toothill Report, two White Papers were published on Central Scotland and the
189
North East (HMSO 1963a, 1963b). Both plans were closely associated with Lord
Hailsham's appointment as Minister of the North East in 1962. Hailsham was
charged with following up and developing the suggestions of Toothill and the
cabinet's steering committee. The White Papers therefore reflected a new
orthodoxy: growth zones, modernisation and the need to transform Britain's
antiquated industrial landscape.
These ideas were given even more prominence after Edward Heath's appointment
as Board of Trade President in 1963. Heath was keenly interested in the regional
debate, and in a celebrated first act, changed his official title to Secretary of State
for Industry, Trade and Regional Development, and President of the Board of
Trade. According to Parsons (1986, p.20), the change was, ' indicative of a new
desire to push the regional aspect of government economic policy to the fore, and
to shift the presentation of government location of industry and local employment
policy into an explicitly regional gear'.
But Heath inherited a problem. The North East and Scottish plans called for a
generous proportion of public expenditure to be devoted to two areas without any
consideration of Britain's other regions (McCrone 1969, p.226). As the new
president realised, the principal purpose of regional planning was to spread
resources in a thought out and rational manner. The days of selective intervention
were at an end. While it was possible to contain the Scottish and NE plans within
existing frameworks, a more comprehensive approach was needed. Accordingly,
Ministers convened a working party to examine how the regional plans could be
incorporated into a national strategy. 5 ' The working party met for the first time in
October 1963. Its final report was completed before polling day, and marked the
final triumph of the regionalist approach.
' Papers and minutes from the Working Party on Distribution of Industiy can be found in PRO
(1964a). At the time of writing many of the docwnents remain closed under the thirty years rule.
The following quotation comes from an undated collection of 'Minutes and memoranda':
'The chairman recalled the events that led to the setting up of the Working Party. Ministers had
agreed that, while the regional plans for Scotland and the North East could be continued within
existing policy in the short-term, the concepts underlying these reports were in some respects
incompatible with existing policy. They had therefore decided that a review was needed. Behind
these recent events lay doubts about the suitability of the Local Unemployment Act for dealing
with the problems now forecast'.
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A detailed account of the working party's meetings and recommendations would
be a fitting epitaph to this study. Although the interim reports are available at the
Public Record Office, a majority of the group's briefing papers and minutes remain
restricted. The available papers clearly show how regional planning was accepted
at ministerial and official levels. But they also show how the tactics of industrial
intervention had changed. The Board of Trade's stress on entrepreneurial freedom
and market solutions had been replaced by a willingness to confront industry and
relocate industrial capital. While 'regionalism' implied a new level of strategic
thinking, the most significant change in regional policy administration was a
willingness to challenge the market.
§6.5 Conclusion
The period from 1958 to 1964 marked a sea-change in the administration and
philosophy of British regional policy. A Conservative administration, nominally
committed to rolling back the frontiers of the state, oversaw the introduction of a
ftmdamentally coercive and dirigiste planning regime. The main reason for this is
clearly linked to the rise in regional unemployment and the collapse of staple
industries in the North and Scotland. But these forces were mediated through an
administrative and political structure which shaped policy response.
Politicians and officials had already accepted that a measure of market failure
existed in location decisions. Hitherto, policy had been couched in terms of
information provision and establishing effective communications. The growing
regional crisis forced the government to reconsider its options and promote a
coercive remedy. For 1M6, this created a problem. Its civil servants were
uncomfortable imposing solutions on entrepreneurs. In response, officials removed
themselves from the decision-making loop. Meanwhile, the department sponsored
a number of policy reviews which re-examined their conception of externalities.
From 1958 to 1964, this produced an irresistible tide of evidence, forcing officials
to accept a new approach.
The motor industry provided an opportunity and a catalyst for this change. In the
beginning, politicians used 11M6's economic expertise to counter the motor bosses'
claims. Even though the deals were executed at ministerial level, they provided an
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impetus for policy reappraisal. The subsequent failure of plants to deliver
downstream development led to operational reviews and growing calls for a
coherent national location strategy. These moves culminated in the triumph of a
regionalist approach embodied in growth point theory and the Scottish and North
East White Papers. Labour would develop these themes in 1964, when the Board
of Trade finally surrendered its regional policy portfolio to the DEA.
For the motor industry, the new plants were an expression of confidence.
Negotiations had secured valuable incentive packages, which promised quick
returns. If Development Area plants were a 'second best' solution, they enjoyed
important compensations. One of these only became apparent in the 1970s,
although an FBI research officer had seen the possibilities a decade earlier.
Commenting on Local Employment Act, one K.M. Hall noted,
I have a dangerous and probably unjustified suspicion that part of the reason
for the motor firms recent rush to the development districts is the desire to
get the government deeply committed to the continued prosperity of the
motor industry as a precaution against the possibility of withdrawal of
protection from continental competition in the home market at some point in





7 Motor Industry Cost Analysis
§7.1 Introduction
Many studies classif,' the motor industry as 'footloose'. This is because it enjoyed a
relatively free location choice during its early years. It produced a high value
good, neither tied to materials nor markets, requiring little heavy duty machinery.
But technical advances transformed this profile. As demand outstripped existing
manufacturing facilities, location became a key production variable.
The state sponsored decentralisation of the British motor industry has attracted
much adverse comment. In a recent study commissioned by the Economic History
Society, Church (1994, p.59) maintained that 'there is no dispute over the adverse
effect, as yet unquantified, on companies' activities of regional economic policy
introduced by the British government in the 1960s'. This pessimistic interpretation
has become part of the regional policy literature, as shown by Scott's uncritical
assessment (1996, p.55) of the 1960 measures. This chapter examines these claims
from a quantitative perspective.
The following chapter uses the techniques endorsed by the Clay Committee and
employed by Luttrell in his 1962 NTESR survey. Luttrell's study provides the
intellectual validation for our approach. This is because it focused directly on
spatial cost criteria and policy performance. Studies of industrial location can be
roughly divided into two camps, those undertaken in support of various theoretical
views, and those undertaken for purely industrial or policy analysis. Luttrell's
work fell into the latter category, and it established a methodology which provided
an objective measure of the costs of industrial relocation. However, it was also an
explicit part of the Clay Committee's research initiative. As such, it used the
performance criteria sanctioned by government, and implicitly related outcomes to
the specific goals and targets of 1M6 intervention. These goals centred on
minimising operating costs for individual manufacturers, while securing the
broader macro-social benefits of production externalities and lower regional
unemployment.
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Ideally, costs should be compared over as many years as possible. However, lack
of relevant information limits us to an analysis with a 1972 benchmark. This
constraint is related to the nature of cost controls in postwar British motor
manufacturing and firms' unwillingness to publish information. The only significant
archive providing access to internal documents is provided by the British Motor
Industry Heritage Trust, and this operates a stringent thirty year rule. In a similar
vein, much of the relevant government material at the Public Record Office is
deemed commercially sensitive and remains subject to restriction. But the 'static'
approach does offer some important advantages. It highlights the 'continuing cost
differences' which dominated the postwar efficiency debate, and it avoids the
distortions caused by OPECI. Where possible, estimates are used to estimate
previous costs and extrapolate beyond 1972, but the aim is to provide an
economic assessment of the annual operational costs of Development Area
manufacturing.
This analysis suggests that although relocation did increase production costs, there
were important compensations in the form of regional development incentives and
lower labour costs. Scottish sites in particular were disadvantaged. The chapter
suggests that previous studies have underestimated the role of financial incentives
and other subsidies in redressing transport costs, and that the failure of sites in
Scotland is linked both to location, and the competitiveness crisis afflicting British
motor manufacturing.
§7.2 Industry Cost Structure
The starting point for any cost analysis is to identify the major items of
expenditure. One may begin by examining the evidence collected by the Census of
Production. Although these figures are not strictly comparable over time, they do
offer a rough guide to cost structure (Table 7.1).
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TABLE 7.1
MOTOR iNDUSTRY COST STRUCTURE - MAJOR ITEMS
As Percentage of Gross Output
1973	 1980









Notes: Due to rounding errors and the omission of minor items,
columns do not sum to 100.
Source: CSO (1974, 1981).
The two biggest categories are labour and purchased materials. The former
reflects the premium placed on well-trained car workers, the latter illustrates the
relatively high bought-out content of British vehicle production (Table 7.2). The
third largest element is Bough/-in Services. This includes areas such as advertising,
postage, bank charges and transport. But it does not include all carriage costs.
This is because companies operate their own freight divisions, whilst purchases
often include a hidden transport element. Evidence from the UK input/output
tables supports this view, suggesting that suppliers favour 'delivered' rather than
'ex-works' pricing (Tyler c/ a! 1988, p.13). Other important categories of Bough/-
in Services are vehicle hire, insurance and rent & rates. Finally, energy charges
comprise about 3% of gross output.
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TABLE 7.2
SPECIMEN PERCENTAGES OF MATERIAL COST OF CARS ACCOUNTED














Source: HMSO (1975b, p.19)'
As far as this chapter is concerned, costs are relevant only in so far as they vary
over space. Elements which represent a small proportion of total costs may seem
unimportant, but as Tyler and Kitson (1987, p.63) argue, this does not undermine
the case for examining geographical variations. This is because the traditionally
low level of profitability in British manufacturing means that even minor costs can
become significant. As Chapter Three explained, the postwar decline of British
motor manufacturing directly relates to unfavourable international trends in price
and quality competitiveness. Thus the cumulative effect of even minor variations
may prove significant.
§7.3 Spatial Cost Profile
Having established an industry cost profile, the next stage is to consider which
costs vary over space. Here one can be guided by a host of post war studies.
These include the theoretical texts of Hoover (1949), Greenhut (1956) and Isard
(1956), together with empirical investigations of plant location (Luttrell, 1962).
One of the more useftil frameworks is provided by Smith (1966, pp. 100-10 1):
'These findings can be corroborated with further evidence. For example, Bhaskar's (1975)
analysis supports this general pattern, while industry-wide studies by Maxcy & Silberston (1959)
and Silberston & Pratten (1967) arrive at similar results. The parliamentary enquiry supplied no








This list can be further reduced by restricting our analysis to those categories
deemed significant by the motor manufacturers themselves. There are two sources
for this exercise - private site surveys, and evidence presented to the Trade and
Industry Sub-Committee (HMSO 1973a, 1973b).
In the former case, any investigation is hamstrung by a lack of available
documents. As Bloomfield (1972, p.93) noted, 'The full technical reports on plant
location are rarely seen by outsiders . . . Most information on location decision
making depends heavily on press releases and speeches'. Papers retained at the
Public Record Office often include minor details, but these relate to physical
characteristics rather than financial costings (PRO 1953-54a). What evidence there
is suggests that labour availability and in situ expansion remained the
manufacturers' key concerns (PRO 1 954a).
The evidence from the Trade and Industry Sub Committee is more reliable and
complete. The study began in 1971 as part of an inquiry into public money in the
private sector (1-IMSO 1972). Subsequent changes in the Industry and Finance
Acts persuaded committee members to take a fresh look at regional development
incentives. Their final report was published in December 1973, and called for a
strengthening and redirection of policy.
The report is invaluable in identifying areas of continuing locational cost. This is
because it offered a platform to companies threatened with the loss of operating
subsidies. Under the 1972 Industry Act, the government had proposed phasing-out
the Regional Employment Premium. Most businessmen opposed this idea. It was
in their interests to cite all locational costs in their evidence to parliament. As the
final report commented, 'It is unusual in an inquiry of this kind to find so many
non-Government witnesses, including both CBI and TUC, in broad agreement on
a measure as controversial as REP, and the remainder at least not actively
disagreeing. On the other hand, one would hardly expect the recipients of a benefit
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- and that includes both employers and employed - to want to see it withdrawn'
(HMSO 1973b, p.74).
The first point one can make is that three areas of cost - rent, rates and insurance
premiums - are ignored by the motor builders. This is probably because they
constitute such a small percentage of gross output. Their omission might also be
explained by low property prices in the regions. Low land values tend to depress
both rent and rates, while the value of insured assets is correspondingly reduced.
In these circumstances, a Southern plant is likely to have a higher locational cost
than its Development Area counterpart. However, a substantial body of evidence
has legitimately questioned the effects of local taxation on profitability (Bennett
1986). Local variations in business rates increased from the late 1960s throughout
the I 970s. But econometric evidence suggests no long term relationship between
rate burdens and changes in regional unemployment and employment. Moreover,
metropolitan authorities in Merseyside, Greater London and Birmingham charged
similar tax levels. In these circumstances, it seems wise to respect the motor firms'
judgement.
The energy component can be discounted in a similar manner. Heat, light and
power have been widely available in Britain for many decades. Where new
amenities are provided, they constitute establishment rather than operational
expense. Relevant locational costs accrue only if power is more expensive in the
regions. Neither Luttrell nor the motor firms provide any evidence to support this
theory.
This discussion leaves three areas of cost with a significant locational element -
labour, industrial services and transportation. Together they accounted for nearly
31% of gross output in 1980. When one adds the embedded freight charge in
purchases, it becomes clear that a over a third of basic manufacturing costs may
vary over space. But these costs must be restricted to two headings: labour and
transport-related expenditure. This is because there is no available proxy for the
assessment of regional service costs. In any eventuality, the lack of locally
available sub-contractors will be reflected in the transport function. This remains
the best surrogate for the loss of what Townroe (1971) called localisation
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economies, defined as agglomeration economies which are external to the firm but
internal to the industry.
§7.4 Output Calculations
If we follow Luttrell's methodology, the first stage of analysis must be to ascertain
plant output. This will allow cost comparisons to be made on a per unit basis, the
Clay Committee's favoured spatial performance criteria (see §4.3). This exercise is
fraught with difficulty. This is because most of the decentralised motor plants also
produced components and sub-assemblies for other sites. We can illustrate the
difficulties involved by considering the example of Speke.
Speke #1 was developed from the old Halls pressing plant - and specialised in
body production. Speke #2 was finally completed in the late 1 960s, and included a
paint and trim plant together with a modern assembly line. Initially, #2 built bodies
for the Stag and shipped the shells on to Canley. But by 1972, the Toledo was
completed on site, with only the Dolomite finished in Coventry (Collins & Stratton
1993, p.112).
Speke was originally part of the Standard Triumph empire. By the early 1970s, it
was controlled by BLMC's Specialist Car Division. But these changes in
ownership did not rationalise material flow. Because the plant produced both
bodies and cars, it is difficult to express output in terms of units of production. But
by calculating output in terms of equivalent final units of production, estimates
are possible. The basis for this technique is a detailed costing of a Triumph
production car from the early 1950s (Table 7.3). This document identified body
and body detailing as representing 40.6% of manufacturing costs. Applying the
same margins to 1972 data, one can express the Stag, Dolomite and TR6
production of 34,500 bodies as being equivalent to 14,007 finished cars (34,500 x
0.406). Thus, if we express output in terms of equivalent final units of production,
Speke produced a total of 40,556 vehicles (26,549 finished cars and 14,007
equivalent units). The output calculations for the other plants are equally



































UNIT FACTORY COST OF A MASS PRODUCED CAR,, 1952
Component	 Material Labour Total %
(E)	 (E)	 (E)
Engine	 42	 10	 52 14.9
Gearbox	 11	 6	 17 4.9
Front Suspension	 13	 13 3.7
RearAxie	 8	 4	 12 3.4
Brakes & Hydraulic Equipment	 8	 8 2.3
Chassis:
Frame	 1	 5	 6 1.7
Radiator	 6	 6 1.7
Road Springs	 4	 4 1.1
Exhaust System	 1	 1 0.3
Shock Absorbers	 5	 5 1.4
Hand Brake	 1	 1 0.3
Hoses and Clips	 1	 1 0.3
Petrol Pipes	 1	 1	 0.3
Fastenings	 1	 1	 0.3
319	 31 350 100.0
Notes:
Figures rounded to nearest pound.
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For example in 1972, Ford's Halewood complex comprised a Body Plant, an
Assembly Line and a Transmission Works. The site was linked to Dagenham by
the nearby London to Liverpool railway, and the company had developed its own
freight terminus. The whole system was designed to ease material flow, forming a
conveyor extension between Merseyside and the South East. As well as complete
vehicles, Halewood also produced over 507,000 gearboxes and 507,000 rear axles
for other plants. In terms of equivalent final units of output, the transmission plant
contributed 42,081 equivalent units of production (gearboxes: 507,000 x 0.049 =
24,843; rear axles: 507,000 x 0.034 = 17,238). This raised total plant output to
284,705 equivalent units of production (242,624 + 24,843 +17,23 8).
In many ways, Vauxhall's Cheshire plant was Halewood's twin. The site was
originally developed because of its excellent road and rail links and its proximity to
Ellesmere Docks. It became a filly integrated car works in 1965, when a
combined press shop and assembly plant was built. By 1972, the factory had
become the home of Vauxhall's small family cars, making the RB Viva from
March 1966 to 1970, then the more angular HC, which was supplanted by the
Chevette in 1975 (Collins and Stratton 1993, pp.'78-8l).
Ellesmere Port produced its own engines, bodies and radiators. It shipped
components to Luton, Dunstable and Bedford, and received electronic parts and
other items from GM's network of British plants. Because representatives of
Vauxhall were not examined in the original parliamentary enquiry, it is more
difficult to quantifj the factory's component output. Two sources - the company
memorandum and Collins and Stratton (1993) - confirm that axles and gearboxes
were shipped to the South East. A reasonable assumption would be that all
Luton/Dunstable vehicles used these Merseyside components. On this basis,
Ellesmere Port would be manufacturing 148,000 axles and transmissions for other
sites, amounting to 12,284 equivalent units of production (gearboxes: 148,000 x
0.049 = 7,252; axles: 148,000 x 0.034 = 5,032). This would provide total annual
production for 1972 of 139,485 (127,201+7,252+5,032).
Linwood and Bathgate complete the output analysis. Linwood was conceived as a
single product site, but by 1972 it was building the Imp and Arrow (Hillman
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Hunter) range, as well as sub-assemblies for Chrysler's Coventry plants. Again, to
convert this to equivalent final units of production, we should account for
component production. Fortunately Waymark (1983) provides a product
breakdown for 1971. This lists average weekly production of 3,800 sets of body
panels, 3500 gearboxes, and 3700 rear axle assemblies. Working on the basis of a
fifty week year, this provides annual totals of 190,000 bodies (3,800 x 50),
175,000 gearboxes (3,500 x 50) and 185,000 axles (3,700 x 50). If we now deduct
those parts destined for Linwood final vehicles, this leaves net figures of 45,139
bodies (190,000 minus 144,861 finished cars), 30,139 gearboxes (175,000 minus
144,861 finished cars) and 40,139 rear axles assemblies (185,000 minus 144,861
finished cars). Applying the cost criteria from Table 7.3, we arrive at Linwood's
final output figure of 166,029 (bodies: 45,139 x 0.406 = 18,326; gearboxes:
30,139 x 0.049 = 1,477; axles: 40,139 x 0.034 = 1,365; finished cars: 144,861).
Bathgate presents a curiosity for our output analysis. Because it produced
commercial vehicles and tractors, its linkages with other plants were very limited.
This reflects its peripheral role within the British Leyland organisation. No
breakdowns are available for component output, and contemporary accounts
provide little indication that component production was a major activity on the
shop-floor. Accordingly, the recorded output of 23,000 finished vehicles is
regarded as a fair indication of total productive activity. This estimate completes
our analysis of plant output. The next stage is to consider transport-related costs.
§7.5 Transportation and Related Costs
Freight Costs
Freight costs represent the first important element of transport-related
expenditure. Neo-classical theory defines optimum location through the transport
function. According to Weber (1929), the best site for an industrial plant
minimised the aggregate costs of bringing in materials and shipping out finished
goods. In this scheme, labour and agglomeration economies were diverting forces
able to deflect, but not replace, the transport solution.
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A more modern view is reflected in Table 7.1. Here the low value of the bought-in
transport category provides a prima facia rebuttal to Weber's model. However,
Tyler and Kitson (1987, p.61) suggest that the measure captures only one half of
all transport expenditure. More fundamental critiques are provided by a 1984
study by PIEDA (a private economic consultancy) and Edwards (1975), who
question the scale of geographical transport cost variations. The PIEDA survey
discovered regional differences ofjust 1%, whilst Edward's concluded:
• in very general terms, the indications are that the difference between
the highest cost regions (Northern Scotland and East Anglia) and the least
regions (East and West Midlands and to some extent the South East) was
(in 1963) relatively small, amounting to not more than 2-3% of vakie
added by the manufacturing sector (and less than 1% of sales value).
Such findings led many to argue that transport costs occupy a minor role in the
decision making process. The implication is that geographically isolated plants
suffer no cost penalty.
These studies must be reconciled with evidence from the motor manufacturers. In
1971, Lord Stokes told the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee a very different
story:
We have a factory in Scotland (Bathgate). . . if you take a five ton truck,
for example, it costs £18 to ship the bits up from England which have to be
put into the truck in the factory in Scotland and then 75% of the trucks are
sold in the southern half of England and we reckon it costs us another £40
to ship the truck back again either to ship it from London or whatever port
it goes from or sell it to the domestic customer. Therefore you have a
penalty of £58 on each truck which costs about £1500 or £2000. It is
quite a heavy price to pay for having a factory up in Scotland (HMSO
1972, p.194).
Lord Stokes echoed the objections of all the major car firms. According to Ford,
Vauxhall, Chrysler and BLMC - the decentralisation programme had necessarily
increased freight charges. This was because of both distance and fragmentation
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effects. In the former case, goods had to be carried further, incurring greater line-
haul costs. In the latter case, decentralisation required extra journeys - increasing
terminal charges. These arguments can be illustrated through a plant by plant
analysis of the Parliamentary evidence.
According to British Leyland, the company's Merseyside complex attracted
significant freight penalties. These related specifically to the cost of importing
engines and transmissions from the West Midlands. In 1972, the company costed
these shipments at £502,000 per year. 2 This produced a transport cost penalty of
£12.38 per unit (502,000/40,556), representing 1.3% of the retail price of a
Triumph Toledo.3
Ford assessed transport costs by employing a simple counterfactual. By assuming
that Halewood did not exist, they were able to calculate the annual freight savings
of a Greater London (Dagenham) location. In 1971/72, the savings were put at
£742,000. Many of these costs originated in extra transports from Dagenham
(engines) and South Wales (radiators).
Interestingly, Ford believed that Halewood actually reduced the company's
delivery costs. This was because the plant was conveniently placed in relation to
the Northern and Midlands markets. Ford put this benefit at £100,000 per annum,
yielding a recurring aggregate freight cost of £642,000 or £2.25 per equivalent
vehicle (642,000/284,705). In 1972, this represented 0.25% of the final retail price
of a 1.1 litre Escort.4
We know that Ellesmere Port produced its own engines, bodies and radiators. It
also shipped components to Luton, Dunstable and Bedford, and received
electronic parts and other items from GM's network of British plants. In 1972, the
extra cost of these transports was estimated at £750,000. Unlike Ford, Vauxhall
believed that its distribution costs were increased by a West coast location. This
2 Unfortunately, no distinction was made between component and distribution costs. The figure
must therefore be regarded as net of any delivery savings.
Based on the retail price of the cheapest 2 door model, £786 list, £951 including purchase tax.
Prices supplied by the National Motor Museum, Beaulieu.
Based on the retail price of a Ford Escort 1100 2 door, £727 list, £878 including purchase tax.
Prices supplied by the National Motor Museum, Beaulieu.
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was because the company used Felixstowe rather than Merseyside for exports.
This incurred additional costs of £100,000 per year, making a net recurring freight
cost of £850,000 per annum, or £6.09 per equivalent unit (850,000/139,485). In
1972, this represented 0.74% of the final retail price of a 1.1 litre Viva.5
In all of the Merseyside plants, it is clear that an East coast location incurred
substantial freight handicaps. A priori, one would expect Scottish factories to
incur proportionally greater charges. BLMC's Bathgate plant provides the first
case study.
The original site had been chosen following an exhaustive search. The firm's
executives had visited estates at Johnstone, Bathgate, Grangemouth, Glenrothes
and Dundee (Sims & Wood 1984, p.24). Eventually, the company chose Bathgate
because it offered the best rail and port connections. But this still left a 300 mile
journey to the Midlands. For reasons which were discussed in §6.4, component
firms did not follow BLMC. Instead, commercial vehicle production relied on
imported English parts. By June 1971, the company ran 40 trucks a night to
Scotland - producing a 'perpetual drain' on working capital (HMSO 1972, p.193).
Lord Stoke's estimates of a £58 per unit penalty can be confirmed by BLMC's
cost memorandum. In 1972, the company assessed extra freight expenses at
£1,284,000. Using Bhaskar's 1972 output figures, this produces an extra cost per
vehicle of55.83 (1,284,000/23,000). On a lorry costing £1500, this equated to a
3.7% tariff.
Linwood completes the freight analysis. There were two dimensions to the plant's
sourcing problems. On the one hand, component suppliers did not establish in
Scotland. As Table 7.5 indicates, nearly 80% of Chrysler's parts were obtained
from the Midlands and South of England. On the other hand, Linwood disrupted
inter-plant linkages. In 1971, the company put these costs at £1.1 million.
Based on the retail price of the cheapest 2 door model; £682 list, £826 including purchase tax.
Prices supplied by the National Motor Museum, Beaulieu.
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TABLE 7.5
PERCENTAGE OF VENDOR SUPPLIED PARTS BY DISTANCE FROM
L1NWOOD, 1972














Source: Young and Hood (1977, p.263)
Chrysler went on to analyse delivery costs. On the domestic front, the company
demonstrated that 85% of its cars were sold to dealers within 150 miles of
Coventry. By contrast, only 15% of sales were within the same distance of
Linwood. Since Chrysler refused to absorb these costs into delivery charges,
£400,000 a year had to be written off by management. Similarly, export
movements were costed at an extra £100,000 per annum. These costs arose
because 40% of foreign sales were shipped through Liverpool, and 45% through
London and the South East. In both cases, Coventry enjoyed a tangible cost
advantage.
So, taking the freight costs together, Chrysler estimated an annual deficit of £1.6
million for 197 1/72. This produces a transport cost per unit of £9.64
(1,600,000/166,029), equal to just over 1.5% of the retail price of the plant's core
product.6
Inventory Costs
Inventory costs represent another important transport related expenditure. In
general, an isolated plant will maintain higher inventories due to the increased
on the price of a standard Hihlrnan Imp, £642 including purchase tax (Henshaw &
Henshaw 1988, p.142).
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distance from its suppliers. If the plant feeds products to more centrally located
sites, stocks may also be higher. The motive is to avoid 'walking and waiting' time
(Williams eta! 1994, p.48). Only by maintaining flow, can labour's share of value-
added be reduced. The consequences of poor material flow are serious, involving
short-time working and difficulty in meeting delivery schedules. These very
problems were encountered at Bathgate in the early 1960s, where supply breaks
were blamed for aggravating labour relations (PRO 1 964a).
Unfortunately, by increasing their stocks, companies expose themselves to higher
operating penalties. This is because the extra floor space, insurance and related
expenditure tie up working capital. At Linwood, it was found necessary to hold an
additional two days of parts, together with extra equipment spares to cover
maintenance problems. Furthermore, an additional one day's stock was held of all
company manufactured parts delivered to or from Linwood. These costs were put
at £200,000 in 1971, and aggregated at £700,000 for the period between 1963 and
1970. This was based on an additional stock-holding of £1,000,000. Similarly,
BLMC calculated that inventories attracted annual interest charges of £27,000 in
Bathgate, and £26,000 in Liverpool. If we assume that interest was charged at
20% of the total stockholding value (as in Linwood), this implies total additional
stocks of £135,000 in Scotland and £130,000 in Liverpool. However, the
memoranda recognised that interest charges represented the best proxy for
loationaI expenses.
Halewood and Ellesmere Port employed a different inventory policy. They allowed
parts to be retained in transit - avoiding on site expenses. But this required an
extra £249,000 worth of Ford parts and £100,000 of Vauxhall components to be
on the road at any one time. Vauxhall estimated that this traffic attracted interest
charges of £10,000 per annum. Because this expenditure constituted a year-long
drain on working capital, both stock and interest charges have been included in the
final calculations.
Travel and Communication Costs
Travel and communication costs arise because both personnel and information
have to be exchanged between plants. This involves additional expenditure on
telephones, telex and data processing, together with travel expenses for key
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workers. It might be expected that there is high locational element in this category.
But it should be noted that even small moves incur penalties. This is because
dislocation rather than distance determines the communications need.
Of the Merseyside plants, only Vauxhall provided an estimate for this category.
This put communication costs at £30,000, and travel expenditure at £12,000 per
annum. Ford provided a gross figure for all decentralised plants. Nevertheless, it is
possible to estimate Halewood's share according to the employee distribution
between sites. 7 While this is not an ideal solution, it does have the advantage of
relating communications expense to manpower control. This yields an annual
penalty of £158,000, which makes Chrysler's figure of £150,000 seem
conservative.
The variations between Vauxhall's and Ford's figures suggest a methodological
problem. Both plants produced a similar product mix, and both head offices were
in the South East. For Ford to spend three times as much on travel and
communication would imply that the firms had widely different organisational
structures. Since we know that that was not true, there must be some other
explanation. The most likely reason is that Vauxhall did not cost the time lost in
travelling between sites. Given the similar sizes of Halewood and Ellesmere Port,
an upward adjustment of £100,000 in Vauxhall's costs would therefore be
appropriate.
BLMC's figures must also be inferred from the data. Working on the assumption
that travel and communications are a function of employee distribution, it is
possible to estimate these costs according to the average cost per employee in
Halewood, Ellesmere Port and Linwood. This cost equates to £13.88, which when
applied to Bathgate and Speke, would give figures of £62,252 and £55,520
respectively. Because of BLMC's complicated plant network, these estimates are
likely to understate actual costs.
' Thus total communication costs for Halewood, Swansea and Belfast were put at £200,000.
Employee distribution was Halewood 12,945 (78.8%), Swansea 2.383 (14.5%) and Belfast 1,101
(6.7%).
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Duplication of Services & Staff Relocation
The final transport related costs are service duplication and staff relocation. The
former refers to the expense of shadowing existing business functions, the latter to
grants and expenses payable to mobile employees. Only Chrysler provided
estimates in the first category. The company argued that Linwood required an
extra 175 staff, costed at £500,000 pa. Duplicated functions included engineering
support, production management and financial control. Since the other motor
firms ignored this category, one must assume that they were unable to identify any
extra requirements. The conclusion must be that Chrysler either represented a
special case (unlikely), or that Ford, Vauxhall and BLMC failed to develop an
appropriate methodology. Because of this impasse, it has been decided to provide
two cost schedules for Linwood: Scheme A will include Chrysler's estimates of
duplication; Scheme B will ignore the category. In this way, it should be possible
to compare decentralised plants on a consistent basis, while providing an upper-
range figure for management expenses.
Staff relocation costs are much more straightforward. In Chrysler's case, after a
large initial outlay (1200,000 from 1963-67), the annual recurring penalty was put
at £20,000. Vauxhall's estimate was on a par at £12,000 pa, while Ford's estimate
of £70,000 for its regional plants can be estimated to £55,000 for Halewood. By
contrast BLMC, provided no estimate for this area. But any amount was likely to
be small in relation to turnover and total labour costs (Halewood alone faced a
weekly wage bill of £800,000). Given these circumstances, it is reasonable to
retain the relocation category without any additional estimates for Bathgate and
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This profile of transport-related costs raises methodological and practical
concerns. The figures involved are certainly striking, constituting 2.3% of
Ford's total 1972 pre-tax profits, 6.1% of British Leyland's profits, 154% of
Chrysler United Kingdom's (CUK) profits, and 25.9% of Vauxhall's losses.
Given 1972 cost structures and output levels, an autonomous five per cent
increase in these charges would have reduced pre-tax profitability by a further
£55,200 at Ford, £97,839 at BL and £123,500 at Chrysler (Table 7.7). Under
the same assumptions, Vauxhall's losses would have risen by £55,200. This is
important because we know that oil and fuel prices rose 132% from 1972 to
1977 (HMSO 1982).
TABLE 7.7
EFFECT OF 5% INCREASE ON TRANSPORTATION COSTS (E)
Ford	 Vauxhall	 BL	 CUK
Transport related costs 	 1,104,000	 1,114,000	 1,956,772	 2,470,000
per Table 7.3
5% increase	 1,159,200	 1,169,700	 2,054,611	 2,593,500
Increase in Charges 	 55,200	 55,700	 97,839	 123,500
Source: Company Accounts, Bhaskar (1975).
This analysis might suggest that OPEC! unavoidably increased the production
costs in Development Area sites. But the ratio between fuel price rises and the
Retail Price Index remained stable in the mid-i 970s. When this evidence is
combined with the small changes in industry cost structure noted in Table 7.1,
it implies that transport-related costs may have increased in proportion to
general manufacturing expenses.
The second point brings the discussion to the nature of production technology.
The Development Area plants had been designed along fordist lines. In the
fordist system, success depended on achieving scale economies by expanding
output. But as Bhaskar outlined in 1975 (para. 9.29), there remained a
fundamental problem:
The ideal output may be 2 million identical cars per year, but that is not
very useful, because under present conditions, there is no chance at all of
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selling that many. Even the more modest compromise of two or three
hundred thousand cars per year of one particular model is not easy to
obtain. Past experience in the UK has shown that whereas companies
may have been able to sell one or two cars at that volume, nobody has
even approached the ideal of selling that many of every model in its
range. The cost penalties of production below capacity are sufficient to
wipe out any gains from the installation of high-volume capacity
The fordist imperative imposed an additional constraint on car manufacturers.
Under normal circumstances, economic production was only possible when
throughput was maintained at adequate levels. Development Area relocation
raised this threshold. In particular, higher terminal costs had to be spread over
larger production runs. Similarly, increased line haul costs could only be
mitigated by a larger scale of operation. Had these plants operated at their
planned output levels, losses per unit would have undoubtedly been lower.
The inability of British motor manufacturers to sell their cars in sufficient
volume was intimately related to the competitiveness crisis affecting British
motor manufacturing. In the mid 1970s, three official reports tackled this issue:
the Ryder Committee focused on the handicap of outdated machinery,
centralised corporate organisation and poor industrial relations (HMSO
1975a); the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee stressed over-manning and
excess demand (1-IMSO 1975b); the CPRS (1975) centred on lack of plant
maintenance and archaic working practices. All were agreed that once
protective trade bamers had been dismantled, British based manufacturers had
to accommodate themselves to a new competitive environment. However,
British firms discovered that quality and price deficits had developed, and that
high volume, high-productivity competition from the continent was difficult to
overcome. 8 In this context, decentralisation proved an unwelcome distraction.
§7.6 Labour Cost
Since labour costs play such an important role in the motor industry, one would
expect wage differentials to figure prominently in the motor firms'
Parliamentary evidence. But the memoranda submitted to the Trade and
8 See Leech and Cubbin (1978) for a discussion of the price/quality trade-off involved.
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Industry Sub-Committee focused on national wage bargaining. By 1972, only
Chrysler and BLMC favoured regionally differentiated pay rates, and both firms
claimed that inter-regional differences in effort and work quality eradicated any
financial gains. The only acknowledged financial consequences of dispersal
concerned training, where Ford estimated an additional expenditure of £30,000
per annum.
Despite centralised bargaining, there are reasons to believe that labour costs
will still vary with space. This is because of differences in training costs, bonus
payments, shift working, payments in kind etc. Following Woo's methodology
(1986), it is possible to quantify this effect using the Labour Cost Survey,
which began publishing regional breakdowns in 1975.
TABLE 7.8
LABOUR COSTS BY REGION, 1975
(Ave. hourly amount per employee)






(Total	 Costs in Pence per Hour)	 (GB100)
North	 158.18	 160.82	 155.98	 84
Yorks.&	 153.33	 154.40	 160.41	 86.4
Humberside
East Midlands	 147.80	 167.69	 187.01	 100.7
East Anglia	 153.11	 151.41	 -
South East
	
173.37	 177.21	 200.84	 108.1
South West
	
157.82	 161.01	 188.05	 101.2
West Midlands	 160.62	 164.57	 187.13	 100.8
North West
	
157.22	 158.48	 176.30	 98
Wales	 167.09	 161.40	 169.85	 91.5
Scotland	 146.87	 126.91	 163.94	 88.3
GreatBritain	 160.17	 166.58	 185.65	 100.0
Notes:
All figures are quoted net of Regional Employment Premium.
Engineering and Allied Trades are defined as metal manufacturing, mechanical
engineering, instrument engineering, electrical engineering, shipbuilding and
marine engineering, vehicles and metal goods not elsewhere specified.
Source: Dept of Employment (1977)
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Table 7.8 outlines the basic pattern. It can be seen that in 1975, the South East
and Wales had the highest per employee labour costs, and the East Midlands
the lowest. Nationally, the engineering and allied sector was 4% more costly
than general manufacturing industry, while the vehicle division incurred 16%
higher costs. In all cases, the South East proved the most expensive location,
reflecting a scarcity of labour and a higher than average skill level.
In the vehicle division, the South East retained a strong lead, followed by the
South West, with the North and Yorkshire & Humberside bringing up the rear.
Woo (1986) was able to divide the car manufacturing areas into three bands:
Band 1 included the South East; Band 2 the three non-assisted regions (East
Midlands, West Midlands and South West), and Band Three the remaining
assisted areas. Scotland, Wales and the North East enjoyed a 12% cost
advantage over the South East, and a 3% advantage over Band 2.
Interestingly, the make-up of labour costs also varied between regions. In
Scotland, wages and salaries comprised 94% of total costs, while the
corresponding figure for the South East was 87%. The South East also had the
highest provision for redundancy, while the scarcity of workers and
environment made non-monetary emoluments necessary. Training costs seemed
to be the only item more costly in the Development Areas, although in both
Scotland and the North East salary levels more than compensated for this.
These regional variations in non-wage labour costs have received surprisingly
little attention from economists. Data has usually been interpreted on a sectoral
or international basis. Typical examples of the former approach are provided by
Bates and Reid (1962), Moonman (1973) and Hawkesworth (1977). These
studies suggested that fringe benefits alone constituted on average 15% of total
pay in the 1960s and 1970s. More recently attention has focused on
international comparisons in total labour costs. This has been motivated by
discussions over foreign direct investment into Europe (e.g. Taylor 1993), and
moves to harmonise employment law under the Social Chapter (e.g. Saint-Paul,
1997). A recent standard undergraduate textbook on industrial location
illustrates these deficiencies. Despite exhaustive treatments of location theory,
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practice and experience, Harrington and Warf (1995) focus exclusively on
wage costs and national bargaining frameworks.
The emphasis on national institutions and agreements may be justifiable
because employment law is generated by central government. However, the
nature of many fringe benefits lend themselves to informal workplace
agreements. Moreover, differences in regional labour markets may allow
workforces and management to secure concessions from one another. If
national wage agreements are in place, it would be reasonable to see
discrimination occurring in other areas. For the motor industry, this trend was
particularly important in federated firms where different work practices co-
existed. Moreover, Chapter 8 demonstrates how management deliberately tried
to engineer new forms of workplace organisation in their regional plants. In
these circumstances, regional variations in non-wage labour costs should not be
unexpected.
The Labour Cost Survey allows us to investigate the annual per employee
labour cost differential between the decentralised and traditional motor building
regions. The method is quite straightforward. To arrive at annual per employee
differences for the vehicle industry, the hourly data from Table 7.8 is combined
with information on the actual hours worked per year in the vehicles group. To




ANMJAL PER EMPLOYEE LABOUR COST DIFFERENTIALS,
VEHICLES GROUP - DECENTRALISED VERSUS TRADITIONAL
AREAS
North West Location	 Scottish Location
1975 Prices	 1972 Prices	 1975 Prices	 1972 Prices
Saving re Pence per
South	 hour	 24.54	 15.65	 36.90	 23.53
East	 £ per year	 446.14	 284.58	 670.84	 427.92
Saving re Pence per
West	 hour	 10.83	 6.90	 23.19	 14.79
Midlands	 £peryear	 196.89	 125.59	 421.59	 268.92
Notes:
Average working year of 1,818 hours, based average hours worked per
employee 1975.
Prices adjusted by implied GDP deflator at market prices
Source: Dept. of Employment (1977)
These findings can be applied to individual plants (Table 7.10). With a
workforce of 12,949 in 1972, the Labour Cost Survey suggests that Halewood
would have enjoyed annual benefits of £1 .6m over a Midlands location, and a
staggering £3.7m over a Dagenham site. Vauxhall's figures of £1.4m and
£3.3m reflect the same relationship (11,490 employees). The corresponding
benefits for Speke (based on a workforce of 4,000) would have been £0.Sm
and £1. Im. In each case it is necessary to take only the relevant counterfactual;
this means that Halewood and Ellesmere Port should be compared with South
East locations, and Speke with a Midlands site.
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TABLE 7.10
ANNUAL LABOUR COST DIFFERENTIALS BY PLANT,
DECENTRALISED VERSUS TRADITIONAL AREAS (1972 Prices)
HALEWOOD 12,949 WORKERS SAVING RE MIDLANDS 125.59 x 12,949 =
£1,626,265
SAVING RE SOUTH EAST 284.58 x 12,949
= £3,685,026
ELLESMERE PORT 11,490 WKRS SAVING RE MiDLANDS 125.59 x 11,490 =
£1,443,029
SAVING RE SOUTH EAST 284.58 x 11,490
= £3,269,824
SPEKE 4,000 WORKERS	 SAVING RE MIDLANDS 125.59 x 4,000 =
£502,360
SAVING RE SOUTH EAST 284.58 x 4,000 =
£1,138,320
LINWOOD 8,000 WORKERS	 SAVING RE MIDLANDS 268.92 x 8,000=
£2,151,360
SAVING RE SOUTH EAST 427.92 x 8,000 =
£3,423,360
BATHGATE 4,485 WORKERS	 SAVING RE MIDLANDS 268.92 x 4,485 =
£1,206,106
SAVING RE SOUTH EAST 427.92 x 4,485 =
£1,919,221
Relevant counterfactuals are: Halewood (SE location), Ellesmere Port (SE
location); Speke (Midlands location), Linwood (Midlands location); Bathgate
(Midlands location).
The Scottish comparisons are equally illuminating. With a workforce of 8,000,
Linwood enjoyed a saving of2.2m over the Midlands, and a benefit of3,4m
above South East England. Bathgate returned figures of £1 .2m and £1 .9m
respectively.
If this methodology is sound, it implies that labour savings more than
compensated Ford and Vauxhall for Merseyside's geographical isolation.
Similarly, labour savings would have eradicated the freight charges incurred at
Bathgate, Speke and Linwood. But this analysis poses problems. The Labour
Cost Survey relied on sampling techniques. In the manufacturing sector, 10,500
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establishments were approached, and 81% replied. The resulting sample (3.6m
employees) represented 54% of the manufacturing workforce. Under these
conditions, it is not unreasonable to assume that the survey produced a
representative cross-section. However, the estimated cost savings are large
enough to suggest extreme caution.
Since the survey reflected actual expenditure, one must wonder why the motor
firms did not identif' labour cost differences in their evidence to Parliament.
Several explanations are possible. First, the companies may have been unaware
of variations. Given the poor standards of cost accounting endemic in the
British motor industry, this suggestion should not be ignored. Second, as
Chapter 8 makes clear, the main labour issues confronting firms were related to
workplace organisation and stoppages. In these circumstances, it would not be
surprising if cost savings were discounted against output loss and the costs of
disruption. This is precisely the argument employed by BLMC in its written
evidence to Parliament (DTI 1973a). Finally, the motor firms may have
concealed their findings to ftirther their policy agenda. This could have been
linked to the retention of REP incentives. In any scenario, it seems that some
financial adjustments are justified.
§7.7	 Financial Incentives
The issue of financial incentives completes the cost analysis. In 1972, Assisted
Area firms benefited from a mixture of capital allowances and operational
subsidies. But the original decentralisation programme had relied on investment
grants and cheap loans. Ideally, any analysis of locational penalties should
therefore reflect (a) the long term benefits of non-commercial borrowing, (b)
the discounted cash flow accruing from past investment grants, and (c)
incentives payable in the current financial year. Unfortunately, both the motor
manufacturers and government proved unwilling to provide detailed
breakdowns.
Chrysler supplied the fullest published evidence to Parliament. In 1961/62, the
company received three government loans amounting to £9.6m. These loans
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were for periods of 15 and 20 years, and attracted interest costs of between 1-
1.5% lower than market rates. From 1966, the company also benefited from the
higher investment grants payable in Development Areas, while REP became
available from 1968.
In 197 1/72, Chrysler calculated that the lower interestpayments on outstanding
loans added £165,000 to the group profit and loss account. In common with
the other companies, Chrysler did not attempt to quantify the discounted cash
flow benefit arising from grants received. But the company did include grant
income of121,000 for 1971/72, and REP payments of804,O00.
Ford's cost memorandum made no mention of loan repayments and instead
concentrated on grant and REP incentives. According to the company's
director of finance, Halewood's peripheral location had secured an extra £8.3m
worth of investment grants by the early 1 970s. No breakdown was given for
1971/2, although REP receipts were put at £788,000. Following BLMC's
methodology (see below), it has been decided to average the grants received
between 1962-71, and calculate the annual savings in depreciation charges
arising. Assuming a writing down allowance of 20% per annum over five years,
this means that in 1971/72 investment grants contributed £830,000 to Ford's
profit and loss account. 9 While this may seem an arbitrary adjustment, it reflects
the continuing financial benefits available to a company established in a
peripheral location. If we place Chrysler's grant income on the same basis -
averaging total receipts since 1963 and calculating depreciation savings - this
raises the benefits from £121,000 to £333,444.'°
Vauxhall's submission proved the briefest of the five. Apart from a plea to
make investment grants payable in cash rather than accelerated depreciation
allowances, the company made no mention of either historic or current
grant/loan income. Again the focus was on REP payments, which secured
funds of £850,000. Nevertheless, it is possible to find a summary of the grants
9 Thus, £8,300,000 received from 1962 to 197 1/72, equivalent to £830,000 savings charged
to the profit and loss account per annum.
°Thus, £3,001,000 received from 1963 to 197 1/72, equivalent to £333,444 savings charged
to the profit and loss account per annum.
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received by Vauxhall in official records (PRO 1967). These indicate that
Development Area relocation earned a net grant advantage of6,41 1,895. This
produces an annual depreciation saving of712,433."
BLMC also restricted their analysis to grant and REP payments. The latter
qualified for assistance of £352,000 in Bathgate and £303,000 in Liverpool.
The two plants also attracted extra capital grants of £2,633,000 and £593,000
between 1966 and 1971. According to BLMC, these grants yielded annual
bonuses of £527,000 and £119,000, being the estimated reduction in
depreciation and amortisation costs.
This leaves the question of benefits from non-commercial borrowing. While
Chrysler provided an estimate employing discounted cashflow analysis,
comparisons are missing for Ford, Vauxhall and BLMC. Moreover,
government records omit any reference to loans or borrowing conditions.
However, we can estimate the amounts involved by using Chrysler's experience
as a baseline. If we assume that the same conditions applied to all loans (a
twenty year repayment period, with fixed repayments at 1.5% below
commercial rates), we might use the data in table 6.8 to calculate annual
savings. Thus, Rootes (Chrysler) was granted loans amounting to £9,200,000
in 1962, which brought returns of £165,000 in the base year (1971/72). In
other words, for every £1 borrowed in the 1960s, the company earned 1.79
pence back in 197 1/72. Applying the same ratio to the other sites, Ford's
borrowings of £9,830,000 would have yielded returns of £176,000; BLMC
would have earned £174,000 at Bathgate and £86,000 at Speke. Interestingly,
Vauxhall declined the offer of loan assistance, instead relying on their bankers
'from whom they could obtain very favourable interest rates' (PRO 1962e).
But as these estimates assume identical borrowing conditions, they must be
regarded with extreme caution.
Thus, £6,411,895 received from 1963 to 1971/72, equivalent to £712,433 savings charged
to the profit and loss account per annum.
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TABLE 7.11
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, 1971/72 (E)
Halewood Ellesmere	 Speke
Port
REP Payments	 788,000	 850,000	 303,000
Savings in Depreciation	 830,000	 712,433	 527,000
Charges
Benefits from Non-	 176,000	 nil	 86,000
commercial borrowing
Total	 1,794,000	 1,562,433	 916,000
Linwood	 Bathgate
REP Payments	 804,000	 352,000
Savings in Depreciation	 333,444	 119,000
Charges
	




Bhaskar (1975), Chrylser UK (1973), DTI (1973a), Ford Motor Co. (1973),
HMSO (1962, P. 116), PRO (1960d), Vauxhall Motors (1973), Young &
Hood (1977, p. 262)
These estimates require some comment. While the figures for REP receipts are
unspectacular, there are big variations in depreciation savings. In particular, the
Merseyside plants seem to have befitted from generous allowances. This is
explicable in terms of the disparate investment strategies employed by firms.
Ford and Vauxhall achieved a high level of support because their investment
was incremental and sustained throughout the 1960s. Speke benefited from
Leyland's decision to centralise sports car production in Liverpool. This
enabled all three companies to benefit from the changes in regional policy
legislation which made investment grants mandatory in Development Areas.
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With Vauxhall, there was a carefWly planned three stage investment plan,
which saw the completion of new buildings in 1964, and the addition of a new
press shop and assembly hail two years later (Collins & Stratton 1993, p.79).
This culminated in re-tooling for the HB Viva, which began production in
1966. In Ford's case, initial investment saw the completion of a stamping and
body plant by 1964, with the addition of an £8,500,000 transmission plant in
1965. As Chapter 8 explains, Halewood developed into a true multi-product
factory, building Anglias, Cortinas, Zephrys, Zodiacs and Escorts throughout
its first decade. In Speke's case, we have already seen how the #2 plant was
cancelled when the company was forced into a defensive merger with Leyland.
However, the new board did sanction additional expansion in 1966, when new
press and body shops were constructed for production of the Toledo and the
TR6 replacement. By contrast, both Rootes (Chrysler) and Leyland found it
difficult to divert scarce resources to their Scottish plants.
Rootes' demise as a British-owned firm was linked to its over-ambitious
expansion plans into the small car market. The company wrestled with a severe
cashflow crisis, problems with the Imp and an uncompetitive model range. The
situation only improved after Chrysler's take-over in 1967, when the new
American owners began a big investment programme. Unfortunately, much of
this money was spent on organisational change and replacing dilapidated
machinery in the Midlands. This meant that Linwood remained largely a one-
product plant operating below 50% of its planned capacity throughout the
1960s.
Bathgate's story was linked to complacency rather than crisis. The Scottish
plant specialised in producing lorries and tractors. But with the expansion of
Leyland into car manufacturing, B athgate' s activities became increasingly
irrelevant to the company's core manufacturing business. The successful truck
and bus division was progressively starved of funds, and the plant soon began
to exhibit many of the problems associated with inadequate investment.
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§7.8 Summary
Table 7.12 (p.230) gives a summary of the findings so far. It should be clear
from each plant that depreciation and labour cost adjustments are crucial in
converting locational penalties into potential gains. Questions now arise as to
the accuracy of the figures, and their relevance to wider regional policy issues.
Firstly, one must recognise that the evidence concerns operational penalties
encountered at a specific scale of output. This means that few clues are
provided about sunken costs or the annual variability in performance. We know
from Luttrell (1962) that locational costs will tend to decrease with time, but
the Expenditure Committee memoranda provide only cross sectional data.' 2 It
is therefore impossible (from this source at least) to estimate previous costs, or
assess the extra strain caused by decentralisation in the early 1 960s.
Given the nature of the Parliamentary enquiry, this is hardly surprising. The
investigation was an attempt to look at the problem of regional development
incentives 'as seen by industry itself. As most firms made clear, their main
problem was the threatened withdrawal of Regional Employment Premium.
From this perspective, the submissions naturally concentrated on operational
issues.
A potentially more alarming reason for the lack of historical data is that no
estimates were possible. This was because the motor firms did not use plants as
cost centres. Gilbert Hunt outlined the typical practice, 'We do not make our
income statements up showing the individual profitability by plant. . . We take a
number of judgements of yardsticks in our plants, which are not necessarily in
sterling' (HMSO 1973 a, p.58). This system works so long as financial
controllers maintain high levels of vigilance. However, by ignoring spatial
profitability, there is an inherent procedural weakness. This is because
artificially derived performance measures do not have the same immediacy as a
monetary equivalent.
12 The only historical cost figures are supplied by Chrysler. These relate to Linwood's
establishment and operation from 1963 to 1970.
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The question of extrapolation is also problematic. Since the memoranda present
recurring penalties, it might be expected that the data can be automatically
applied to subsequent years. But the further from the base year, the less reliable
these estimates will be. This is especially important given the changing
industrial context of the mid 1970s
The figures themselves are striking. The least robust component is in labour
costs. This is because the figures are not directly culled from motor industry
sources, and because there is a lack of secondary literature. While this chapter
has suggested a reasonable hypothesis for regional variations in non-wage
labour costs, it would be prudent to bear these restrictions in mind. The
depreciation statistics also present problems. Grant receipts were listed by the
motor firms, but they were usually included as annual totals. By contrast, Table
7.11 has averaged grant receipts over the entire period of operation, and
calculated the depreciation savings accruing in the benchmark year. This
provides a much more realistic measure of benefits, since it recognises the long
term rewards associated with incentives, and goes some way towards
reconciling operational costs with the continued availability of grant income.
The results suggest that Development Area plants in Merseyside were able to
curtail additional operating expenditure and generate valuable returns from
their investments. This implies that the compensation package offered by
government was sufficient to defray extra freight charges without any
adjustment for labour costs. By contrast, Scottish manufacturing sites were
unambiguous failures. Operating costs remained high, due to both function and
distance. On the one hand, they were isolated from Midlands suppliers, on the
other, they were producing marginal products from marginal sites. When the
Imp failed, throughput became a crucial issue for Rootes. In a similar way,
Bathgate was neglected by Leyland's ambitions in the South. A form of natural
selection seems to have ensured that the marginal firms secured the marginal
sites.
The data introduced in this chapter represents as detailed a cost analysis as can
be expected from diverse and incomplete sources. The inclusion of labour cost
228
differences and investment grants are a justifiable extension of relevant cost
accounting, while the results themselves present a useful snapshot of regional
economic performance. The findings demonstrate that the levels of locational
penalties - with the notable exception of the Scottish plants - were relatively
insignificant in relation to retail price. They also imply that competitiveness
remained a major problem. In its discussion of labour problems, Chapter Eight
will demonstrate how the failure of regionally produced vehicles was linked to
both reliability and design. As we shall see, these were industry-wide problems,
in which location played a minor part.
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Labour Cost Savings	 3,269,824
Total Locational 	 4,375,026	 15.37	 Total Locational 	 3,718,257	 26.66
(Cost)/Saving	 (Cost)/Saving
Speke	 Location	 Per	 Bathgate	 Location	 Per
(Cost)!	 Equivalent	 (Cost)!	 Equivalent



















Total Locational 	 834,840	 20.58
(Cost)/Saving


























Labour Cost Savings	 2,151,360
Total Locational	 983,804	 5.93	 Total Locational	 1,483,804	 8.94
(Cost)ISaving	 (Cost)/Saving
Sources: Tables 7.4, 7.6, 7.10, 7.11
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8 Labour and Industrial Location
§8.1 Introduction
According to fordist orthodoxy, commercial success derives from product
standardisation and labour deskilling. In this schema, internal productivity gains
generate cost reductions which widen market potential. Hence the Model T's price
was progressively cut by adopting a mass production system which reduced labour
content and maintained profit margins.
Subsequent analyses have confirmed labour as the key input in motor
manufacturing. The following comments are typical:
The obvious immediate problem of the car manufacturer may be
component costs, but for the sector as a whole the fundamental problem is
that at whatever stage it appears, manufacturing conversion requires a
substantial physical labour input, and adding value incurs substantial labour
costs. The fundamental problem is simply disguised if the manufacture of
components takes place at different stages and the work is performed in
(legally) separate firms (Williams et a! 1994, p.1 9).
In this context, worker quality and effort are critical. The ideal operative is semi-
skilled, educated to a basic standard and capable of repetitive and accurate motion.
If work quality or effort vary over space, there may be additional locational costs
within the labour function. This chapter will test these costs. It will assess whether
inferior labour skills handicapped Development Area plants, and if these plants
suffered from disproportionately high strike activity. It will then place these
findings into a wider historical perspective.
The chapter argues that the Development Area plants are best regarded as the first
attempt by car makers to impose fordist practices on British workers.
Consequently, a large part of the disruption experienced in the 1 960s can be seen
as the first stage of a transformation crisis which later affected the whole of British
motor manufacturing.
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§8.2 The Labour Function (1) Quality
Few men see the cars being driven off the line. While an assembly line
worker is always dealing with a moving car it is never moving under its
own steam. The line stands two feet above floor level and moves the car
monotonously, easily along. Walking along the floor of the plant as a
stranger you are deafened by the whine of the compressed air spanners,
you step gingerly between and upon knots of connecting air pipes which
writhe like snakes in your path, and you stare at the moving cars on either
side. . .This is the world of the operator (Beynon 1984, p.119).
Postwar vehicle production has been dominated by the moving assembly line. Its
design has determined not only the pace of work, but the character of the workers.
An assembly plant in the early 1 960s could be expected to employ over 60% of its
manpower in semi-skilled or unskilled grades. In the words of Ben Hamper's
Rivethead (1992, p.41), the requirement was for 'a bunch of overachieving
simians'. But even here, the motor firms criticised Development Areas. According
to Ford (1973), Vauxhall (1973) and Chrysler (1973), the outlying regions
provided an ill-suited mixture of miners, dockers and petty criminals. High
turnover, absenteeism and poor build quality were believed to translate into extra
locational costs. As the Ministry of Labour noted, there were doubts about the
'suitability' of the new workforces, and their 'willingness to do an honest day's
work for a good day's pay'(PRO 1964b).
These charges may be examined by considering three factors - the recruiting
policies employed by firms, the origins and character of recruits, and the training
efforts adopted. The first and third elements can help us examine the culpability for
alleged problems, while the second helps us to determine the workforce profile. As
always, the counterfactual is expansion in the Midlands or South East - where a
long tradition of flow production was believed to exist.
Labour Recruitment Policies
When the new factories were announced in the early 1960s, there was a popular
belief that localised unemployment in Merseyside and Scotland would quickly
disappear. Speaking in the Liverpool Post in December 1960, Alderman Braddock
assured the local population that, '. . . this is the end of the unemployment
problem which has bedevilled Merseyside ever since 1919. It is quite clear that the
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industrial development now starting, when it becomes an accomplished fact will
provide employment for all the present unemployed in Liverpool and will provide
very largely for the vast numbers of young people who will be leaving school in
the next five years'.
In fact, by this time, the motor firms had already decided to concentrate
recruitment among the employed, the married and the twenty-one to forty year
olds. The small amount of skill needed for most motor industry jobs meant that
firms could, in theory, recruit from the whole labour reserve. But personnel
officers deliberately excluded large sections of the population. At Halewood,
Goodman and Samuel (1966) recount how Ford targeted 'green labour' -
shunning seamen, dockers and the unemployed. At Rootes, applicants were
refused if they had had more than four jobs in the past five years, while single
candidates had to have 'a better than average work record' (PRO 1964c). In
general, the over forty-fives were considered only for skilled posts, while men
under twenty were formally barred by both Rootes and Ford. These practices were
a far cry from Alderman Braddock's beliefs, and a Ministry of Labour report
(PRO 1964d) on BMC's problems confirmed the existence of a substantial
expectation gap:
There was a local attitude amongst the less well educated that the BMC
had been sent to Bathgate to create a new prosperity and that the
employers were obliged to engage any man who presented himself for a
job. Letters have been frequently sent to the local MP by constituents
seeking his intervention to compel BMC to give them work [emphasis in
original].
This highly selective recruitment policy was reflected in the remuneration package.
At all the new assembly plants, wages were deliberately pitched above local
norms. In part this reflected national inter-industry differences, but it also
deliberately encouraged settled workers to apply to migrant firms. As the left-wing
academic and Ford critic Huw Beynon put it, the new workers were encouraged
to come 'in search of Eldorado' (1984, p.101).
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In terms of this thesis, attention is focused on whether selective recruitment
represented a departure from established practices. There is much to support this
view. When engaging new workers in the 1950s and early 1960s, plants in the
Midlands and South East were constrained by the available workforce and the
level of in-migration. In Coventry alone, 44.5% of the population growth between
1951 and 1961 was dependant on migration (Lancaster & Mason 1986, p.'76). But
tight local labour markets persisted (Tolliday & Zeitlin 1985, p.204). In such
circumstances, employers had to be less choosy (Turner 1963). But in the new
plants, motor firms felt compelled to adopt new policies. This was due not only to
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the scale of their projects, but the opportunities it afforded to management. As
Beynon (1984, p.66) explains,
The managers and foremen who went to the new plant (Halewood) were
recruited from Dagenham. . . Many of the management team had been
involved in conflicts with steward organisation at Dagenham, and were
determined to prevent a similar situation developing at Halewood. The first
Personnel Manager of the PTA plant remembers that "we went there with
the idea of having a good plant; one with good labour relations. We wanted
to get a trouble free plant, to get away from Dagenham and Dagenham
ways."
Decisions taken here had important implications for future workplace relations.
They also suggest that firms were experimenting with new and untried methods.
Workforce Profile
The evidence suggests that these policies created a new workforce profile.
Initially, age distribution in the Development Area plants was highly skewed
towards the target groups. In an analysis of Ford and Vauxhall's policy, Salt
(1967) discovered that 44% of those employed in the first two years of operation
(Halewood: end 1964; Ellesmere Port: end 1965) were aged between 21 and 29,
and a further 36% between 30 and 39. Comparative figures for Rootes show that
85.6% of Scottish employees were between 21 and 44 years old. At Ford, only 1%
of employees were aged over 50, while Vauxhall restricted the intake to 3%. This
age bar effectively excluded 25% of Liverpool's unemployed from the new
factories. At Rootes, the 14,290 applications meant that age limits were very
strictly applied (Table 8.2). Here the recruiters were able to establish separate
guidelines for each grade (PRO 1964c):
TABLE 8.2





Skilled Workers	 2 1-60
Source: PRO (1964c)
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This age pattern was at odds with industry-wide trends. In 1964, over 63% of
motor workers were aged thirty-five or over. During the same period, the not
untypical Coventry based firm of Rover had 33% of its employees in the fifty-plus
age bracket (Turner et a! 1967, p.1 72).
Early experience at these plants suggested that selective recruitment did not create
high labour turnover. The 1964 Ministry of Labour survey identified figures of
17% at Linwood, 13% at BMC, 10% at Vauxhall, 10% at Speke and 18% at
Ford. The report concluded that 'turnover was not a problem', being below the
average for the engineering industry and manufacturing as a whole. Against this
must be placed Beynon's work, which recounts how Ford were forced to revise
their hiring policy in the light of mass resignations and a labour shortage in the mid
1960s. This is more in character with evidence presented to the Expenditure
Committee, where the motor firms described severe 'adjustment problems' in their
regional plants.
The existence of a large pool of unemployed was one of the main reasons for the
direction of the car firms to the Development Areas. Yet as Salt (1967) clearly
shows, the Merseyside recruitment officers were successful in restricting access to
jobs. At the time of the Halewood/Ellesmere Port survey, only 8.7% of the
workforce had been jobless before joining the firms. This represented a mere 1,100
men, the majority of whom (75%) came from the short term unemployed. In
Scotland, Rootes recruited only 25% of its workers from the dole queue, while
BMC had the highest proportion at 40%.' As Salt (1967, p.58) argued:
This shows the folly in appraising Development Area policy of equating
jobs in the pipeline with the numbers out of work. It would be splendid if
this did happen, but most unlikely because the unemployed tend to be less
stable elements in the workforce and it is important for a new factory to
develop stability among its employees at the earliest opportunity.
The question of previous industrial background was also crucial to the quality
debate. The complaint from the motor firms was that that they were being forced
to recruit 'green labour', untutored in flow production.2 According to Sinnot,
l No comparative figure for Speke is available.
2 See Turner eta! (1967, p.144) for a discussion of the 'green labour' hypothesis.
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Bathgate's general manager, the problem was an 'unadaptable workforce, content
with modest earnings if increased pay required extra effort' (PRO 1964d). At
Linwood, the problem was seen more in terms of build quality. Early Imps became
notorious for faults. As one of the Ryton fitters recalled, 'We had a car come
down from Scotland and was generally inspected by all and sundry at Ryton. You
could actually sit in the thing and see the road beneath your feet, the gaps in the
body panels were atrocious. You simply can't build cars like that' (Henshaw &
Henshaw 1988, p. 57).
The Bathgate problems were the subject of a special investigation by the Board of
Trade and Ministry of Labour. Sinnot had estimated that 50% of the plant's £2m
losses (year ending July 1964) could be blamed on labour inefficiency. He argued
that 71% of employees were from mining backgrounds, and that these workers
were particularly troublesome. The Ministry of Labour did not agree. Although it
noted that 'none of the men recruited in Scotland had previous motor vehicle
manufacturing experience', it questioned the 71% claim. According to the Board
of Trade, the allegations were 'patently untrue'. Keen to promote inward
investment, the Scottish Office agreed. In a separate memorandum, the department
added, 'We have no firm figures for how many men came from a mining
background. We believe that the shale miner is the best type of employee, although
our impression of coal miners is that they are adaptable and intelligent. Since 1963
3,000 coal miners have been absorbed by other industries in Scotland, and the
BMC criticism is the only adverse reaction we know of' (PRO 1964d). The
suggestion was that the BMC management shared complicity for their problems,
and had helped to create an industrial relations environment in which conflict had
become endemic.
Unfortunately, there was no corresponding investigation into Linwood's record.
The surviving evidence suggests that Rootes was not displeased with labour
quality, although their turnover figure of 17% was amongst the highest in the
motor plant sample.
Better evidence is available for the Merseyside plants - particularly Halewood and
Ellesmere Port. Table 8.3 summarises Salt's estimates of those Orders losing men
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to the two plants. In total, 61% came from the manufacturing orders of the S.I.C.,
32% from service orders, and 6% from construction. Salt estimated that 52% of
these recruits came from orders declining in male employment (1959-63), and
48% from expanding sectors.
TABLE 8.3
INDUSTRIES LOSING MOST MEN TO FORD AND VAUXHALL
Industry	 Number Lost	 Sampling
Error


















Source: Salt (1967, p.259)
Goodman and Samuel's (1966) more detailed study of Ford's workforce confirms
this pattern. Almost half of the recruits were drawn from three industries;
engineering and electrical, transport and communications and construction.
Engineering and electrical was by far the greatest contributor, accounting for
almost one quarter of new workers
The problem with this evidence is that it relates only to the first years of operation,
and tells us nothing about labour market impact. However, it is clear that labour
recruitment became progressively more difficult. Whereas Vauxhall's early recruits
were hand-picked, 'To build up to 10,000 to 12,000 involved accepting virtually
all corners for line assembly work'. Consequently, ' . . . it became apparent that a
wider cross section of Merseyside labour was not becoming so readily acclimatised
to the special characteristics of motor vehicle manufacturing' (Vauxhall Motors
Ltd 1973, p.465). This tendency was also reflected by Ford, where the age bar
was formally abandoned in 1965. But arguably, these problems were predictable.
Salt (1967), Turner el a! (1967) and Goodman and Samuel (1966) argue that
labour recruitment was a simple ftinction of the local industrial structure. It was up
to management to devise a strategy to cope with the conditions. Initially, Rootes,
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BMC Bathgate and Vauxhall traded-off labour inefficiency against lower wages.
But the ideal solution would have been to combine effective recruitment with
effective training.
The Training Effort
Historically, the motor companies did not believe much of a training programme
was necessary. As early as 1925, Henry Ford had estimated that 75% of his
workers could be made proficient in eight days, and as many as 43% of them
required only one day's training. By the early 1 960s, the British motor firms had
abdicated responsibility for even basic instruction. The preference was for men
who had been 'broken in' by other trades - not necessarily factory ones. Viewed in
these terms, the Development Areas did not offer a new problem, but a new scale
of problem.
All the Development Area plants relied on establishing a core of experienced
supervisors and foremen to develop on-the-job training. This meant either
importing personnel from established sites, or training new workers from scratch.
In Scotland, there was a particular problem in attracting workers from the
traditional manufacturing regions. BMC countered this with a preparatory
supervisor training programme and industrial relations course for shop stewards.
Rootes appeared to have a much more lax approach, with little (if any)
management training. It was only later that a two week course was introduced for





completed by 228 foreman
Industrial relations course for
shop stewards
No formal supervisory training
TABLE 8.4
EMPLOYEE TRAINING SCHEMES iN DEVELOPMENT AREA PLANTS
Plant	 Management/Supervisory	 Line Workers Programme
Programme
Ellesmere Port 17 week course for supervisors
Halewood
	
Pilot plant established to train
supervisors and managers
Trainee foreman scheme
introduced in advance of
production
Sneke	 No courses indicated
Formal induction procedure
Majority of subsequent training
'on the job'
3 hours basic induction
From 1964, 2-4 week training
school for semi-skilled
Brief induction course
Majority of training 'on the job'
'Good' induction procedure
No induction course
Training entirely 'on the job'
Source: PRO (1964g).
Of the Merseyside plants, the American-owned subsidiaries had the more
comprehensive programmes. At Vauxhall, the company's hitherto impressive
labour performance was mirrored by a seventeen week supervisory course. Ford
went one stage further, establishing a pilot assembly line which acted as a training
ground for the first wave of recruits. However, this policy was soon abandoned.
Conversely, Standard Triumph relied almost entirely on on-the-job training, while
a system of Coventry based supervisory courses were phased in during 1964.
From the employers' perspective, any training constituted a special effort.
Induction and supervision courses were not unknown, but their systematic
application in a new location was. With the notable exception of BMC, all the
firms thought the effort worthwhile. By 1964, Ford, Vauxhall, Standard and
Rootes had told the Ministry of Labour that their new workers were well suited to
the plants. It was only in the medium term, with the failure of new working
practices, that labour became an issue.
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Foreshadowing later complaints, Bathgate's problems were articulated in terms of
attitude rather than aptitude. According to management, the workers did not lack
the skill, but rather the drive and willingness to 'complete an honest day's work'.
These opinions earned widespread publicity in both the local and national press, so
much so, that BMC were forced to order plant manager Sinnot to stay silent.
Bathgate's labour profile did not differ massively from the other plants.
Recruitment was from a slightly larger catchment area, and more workers were
drawn from the extractive sector. But the crucial element was managerial. BMC
quickly allowed a culture to develop which alienated both workers and unions.
While industrial relations were poisoned by a series of controversial press
briefings, the original labour contracts were arbitrarily discarded by managers.
Standards of supervision were universally condemned, and the Ministry of Labour
thought the company 'too willing to yield to union demands'. Diak's (PRO 1964h)
comments in September 1964 made the point succinctly:
It was inevitable that difficulties should arise because of the lack of
familiarity with a type of production of which there is little tradition in
Scotland, and also because the labour build-up involved in a project of this
kind tends to limit the amount of training that can be undertaken. Even so,
other firms like Honeywell Controls of Airdrie and National Cash Registers
of Dundee have introduced mass production systems into Scotland with
conspicuous success.
There was little sympathy for Bathgate amongst other manufacturers. Ford
executives actually told Diak that BMC had brought the problems on themselves.
Certainly BMC were aware of their short-comings, and even Sinnot admitted that
the company had been the victim of poor preparation. It is therefore surprising to
find Vauxhall, Ford, Standard and Rootes later repeating the Bathgate pattern.
According to written and oral evidence, there was a deterioration of work effort in
all Development Area plants during the late 1 960s. Just like BMC, the companies
blamed employee background and militancy.
To recap, the evidence suggests that selective recruitment created an exceptionally
young labour force. However, the employment histories of recruits do not
substantiate claims of widespread inexperience and unsuitability when compared to
traditional regions. While patterns of previous employment were different,
241
workers in the West Midlands and South East were just as likely to have had
limited experience of factory production. What was different was the scale of the
problem.
Employers initially declared themselves satisfied with the standard of labour in the
new plants. The move to less selective forms of recruitment allowed them to blame
worker backgrounds for subsequent performance problems. However, all the
companies provided inadequate training regimes. While firms recognised a skills
deficit in the North West and Scotland, they persisted with on-the job instruction.
This suggests some shared responsibility for labour problems.
There were also separate issues concerning new management policies in the
Development Areas. According to the firms, the deterioration in labour quality
coincided with the change in recruitment strategy. But this does not prove a causal
connection. As will become clear, a simple focus on worker origin is inadequate.
The study must go beyond aggregates to consider the nature of workplace
relations and the actions of managers during the crucial foundation stages. This is
evident from an analysis of industrial stoppages.
§8.3 The Labour Function (2) Strikes
This section poses three important questions:
. Were Development Areas historically more strike prone than areas in the South
and Midlands?
• Did the Development Area motor plants prove more strike prone than existing
plants?
• What costs (if any) did regional variations in strike activity impose on the
motor manufacturers?
Information about strikes in the UK is collated by the Department of Employment
on a voluntary basis through local Unemployment Benefit Offices, returns from
nationalised industries, public bodies and large firms, and reports in the national
and local press (Dickerson 1992, p.49). There are obvious problems in ensuring
complete coverage, and stoppages involving fewer then ten workers and lasting
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less than one day are normally excluded. Industry specific evidence suggests that
under-recording is a very serious problem (Durcan et cii 1983, p. 5), with Turner
et a! (1967) and Kelly and Nicholson (1980) noting substantial shortfalls in
reported car strikes. On a wider scale, Brown (1981) has suggested that 38% of
strikes and 4% of working days lost in manufacturing evaded government
statisticians in the not untypical year of 1976-77.
Perhaps of greater importance than completeness is the consistency of the data
over time. This is affected by administrative practices and changes in the Minimum
List Headings. In the former case, errors are very difficult to identiFy. It is usually
assumed that accuracy has been constant, providing an important caveat for time
series analysis (Dickerson 1992, p. 53). By contrast, difficulties in industrial
classification are largely surmountable. Problems arise because the 1948 Standard
Industrial Classifications have been revised decenially. The most important
revision for motor vehicles occurred in 1958, when cycles was excluded while the
manufacture of parts and accessories was included. A further revision in 1968 led
to the reclassification of wheeled tractor manufacture. Strictly speaking, these
revisions mean that comparisons based on the 1948, 1958 and 1968 series are
invalid, but, in practice, the manufacture of cars and commercial vehicles has
always dominated the statistics. This means that broad comparisons are possible,
but undue weight should not be attached to minor variations over time (Durcan et
a! 1983, p. 313).
Regional strike statistics were first published in 1957. While these include the
workers involved and working days lost during a given year, they exclude the
number of strikes. Fortunately this is not a major handicap, and the Department's
annual estimates can be supplemented by information in the Industrial Stoppages
Data. For earlier years, work by Durcan et a! (1983) provides a limited database.
These statistics suggest a two part analysis:
Period #1	 1945-60 - the historical evidence of regional differences in strike
liability using the established literature.
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Period #2	 1959-82 - focusing on the early performance of the Development
Area plants using published and unpublished official data, and statistics from the
Industrial Stoppages Data.
In both periods, several measures can be employed. Broadly speaking, these
conform to the three basic indices of stoppage activity. These are represented in
the identity:
Days Lost Strike Size x Duration
Where 'Strike Size' is the average number of workers involved in a dispute and
'Duration' is measured in days. The total number of 'Days Lost' is then obtained
by summing over all disputes. The relationship can be applied at any level of
aggregation, to any unit of observation and for any period of interest. Each
component reflects a different dimension of conflict, although the number of
strikes is most frequently used by economists. This study will focus on the Number
of Days Lost. This has been championed as the best indicator of the economic
effects of stoppages. 3 This is because, while the number of strikes is under-
recorded due to size criteria, the number of days lost in short strikes represents
only a tiny fraction of total working days lost. The measure therefore provides a
much better measure of conflict. However, Knowles (1952, p. 267) has remarked
that using the number of working days lost as a proxy for economic effects was
'not unlike estimating air raid damage by reference to the bomb tonnage dropped,
irrespective of target or type of bomb'. In fact, the days lost series can seriously
over or underestimate economic damage depending on the level of stocks and the
potential market for 'lost production'. As will be shown, the potential market is of
crucial importance for motor industry data.
Period #1 - 1945-60
The pertinent question here is whether Development Area destinations were
particularly strike prone before intervention in the 1960s. Since regional strike
data has only been published since 1957, this question is particularly problematic.
See the technical note attached to the Department of Employment's annual summary of
stoppages in the Employment Gazette.
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Existing studies of labour relations in the motor industry have focused on inter-
firm comparisons (Turner et a! 1967, Bescoby & Turner 1961), while both Woo
(1986) and Smith et a! (1978) begin their analyses in the mid 1960s. The notable
exception is Durcan et al (1983), who provides an analysis of regional strike
trends from 1946-1973.
Durcan's et al's analysis is uncharacteristically sketchy. Taking three sub-periods
(1946-62, 1963-68, and 1969-73), the study made the following observations:
Overall the West Midlands dominated the major strikes league with 48% of
the total. Runners-up included the South East with 21%, the North West
with 12% and Scotland with 12%. Other regions accounted for 9% and
strikes affecting more that one region amounted to less than 3% of the total.
Analysis by sub-periods disclosed a consistent decline in the West Midlands
share and a consistent rise in the North West. Scotland's share rose in the
mid-1960s and then fell. The South East's share fell and then rose. In terms
of actual number of stoppages, comparison of the last two sub-periods
disclosed that major strikes in Scotland rose by 13%, in the West Midlands
by 49%, in the South East by 135% and in the North West by 400% (1983,
p.3 22).
Durcan et al offered no real explanation for these trends, merely noting the
changing regional distribution of motor industry employment and speculating that
it 'had made the areas where motor vehicle manufacture had previously
concentrated more susceptible to adverse movements in employment'.
The standard of Durcan et al's analysis was related to the quality of available
information. Despite being granted full access to the Department of Employment's
records, the regional series only related to stoppage frequency. The investigators
were also forced to compile their own industry figures since the cross-tabulation
of regional and SIC headings did not begin until 1957. However, industry-specific
evidence is not essential in this part of our study. This is because we are
investigating strike-proneness in the wider regional environment. In this context,
details of early postwar Development Area motor disputes are largely irrelevant,
since car building remained concentrated in the West Midlands and South East.
Instead, we can examine evidence from all manufacturing industry, and this can be
used to assess historic patterns and trends.
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TABLE 8.5
MAJOR STRIKE FREQUENCY, ALL INDUSTIES, 1946591
1946-52	 1953-59









































Standard Deviation	 21.19	 0.49	 17.49	 0.59
Coefficient of Variation	 85.63	 51.28	 75.23	 62.82
Notes:
1 Major strike activity is defined as stoppages which involve the loss of
5,000 or more working days. Does not include coal mining.
2 Based on the average number of employees at each mid-year, 1951-59.
Does not include national strikes or strikes affecting more than one region.
Source:
Durcan et al (1983, tables 2.18 and 3.18).
Department of Employment and Productivity (1971, table 131).
Table 8.5 provides the best available evidence for regional strike frequency from
1946-59. Not surprisingly, the South East dominates the data, comprising 37.6%
of all stoppages in 1946-52, and 28% of major strikes from 1953-59. This reflects
the higher concentration of industry within the South East. To compensate for
this, a second column has been added to relate strike activity to industrial
distribution. This is moderately successful for both periods, reducing the
coefficient of variation by 34 and 12 points respectively. Unfortunately the
exercise does not address variations in regional industrial make-up. In particular,
the concentration of traditionally militant industries in 'outer Britain' introduces a
structural element, making inter-regional comparisons difficult. The usual practice
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is to isolate the structural effect by comparing stoppage incidence in a given
industry at the local level with national averages. 4 However, the available evidence
makes this impossible. Nevertheless some useftil observations can be made.
The first point is that from 1946-52, the stoppages recorded in table 8.5
represented 90% of all reported strikes. In other words, industrial activity was
localised. In terms of strikes per 100,000 workers, Scotland's figure was nearly
twice the national average. Another Development Area - Wales - closely followed,
but the North West nearly matched the national mean. The two traditional car
making regions in the Midlands and South East were third and fourth placed
respectively, recording figures of 39% and 43% below the worst performing
region.
In the second sub-period, it is possible to draw some conclusions about whether
particular regions were becoming more or less strike prone. In absolute terms, the
South East still had the highest number of stoppages, followed by Scotland and
the West Midlands. In terms of strikes per 100,000 workers, both Scotland and
the West Midlands suffered considerable increases. By contrast, there was a
marked decline in the South East, which dropped to sixth in the regional rankings.
In general, relative positions did change, but not markedly (the rank correlation
coefficient was 0.84). But whereas the most militant area in 1946-52 suffered five
times greater disruption than the East Midlands/Yorkshire & Humberside
divisions, in 1953-59 the corresponding ratio approached 800%. This was
mirrored in increases in both the standard deviation and coefficient of variation. In
summary, the pattern of strike activity showed reasonable consistency, although
the range and standard deviation increased. The West Midlands suffered increasing
industrial unrest, while Scotland remained the most militant region.
Increasing militancy in the West Midlands can be partly be explained by rising
unrest in the motor vehicle industry (Figure 8.1). Durcan et al's (1983, pp. 312-
51) study revealed increases in both major and minor strike activity. Their
subsequent analysis mirrored the findings of Turner et a! (1967), highlighting
irregularity of employment, the payment structure and frustrated wage
For example, see Smith et a! (1978).
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expectations as prominent causes. However, the frequency statistics suggest that
for most South East or Midlands based firms, a move to Scotland still represented
a step into the unknown. This fact was keenly appreciated by the Scottish Council.
FIGURE 8.1
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Source: Durcan et al (1983, tables 10.2, 10.3)
In their approach to the motor manufacturers in 1959, the Council tried to allay
strike fears by providing an analysis of stoppages in both Britain and Scotland. The
report highlighted the difference between new industry and traditional
manufacturing, and suggested that the record of new firms was befter than might
be expected. Much was made of the position in 1959, when the number of day lost
in newly settled firms was below both the Scottish and British averages (Figure
8.2). But this could not disguise the fact that, in terms of aggregate frequency and
working days lost, the Scottish division remained the most militant part of Britain.
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FIGURE 8.2
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This section began by posing the question 'Were Development Areas historically
more strike prone than areas in the South and Midlands?' The available evidence is
inconclusive. While Scotland seems to have endured the greatest strike frequency,
the North West was consistently below the West Midlands and national averages.
By contrast the South East recorded the lowest average number of strikes per
100,000 workers in the subset of 1960 motor manufacturing regions (South East,
West Midlands, North West and Scotland). By itself, the evidence suggests that
the North West may have been the least militant Development Area location. It
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also implies that any move from the South East represented a major gamble for
existing manufacturing enterprises. However, it is unclear whether this fact was
appreciated by the motor firms in the prelude to decentralisation. Site surveys
concentrated on physical attributes and the proximity to suppliers, rather than
labour attitude. While the availability of key workers remained a binding
constraint, firms appeared to regard relocation as an opportunity to embrace new
forms of workplace control. This suggests that management incorrectly assessed
the strike proneness of traditional labour systems in the South East and Midlands,
while underestimating the potential for conflict under a new regime.
Period #2 1959-1982
Several influential studies have argued that the postwar British motor industry was
highly strike prone, both in comparison with overseas based car makers, and with
domestic manufacturing as a whole (Church 1994, p.65). For example, Jones and
Prais (1978) suggest that the percentage of British man days lost in vehicle
manufacturing in the 1 960s and early 1 970s was half as high as in the United
States, and ten times greater than in Germany. But while industrial stoppages have
attracted interest on both national and international levels, the regional dimension
has been largely ignored. Forman-Peck el a! (1995) are typical in their approach,
suggesting that 'all the new plants in "outer Britain" suffered from poor, if not
poorer industrial relations than the original sites'. Crucially, however, they provide
no corroborating evidence.
This section addresses the second question posed in §8.3, and concentrates on the
strike record in Development Area plants. Three measures are available for
analysis: days lost, workers involved, and strike duration. In the first two cases,
regional totals have been adjusted by providing 'per employee' measures.
However, strike duration has been proxied by calculating the number of days lost
per striking worker. This latter measure is not an ideal surrogate, but has the
advantage of following a clearly established methodology (Dickerson 1992, p.61).
250
Our first point of reference is the number of days lost per employee in different
regions. Table 8.6 presents annual data for both the traditional areas of motor
manufacturing (the South East and Midlands) and the regional policy destinations.
TABLE 8.6
DAYS LOST PER WORKER: TRADITIONAL MOTOR MANUFACTURiNG
AREAS VERSUS NEW LOCATIONS'
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
South East2	 0.61	 1.15 0.90	 1.09 0.38 0.28 0.45 0.35 0.82 0.80 2.29 1.77
Midlands3	 0.74 1.05 0.26 0.67 0.56	 1.00	 1.98 0.86 1.44 1.42 1.47 2.06
North West	 0.24 0.14 0.24	 1.13 0.16 0.12 0.39 0.48 0.21	 1.35 11.3 2.81
Scotland	 0.07 0.63 0.32	 1.92 0.57 0.56	 1.31 3.07 0.99 6.65 4.10 5.33
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
South East	 8.52 0.83 4.35 3.17 1.65	 1.73	 1.80	 1.83	 1.89 1.94 2.03 2.13
Midlands	 4.38 3.49 3.20 2.95 2.51	 1.83	 1.89 1.94 2.04 2.06 2.15 2.22
North West	 9.04 2.85 7.26 5.94 1.03 2.63 2.77 2.92 3.08 3.19 3.37 3.56
Scotland	 0.99 15.0 5.25 9.53	 1.82 3.42 3.62 3.79 4.00 4.12 4.33 4.55
Notes:
'1960-1965: Vehicles; 1966-79: MILH 381, Motor Vehicle Manufacturing;
1979-1982: SIC 351 Motor Vehicles and their Components.
2 Londofl & South Eastern, Eastern & Southern and East Ariglia.
'East Midlands, West Midlands, Yorkshire & Humberside.
Sources:
Ministry of Labour Gazette (various years), Employment Department
(1991), Durcan eta! (1983, p. 328); CSO Business Monitor (various years).
These figures demonstrate the growing tide of industrial unrest in all regions from
the mid 1960s to the late 1970s. They also indicate a noticeable regional pattern,
with Scotland and the North West starting the period with a much lower incidence
of days lost, then spectacularly outpacing the established regions, before finally
settling to a level which was broadly double the South East and Midlands average.

























deviation in days lost in Development Areas compared with South East and
Midlands norms.
FIGURE 8.3
DAYS LOST PER EMPLOYEE: PERCENTAGE DEVIATION FROM
TRADITIONAL MAMJFACTURING REGIONS
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Source: As in Table 8.6
The inter-regional differences in days lost per worker reflect trends already noted
in Table 8.5. Scotland's status as Britain's most strike prone region is clearly
evident. The North West also emerges as a relatively benign area for industrial
relocation, having a lower incidence of day lost per worker than Scotland, while
keeping well above South East and Midlands levels. In short, the aggregate data
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seems to suggest that relocation did indeed increase the number of days lost per
employee, and that by the late 1970s, time lost in the North West and Scotland
was between 50% and 110% above levels in core manufacturing regions.
If we examine trends in the number of workers involved in industrial disputes, a
different pattern emerges (Table 8.7). Apart from anomalous findings for Scotland
in the mid to late 1960s (see below), it seems that the number of workers involved
in disputes was lower than expected in the Development Areas. But because of
interpretational and methodological difficulties, only limited inferences can be
drawn from this evidence. 5 The main lesson appears to be that fewer workers
participated in industrial disputes in the North West and Scotland, although the
number of days lost per employee was consistently higher in these locations. This
suggests that either the duration of stoppages was longer or the frequency of
strikes was greater in the new plants.
See Dickerson (1992) for a fuller discussion of these problems.
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TABLE 8.7
WORKERS iNVOLVED PER EMPLOYEE: TRADITIONAL MOTOR
MANUFACTURING AREAS VERSUS NEW LOCATIONS'
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
South East2 	0.16 0.57 0.27 0.74 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.25 0.23 0.38 0.31
Midlands3 	0.32 0.29 0.14 1.25 0.26 0.26 0.44 0.37 0.60 0.49 0.45 0.48
North West	 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.96 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.06 0.18 0.33 0.77 0.63
Scotland	 0.07 0.05 0.08	 1.47 0.43 0.43 0.57 0.59 0.83 2.17 2.33 2.13
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
South East	 0.32 0.15 0.93 0.29 0.15 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.30
Midlands	 0.94 0.72 0.58 0.33 0.57 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.50 0.52 0.53
North West	 0.92 0.75 1.85 0.49 0.95 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.50 0.58 0.61
Scotland	 0.53 0.85	 1.03 0.21 0.39 0.83 0.88 0.93 0.98 0.95 0.98 1.01
Notes:
'1960-1965: Vehicles; 1966-79: MLH 381: Motor Vehicle Manufacturing;
1979-1982: SIC 351 Motor Vehicles and their Components.
2 London & South Eastern, Eastern & Southern and East Anglia.
B East Midlands, West Midlands, Yorkshire & Humberside.
Sources:
Ministry of Labour Gazette (various years), Employment Department
(1991), Durcan et al (1983, p.328); CSO Business Monitor (various years).
Table 8.8 provides a proxy for strike duration by calculating the number of days
lost per striking worker in each of the study areas. It is immediately clear that
strikers in decentralised plants tended to spend far less time on strike per year than
their counterparts in the South East and Midlands. The inescapable conclusion is
that strikes must have been more frequent and shorter in Scotland and the North




DAYS LOST PER STRIKING WORKER: TRADITIONAL MOTOR
MANUFACTURING AREAS VERSUS NEW LOCATIONS'
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 19661967 1968 1969 1970
South East2	3.79	 2,02 3.32 1.47 2.19 2.09 2.70 2.63 3.29 3.52 5.98 5.62
Midlands3	2.33	 3.63	 1.84 1.34 2.18 3.83 4.55 2.35 2.40 2.90 3.31 4.31
North West	 4.24	 1.97 2.08 1.18 2.50 1.44 2.12 7.37 1.19 4.10 14.57 4.48
Scotland	 1.07 12.63 4.29 17.31	 1.33	 1.30 2.30 5.20	 1.20 3.06	 1.76 2.50
1971	 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
SouthEast	 26.26	 5.66 4.70 4.87 5.24 6.09 11.29 25.51 4.46 3.75 3.68 1.05
Midlands	 4.67	 4.84 5.52 5.77 6.89 4.21 8.06 4.67 8.41 5.39 3.79 3.84
North West	 9.86	 3.79 3.92 8.05 1.95 2.58 9.75 17.72 14.71 1.72 2.96 3.90
Scotland	 1.88 17.59 5.09 6.44 &41 3.42 S.4 i4.5	 5.24 4.17 4.44 9.12
Notes:
'1960-1965: Vehicles; 1966-79: MLH 381 Motor Vehicle Manufacturing;
1979-1982: SIC 351 Motor Vehicles and their Components.
2London & South Eastern, Eastern & Southern and East Anglia.
3	 Midlands, West Midlands, Yorkshire & Humberside.
Sources:
Ministry of Labour Gazette (various years), Employment Department
(1991), Durcan eta! (1983, p.328), CSO Business Monitor (various years).
In summary, the regional data for the period from 1959-1982 indicate the
following trends:
a tendency for working days lost per employee to be higher in the new
manufacturing regions
• a tendency for the number of workers involved in stoppages to be lower in the
new manufacturing regions
• a tendency for strikes to be shorter, but more frequent in the new
manufacturing regions
In addition, it seems that patterns did change over time. In particular, there
appears to have been a settling-in period in all the new plants, lasting from the mid
1 960s to the early 1 970s. During these years, the number of days lost was much
higher than in the traditional areas, with a number of regional peaks in stoppage
activity. However, after 1974, the number of peaks diminished, and strike activity
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in 'new' areas fell to a level which was broadly double the figure in core
manufacturing areas. This evidence corresponds to findings by Woo (1986) and
Townroe (1979), who identified short to medium term labour relations problems
for migrant companies in the 1 960s and early 1 970s.
§8.4 The Costs of Industrial Action
Having examined the pattern and nature of disputes, attention now focuses on the
economic costs caused by greater disruption in the new plants. Conceptually, these
costs should be measured as the sum of the producer and consumer surpluses lost
as a result of labour unrest. But for the purposes of this study, we are simply
concerned with the costs borne by individual firms. As we have seen in Chapter 3,
the motor industry literature is dominated by this question. Debate usually centres
on two issues: lost output and the increased costs associated with delays in the
production process.
On the macroeconomic level, the available evidence on the cost of lost output is
limited. Whittingham and Towers (1971) calculate the total loss to be only 0.2%
of GNP for 1970, while Turner (1969) puts the figure at less than 0.1%. For
individual firms, the effect of lost output will depend on the availability of stocks
and the level of demand. This means that strikes are not necessarily damaging. For
example, Turner et a! (1967) have argued that motor industry bosses provoked
disputes in the 1 950s and 1 960s in an effort to avoid redundancy claims. 6 But even
so, Department of Employment statistics show that industrial disputes accounted
for half of lost output in the late 1960s (HMSO 1975b, p.'74). Moreover,
Foreman-Peck el a! (1995, p.182) argue that strikes on new model lines remained
extremely damaging throughout the 1 970s, because the number of vehicles lost
was high relative to the wages saved.
On the regional level, the effect of lost output is difficult to assess. For firms
producing successful models or introducing new products, stoppages could be
critical. But for less successful models, interruptions in output afforded smaller
6 Turner et al's arguments are also echoed by Bhaskar's (1975, p 5.59) discussion of the 1975
door hangers' dispute.
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penalties. The Chrysler example is instructive. Linwood's initial failure was linked
to the fortunes of the Hiilman Imp. Throughout its production run, the car failed
to meet sales forecasts and output remained below planned capacity. 7 In the early
1970s, the Imp was replaced by the Hunter (Arrow), and by 1971, Linwood's
production was running at over 2,000 cars per week. Chrysler estimated that
internal disputes caused the loss of some 212,000 vehicles over the next four
years. But as Young and Hood (1977, pp. 244-46) maintain, the real impact of
these losses depended on domestic and overseas conditions:
There is no doubt that the UK market alone could not have borne these
additional production volumes. The most that could have been hoped for,
assuming that Chrysler had been able to maintain say, a 10% market
share, would have been 70,000 extra units over the four year period. It is
doubtful whether any additional sales would have been made in Europe..
.This leaves the US market. Their insecurity of supply was undoubtedly
one factor leading to the replacement of the Avenger by the Mitsubishi
Colt. While mere speculation, a decision in favour of the Avenger could
have meant additional sales of 120,000 units to the Unites States, at best,
therefore, about 90% of output lost because of strikes might have been
sold; at worst about 30%. The latter would have scarcely have increased
throughput and revenue enough to prevent recourse to government
funds, but the latter almost certainly would have, with capacity utilisation
being increased from under 70 to between 80 and 85% on average over
the next four years.
Given the increased international competition following the Kennedy Round and
Britain's entry into the EEC, Young and Hood's assessment may be generous.
However, it does illustrate the difficulty in creating a plausible counterfactual. Lost
output does not necessarily mean lost sales, and account must be taken of demand
conditions. Moreover, company estimates of vehicles lost remain highly suspect.
In the year ended September 1973, BL produced 1,161,000 vehicles, the
Expenditure Committee reported that, if the company's vehicles lost figures were
added to the actual production figures, total capacity would have been 1,400,000
(HMSO 1975b, p.90). As Bhaskar (1975, p. 120) notes, 'It is inconceivable that
given no industrial relations problems and perfect working of all machinery, that
BL could produce that number of vehicles'.
See Henshaw & Henshaw (1988, p. 43) for detailed Linwood sales and production figures.
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Similar difficulties are illustrated by the experience of BL's Liverpool complex.
The Speke 2 extension was originally used to assemble Triumph Toledos, the
TR6 and body panels for the Triumph Stag. In 1974, the plant became responsible
for production of the new TR7. 8 The TR7 was the first sports car to be completely
assembled at Merseyside, and the only complete car in Liverpool's care. It formed
the centrepiece of BL's ambitious North American sales programme.
The car attracted attention for all the wrong reasons. Its wedge-shaped profile
challenged conventional ideas about sports car design, but its reliability and safety
were woeful. The TR7 obtained by Motoring Which contained 24 defects when
purchased, including several missing parts. 9 During a 10,000 mile test, the car
developed trouble with vibration, noise, stalling, the exhaust system, transmission,
propshaft, front and rear suspension, leaks, paint, bodywork rattles and electrics.
Motor criticised the Triumph's noisy and undependable engine, its unreliable
transmission, vibration, leaking door seals, and 'the stupid little things that keep
falling off or breaking'. The bad publicity culminated with the American Centre of
Auto Safety's 1977 censure of BL for producing dangerous vehicles. According to
the CAS, the TR7's failure rate was 'excessively high' and American consumers
were being used as little more than 'guinea pigs'.
Although 76,000 TR7's were produced in Liverpool from 1974-77, this was well
below the break-even figure (Austin Rover 1985). The Liverpool factory was far
too big to be profitable making only one model - unless that model could sell in
sufficient quantity (Langworth & Robson 1979, p.280). While BL pointed to
labour relations problems at Speke, it was clear to many observers that lost output
did not equate with lost sales. The heart of the problem was an inability to produce
cars of sufficient quality, and this was linked to the design, engineering and
production failures which pervaded BL. The decision to close Speke was linked to
poor industrial relations, but it also reflected the 'product led failure' identified by
Williams et a! (1986).
A discussion of the TR7's development can be found in Langworth & Robson (1979) PP. 271-
85.
This discussion relies on Whisler (1995, pp. 246-25 1).
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Bathgate's lost output can be regarded in a similar manner. The Scottish plant
specialised in assembling trucks and tractors for the commercial vehicle sector.
Although Barber told the Expenditure Committee in 1975 that the division was
performing well (Barber 1975, p.1 39), an objective assessment by Bhaskar (1975,
p.129) identified major weaknesses. Bhaskar noted that Leyland's pre-BL strength
lay in commercial vehicles, but that the company had been starved of funds and
overtaken by both Vauxhall and Chrysler. Ford had also established a strong
presence, and smaller firms were threatening in the articulated vehicles sector.
Bhaskar's analysis proved correct, and BL saw its UK market share dwindle from
around 20% in 1970 to 12.8% in 1982 (Bhaskar 1983, p. 156). This resulted in
substantial surplus capacity, and ultimately led to Bathgate's closure. Again, there
is a strong suggestion that lost output might not have been very easy for the
company to dispose of.
Lost output is more important for plants operating in core markets with good
selling products. While Halewood fits this profile, Ellesmere Port proved slightly
less successful. But both plants produced important models in a growing
international marketplace.
Halewood has traditionally focused on right hand drive (RI-ID) models for the UK
and the Far East. Halewood's products were unusually successful, with the Escort
never out of the top ten best sellers. It remains speculation as to whether the firm
could have sold the output lost to industrial stoppages, but the UK market has
always been able to absorb the Liverpool plant's output. Moreover, during the
1970s and early 1980s, Ford's models were so successful that the company sold
more cars in the UK than it produced (Bhaskar 1983, p.206). During these years,
Escorts were imported from Saarlouis in Germany, reflecting the European focus
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Source: Pike (1994, p. 211).
Ellesmere Port also concentrated on the production of RI-ID vehicles. The plant
began as a fully integrated manufacturing site, specialising in small family cars such
as the Viva and Chevette. With GM's internationalisation programme in the
1 970s, plant strategy switched to consolidating existing functions while supplying
components to General Motors Europe. However, Vauxhall experienced sales
problems throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, with market share falling from
12.7% in 1967, to 6.9% in 1978 (Church 1994, p. 79). In these circumstances it is
questionable whether lost output could have found a market. But the more
important consequence of lost production was that new investments were steered
away from Britain.'0
 As a consequence of sourcing decisions, the local content of
Vauxhall's cars fell from 98% in 1973 to 22% by 1983 (Church 1994, p.110). In
'° Jurgens eta! (1993, p.272) note in their discussion of the British 'Hartinoor' plant that:
'Regardless of the reasons for not attaining the production target, the fact that they did not attain
it placed British plants - local management as well as unions - in a difficult position when they
brought their demands for an increased production volume, and thus increased employment for
the British sites. As long as they could not show that they could regularly keep to their daily
production quota, they could hardly criticise the circumstance that the production volume
allocated by European headquarters to the British plants was considerably below the sales
volume for the corresponding vehicle in the British market'.
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part, this reflected GM's attempts to yield scale economies from international
patterns of specialisation, but it also indicated the premium which global
production strategies have placed on continuous supply.
This leads our discussion to consider the separate question of delays in production.
The issues here are quite straightforward. Both 'fordist' and 'flexible' production
systems are generally intolerant of disruptions to the product flow. This is because
both rely on the continuous movement of products throughout the plant. Williams
et a! (1994, pp. 25-26) explain the concepts involved:
In repetitive manufacturing, goods are fabricated or assembled as they
pass through a series of work stations each of which consists of one or
more machines and/or one or more workers. Car and component
factories are a loose system of interconnected work stations which are
either adjacent to, or connected by, handling system which have slides,
roller beds or powered conveyors. The work of the stations can be
scheduled on a push or pull basis. . . in either case the system is
fundamentally driven by the build requirement for regular delivery of one
finished unit at a set time interval: every major production stage which
produces assemblies for the finished product must operate on this
delivery cycle . . . As a manufacturing activity, car making is
distinguished by an unusually acute difficulty with sustaining continuous
operation and flow between the processes.
Since labour and capital stand idle during disputes, discontinuities arrest
production and involve substantial costs. For these reasons Woollard (1954, p.'7O)
concluded that 'continuity is the secret of production'. The Development Area
plants' proclivity for small scale frequent stoppages represented the antithesis of
Wollard's ideal. Hence Beynon's memorable account of the attempts at Halewood
to the keep the line moving. According to the motor manufacturers, disputes
impacted on efficiency and profitability. The difficulty arises in trying to quantiIy
the losses. None went as a far as BL, who included unaudited and unsubstantiated
estimates of 'manpower efficiency losses' in their evidence to parliament. These
suggested that extra training and stoppages cost the firm an additional £1.4 million
pa in both Bathgate and Liverpool (DTI 1973a, p.416).
There are some wider studies on the impact of stoppages on industrial efficiency.
Pencavale (1977) presents an historical survey of the coalmining industry, while
the work of Caves (1980) and Davies and Caves (1987) produce conflicting
results on British and American productivity rates. Knight (1989) analysed a cross
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section of industries for 1968, and found that the impact of strikes on productivity
was weakly positive in most industries (although there remained notable
exceptions). Meanwhile Machin (1988) completed a study of 52 engineering firms
for 1982, concluding that the overall effect of unionisation was insignificant." In
all of these studies, there is no clearly accepted methodology. This problem has
also plagued international comparisons of productivity, with investigators
struggling to isolate the consequences of internal labour disputes. This is especially
difficult where interplant linkages and quality issues distort the picture.'2
However, we do know that, in international terms, Britain's record was not
unique. In terms of days lost per 1,000 workers, Britain was ranked fourth
amongst the G7 countries from 1967-1976 (Middleton 1996, p.456). Moreover,
unrest was concentrated in a few sectors, with large plants particularly strike
prone. But since many of Britain's mass production industries were characterised
by low throughput and poor productivity per worker, the labour process became
part of a wider malaise affecting British competitiveness. Richardson's warning
(1991, pp. 432-33) is a reminder not to jump to hasty conclusions:
The motor car industry, for example, has had a clear tendency to suffer from
a large number of very often small strikes throughout much of the postwar
period. It also an industry where performance levels and production have
tended to fall behind those in the rest of Europe. To establish this association
is not the same as establishing a strong causal connection however. No
doubt industrial unrest harmed the UK motor car industry, but the extent of
the damage done, in comparison with that caused by other factors is
extremely difficult to establish. The problem here is that strikes are very
public, noticeable events. They can be readily pointed to as self inflicted
wounds. This does not mean that they are in the first rank of importance.
In his recent survey of the British motor industry, Church (1994, p.68)
distinguished between a British industrial relations system characterised by high
levels of unofficial strike activity and low labour turnover, and a continental
system marked by regular confrontations and close labour control. His conclusions
on formal versus informal conflict could equally apply to the regional pattern
within Britain. Thus the differences between Halewood and Dagenham were
" For review of the literature, see Richardson (1991)
12 See Jurgens et a! (1993, p.276). They concentrate on tension between a company's Gennan
and British plants, noting how productivity in the UK was constrained because the Gennans
unilaterally changed design specifications on i,nportant component supplies.
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potentially as significant as the differences between Britain and Germany.
However, while international differences in workplace culture have been the
subject of much investigation, a lack of data - especially in relation to productivity
- has meant that regional dimensions have been largely ignored. The arguments
presented here suggest that Development Area manufacturers did pay a locational
premium, although this was part of the wider problems facing British producers.
§8.5 Towards an Explanation
Having demonstrated that the Development Area plants suffered greater disruption
than their Midlands and South East counterparts, and given the evidence presented
in §8.2, the large regional variations in industrial stoppages remain unexplained.
The literature suggests two possible analytical directions: a macro focus centring
on regression analysis and time series data; and a micro approach more usually
identified with industrial sociology. A typical example of the former is the 1978
Department of Employment sponsored study Strikes in Britain (Smith et a!), while
Beynon's (1984) work remains the classic embodiment of investigative sociology.
When examining the macro perspective, the literature is surprisingly sparse. For
the period before the mid 1970s, only two major British investigations explicitly
considered the geography of unrest. Durcan et al's Strikes in Postwar Britain
(1983) was a seminal work. However, the book devoted little analytical content to
an explanation of regional strike patterns. By contrast, Smith et a! (1978)
conducted a rigorous geographical analysis of stoppages from 1968-73. Their
study undertook detailed regression analyses of strike rates, seeking to explain
regional differences by such variables as the rate of earnings growth, average plant
size, activity rates, female employment rates, population density and inter-sub-
regional migration rates. The findings suggested that socio-economic variables
provide 'only a very limited explanation of the pattern of adjusted strike
proneness', and the authors concluded that more research was required on a wide
range of socio-cultural factors more closely associated with qualitative research.'3
A summary of these findings may be found in Charlesworth eta! (1996, p.186).
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Micro-level studies offer a different agenda. While lacking the quantitative rigour
of econometric analysis, they enable investigators to identifj key differences in
workplace industrial relations. The most enlightening comparisons centre on
Ford's plants, where investigators have the benefit of Beynon's Merseyside study
and a series of previously confidential labour statistics. These help to demonstrate
how different traditions of workplace organisation explain major differences in
regional strike proclivities.
Our analysis begins by studying the nature of industrial conflict in Dagenham and
Halewood. Ford's figures allow per employee comparisons on a wide range of
indicators, including disciplinary actions, warnings, discharges, absenteeism,
labour turnover, and overtime worked. The results are available for two ten year
periods, 1967-76, and 1975-84.
TABLE 8.10
FORD LABOUR PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PER WORKER, 1967-76
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Labour turnover	 100	 146
Overtime worked	 100	 73
Source: Woo (1986, p, 75)
In the late I 960s, the results (Table 8.10) reflect the problems with recruitment
and training already noted in §8.2. More fundamental difficulties with labour
discipline are also clear, with warnings in the North West forty times higher than in
London, and suspensions showing a 300% differential. This suggests a strategy of
personal challenge in Merseyside, with confrontations between workers and
management becoming an accepted part of workplace culture. The table also
indicates broadly similar levels of absenteeism, although labour turnover remained
50% higher in Liverpool.
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TABLE 8.11






Labour turnover	 100	 38
Overtime worked	 100	 62
Source: Woo (1986 p, 75)
It is clear from Table 8.11 that disciplinary problems did improve in the late 1970s.
Discharges fell significantly below South East levels, as did absenteeism, labour
turnover and overtime. However, warnings and suspensions remained higher in
Liverpool, contributing to the poor reputation which the plant acquired during the
1960s.
The pattern of industrial stoppages is explicable only when one recognises the
cultural differences represented in these indicators. Halewood embraced different
modes of workplace confrontation and conflict resolution. Workers were easily
agitated, and more apt to question management authority on the shopfloor. This
often took the form of personal challenges, which resulted in frequent low level
disciplinary action (warnings) and a much higher level of discharges from 1967-76.
There was also greater frequency of small scale stoppages, usually settled through
informal negotiation procedures. These findings are confirmed in studies by
Beynon (1984) and Friedman & Meredeen (1980), which identified two causes for
this pattern: management style and the parity issue.'4
As we have seen, Ford deliberately tried to engineer a new management style at
Halewood. This was largely inspired by studying American techniques and modes
of workplace organisation. Crucial to this approach was avoiding the multi-
unionism then endemic in the car industry. The opening of its new plant had been
preceded by the signing of exclusive agreements with the AEU and NUGMW.This
led to a major clash with the TGWU, which threatened to black Halewood's cars
14 See also Edwards (1986, p, 245).
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unless their officials were given equal recognition (Beynon 1984). This provided
the backdrop for five years of industrial conflict, with Ford trying to impose it's
new vision of working relations. These were the years Beynon later referred to as
'the period of struggle', when unions strove to secure thU negotiating rights for
shop stewards, and to curtail obvious management abuses. But the conflict at
Halewood had important long term implications. As one union official recalled,
After we'd won all the legitimate cases we began to challenge the whole
bloody system. Not altogether consciously mind you, but we started
saying things like "you can have too much efficiency". We wouldn't work
overtime unless we had twenty four hours notice. Things like that. They
didn't like it because they didn't have absolute control of the labour
anymore. They had to enter into negotato They were gdmg
to do. Before, if you like, we were winning cases because higher
management said what we wanted was fair. Then we started saying to
them, "airight so it's 'fair' but we're not flicking having it anyway".
(Beynon 1984, p.82)
A key battleground was the parity issue, an 'historical bogey' which dominated
labour relations (Freidman & Meredeen 1980, p.206). Many of the peaks in the
stoppage data can be identified with parity disputes.' 5 In Ford's case, nominal
equality with Dagenham was achieved only after two years of strikes and overtime
bans. But this was only a partial victory. Since workers at Halewood were all new
starters, Ford's merit-pay formulae continued to discriminate against them. By not
bringing pay into line with South East levels, Halewood experienced continuous
labour problems until 1967. The introduction of a new grading structure aimed to
end the conflict, and unions secured a substantial pay rise in 1968. But the parity
issue resurfaced in the early 1970s. This time unions wanted Ford to match
Midlands rates, but the campaign ended with a simple weekly increase and the
introduction of a no-strike clause. This was widely regarded as a defeat for the
unions.
Vauxhall's story is a little more complicated. Before 1960, the company had
acquired a reputation for relatively peaceful labour relations. The firm had also
been very welcoming towards academic investigations, including Melman's (1958)
For example, in 1968 several large scale disputes developed over re-grading and incentive pay
structures in Merseyside plants; in 1969, 561,000 working days were lost in disputes over a new
pay and productivity agreement at Halewood; and in 1972, there were large scale disputes at
Linwood and Bathgate over parity with Midlands plants.
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celebrated study of comparative productivity in Britain and the United States.
However, little investigative work was completed during either the 1 960s or the
1 970s. We do know that labour relations deteriorated sharply after 1964, and that
by 1973, the management were making some familiar claims:
Absentee rates and labour turnover have showed a tendency to ride at
distinctly higher levels than in Vauxhall's other plants and in particular
the Company ran into a progression of labour relations problems. Such
problems have not been uncommon in the motor industry at most plants
over this period. On the other hand, the tendency for work-people to
walk out 'at the drop of a hat', would appear to be a Merseyside
characteristic. Issues which would normally be resolved in other areas by
normal procedure, albeit under stress, can start off at Ellesmere Port with
car park meetings after which employees go home without further parlay
and so sever lines of joint communication. Such incidents cause lay-offs
of other employees which constitute a secondary but oñei more señous
basis for dispute (Vau'xhall Motors Ltà. 19?3, p. 465).
Part of the explanation is that Vauxhall were involved in experimentation at all of
its plants. As well as a new recruitment policy, the firm instigated a new grievance
procedure operating through an existing national Management Advisory
Committee (MAC). The Liverpool workers refused to co-operate with the body,
interpreting it as an attempt to wrest workplace control from shop stewards
(Turner et a! 1967, p.348). By the mid 1960s, Vauxhall conceded to union
pressure and relaxed the MAC system, focusing on developing direct relations
with shop stewards in Liverpool. This 'victory' for Ellesmere's workers was won
after a series of stoppages and walkouts, which established a pattern for future
negotiations. It also reflected the very real differences between established
Merseyside patterns of working and management's preferred alternative.
Similar trends emerged in all the other Development Areas. Rootes suffered
corresponding levels of absenteeism, poor labour discipline and stoppages. Its
Linwood plant went through a comparable 'settling in' period, when both
management and unions tried to assert their authority. There were failings on
every side. The 1964 Ministry of Labour investigation concluded that the
company's personnel manager was incompetent. He was described as 'a slow
thinker' who was recruited 'from a firm with an appalling level of strikes' (PRO
1964d). The unions were criticised for their inability to maintain discipline. Their
shop stewards were poorly trained, and an internal struggle between the AEU and
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TGWU fragmented control, and led to a series of unofficial disputes and wildcat
stoppages.
Again, wages and parity were the key concerns. Linwood's pay structure had been
established under the Brabloch Agreement, when Lord Rootes had obtained the
consent of Scottish unions for a regional pay structure (Sims and Wood 1984, p.
28). Until the Chrysler take-over, this meant that Rootes' Scottish employees were
paid under a different system, and at lower rates than their English counterparts.
Rootes had hoped this would lead to higher production, since piece-rate disputes
would be avoided. But the new plant's management were sceptical about the
approach (PRO I 964j) because it robbed them of their traditional negotiating
framework. The whole payments question was thrown into further flux by
Chrysler's take-over in 1967, which imposed a common wage system on all UK
plants. But, as in Halewood, considerable damage had already been done to
industrial relations:
At Linwood, the absence of effective consultation procedures and the
ineffective use of existing procedures continued to be reflected in
repeated disruptions over minor issues. In the first three months, there
were 27 stoppages, costing nearly 30,000 man hours. The new chief
executive at Linwood commented in May: 'Chrysler is extremely
concerned at our seeming inability to work many consecutive days
without a stoppage'. While at Linwood, as in most of the other Chrysler
plants, the stoppages were usually for brief periods, the implications for
production planning and acceptable working relationships were far-
reaching (Young and Hood 1977, p. 230).
The same conclusion applied to BMC's Scottish plant. Both unions and
management had raised legitimate fears about the suitability of local workers for
the assembly line. The AEU divisional organiser pointed out a key cultural
difference, noting that 'many of the workers, although previously union members,
have never experienced working in a federated finn, many of them previously
worked in firms with no procedural arrangements where a stoppage was the
quickest and most effective way of ending a dispute' (PRO 1964d).
The management dimension to Bathgate's problems centred on work flow. The
traditional form of regulating output and maintaining quality in BMC's federated
firms was through the piecework system. From its inception, Bathgate operated a
time rate, transferring to a measured day rate in 1964. This robbed management of
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the informal bargaining structures which had traditionally governed workplace
relations. Management had little experience of countering unrest in a situation
where wages were not directly linked to output. Thus, the Ministry of Labour
noted how bosses repeatedly caved-in to union demands in the first two years,
setting the tone for future negotiations (PRO 1964d) According to the Scottish
Office, this highlighted a fundamental dichotomy:
I believe that Sinnot recently said that instead of a vehicle works the firm
was becoming a gas works. To my mind the difficulty at BMC is that we
are dealing with questions of motivation which are rather theoretical, and
the firm is most immediately concerned with hard facts such as the level
of production and financial loss. (PRO 1964h).
Bathgate's short term failings were followed by several years of
underperformance. Levels of industrial unrest remained high, and the plant later
became entangled in the wider restructuring problems associated with BL's failure.
A similar fate befell Standard. A key element in Speke's story was the take-over of
the company by Triumph in 1960 and by Leyland in 1967. Standard traditionally
based labour relations on high wages and ceding shopfloor control to the workers.
The basis of this scheme was a piecework regime which incorporated performance
bonuses and a 'gang' system. Shop stewards controlled manning levels and line
speeds, and bonus payments were used to motivate workers (Lewchuk 1987, pp.
195-202).
The system had already started to deteriorate in the mid 1950s, when John Black's
departure as chairman heralded a wave of redundancies and a much harder
management line.' 6
 But Leylands' s take-over exacerbated the situation. The
Lancashire firm had a much more paternalistic approach, relying on the exercise of
unquestioned management authority. The new owners also had an overwhelming
need to reduce Standard's wages bill. Leyland's paternalistic structures ran
counter to Standard's long term tradition of mutuality, and the Standard workers
resented surrendering shopfloor control to their new masters. Skirmishes in the
early 1960s got progressively more bitter, and Speke #1 was put in the forefront
of conflict.
16 For a full discussion of the events surrounding Standard's labour relations in the 1950s and
1960s see Whisler (1995, pp. 137-52).
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The Board successfully resisted attempts to bring Merseyside wages into line with
Midlands levels. In fact, the company based its decision to build Speke #2 partly
on the potential of lower wages (Whisler 1995, p. 146). There were changes in
management stance, most notably the 1969 'Communication Campaign' launched
by Donald Stokes, but stoppages continued to mount until the decision to
introduce measured day rates in 1970 (the so-called Protected Earnings Plan). The
Liverpool plants accepted the earnings plan in 1972, but only after lengthy talks
and a significant increase in the basic rate. But the situation progressively
worsened until Michael Edwardes' appointment as BL chairman. Unlike his
predecessors, he was willing to confront unions head on. A protracted strike at
Speke allowed Edwardes to carry out a closure threat, freeing BL to concentrate
sports car production in the Midlands and South East, while establishing a strong
position for future national labour negotiations.
Speke's problems were intimately related to changes in workplace culture. The
shift from Standard's mutuality to a more paternalistic approach left both unions
and workers embittered (Whisler 1995, pp 13 8-49). This coincided with the first
phase of Merseyside expansion, and meant that both sides became involved in
ritualistic trials of strength. The subsequent change to measured day working
aggravated the situation, with management struggling to come to terms with new
modes of workplace conflict. The long dispute of 1977 proved the ultimate test,
with both labour and unions facing vastly different economic and political
constraints.
The significance of this evidence is that workplace culture was important. As
Beynon maintains in Working for Ford 'The fact that the PTA workers at
Halewood were scousers mattered. The fact that they worked in an assembly plant
of the Ford Motor Company mattered more' (1984, p.68). Existing studies of
labour relations in the new plants have stressed the former rather than the latter.
While the new workforces were less experienced and more volatile than their West
Midlands and South East counterparts, management style also differed. The motor
companies used their regional expansion to experiment with different forms of
workplace organisation. This created a tradition of conflict and enmity which
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endured for years. It was not a case of unions simply resisting change, but of
management and shop stewards redefining their roles in a new industrial context.
This evidence supports Lewchuk's (1987) influential analysis of the postwar
British motor industry and Broadberry's (1997) recent study of Anglo-American
productivity differences. In both cases, it is possible to characterise Development
Area 'experiments' as the industry's first belated moves towards adopting fordist
production methods. Viewed in these terms, the concerted attempts to abandon
piecework and establish new workplace structures can be seen as the first stage of
a transformation crisis which afflicted the whole of British motor manufacturing in
the 1970s. The regional element provided a keen edge to this battle, but
Development Area expansion simply offered the opportunity for employers to
develop a new workplace culture.
This leads us to consider one final question, namely whether the attempts to
impose new modes of working need have created labour problems. Vauxhall
questioned this in 1973, noting that industrial relations might have been improved
'by the continuous efforts of the management and by responsible Union leadership
and Government influence' (Vauxhall Motors Ltd 1973, p.465). The recent
experience of Japanese transplant manufacturers in Development Areas suggests -
albeit in a different labour market context - that there is a potential for peaceflul
accommodation between capital and labour in greenfield sites.'7 But the possibility
remains that the imposition of fordist structures on a British workforce was
inevitably confrontational, and that reconciliation lay outside a slavish emulation of
American techniques and philosophy.
This suggests that Britain faced a unique problem in postwar Europe. While the
greatest potential for productivity growth resided in large scale fordist systems,
British car making remained dominated by piecework and fragmented shopfloor
control. Expansion into the regions offered a chance to reform these practices, but
management did not appreciate the challenge this represented. The new workers
possessed sophisticated bargaining skills, and they resisted the imposition of alien
working practices and strove for parity with their counterparts in the South and
17 For a review of the literature in this area, see Guest and Rosenthal (1993).
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Midlands. While French and German car plants relied on armies of compliant guest
workers (Bardou et al 1982), British manufacturers mistook provincialism for
ignorance.
§8.6 ConcJusion
This chapter has demonstrated that the Development Areas were more strike
prone than regions traditionally associated with motor manufacturing. It has also
identified different patterns of conflict, with a greater emphasis on frequent, short
term disputes in Scotland and the North West.
The conventional explanation for these trends has centred on the origins of new
employees, and the greater degree of militancy amongst 'green' workers. While
industrial background is clearly important in conditioning workplace behaviour, so
too is management style. All the motor firms used their new plants to experiment
with different forms of labour control. These centred on new payment systems,
negotiating frameworks and grievance procedures. Broadly speaking, this can be
characterised as a move towards a fordist management structure. While labour
opposed many of these innovations, bosses also struggled to accommodate
themselves to a new bargaining framework. The result was an extended period of
industrial disruption, which established damaging precedents. Plants in the
Midlands and South East experienced a similar 'transformation crisis' in the
1970s, but by this time, a distinct pattern of unrest was institutionalised in the
Development Areas.
The costs of this industrial disruption are difficult to assess. Both demand and
supply constraints need to examined. We can see that for plants operating at the
spatial limits of profitability (Speke, Linwood, Bathgate), labour problems helped
contribute to their downfall. But for Halewood and Ellesmere Port, the effects
were seen in unfavourable sourcing decisions and a difficulty in securing new
investment. In all of these cases, the economic context of the 1970s was critical in
forcing retrenchment.
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9 Summary and Conclusions
§9.1 Introduction
We began Chapter One by posing five questions:
• How did the relationship between industry and the state develop in postwar
Britain?
• What were the processes and motivations behind British location policy?
• Were locational penalties anticipated at either government or enterprise level?
• Did controls lead to poor site selection - with quantifiable cost penalties?
• What were the consequences for individual firms?
The following summary considers each in turn.
§9.2 Industry and the State
Britain was unique in establishing a distribution olmndustry po'ity 'which mbmtt1
coercive and persuasive tactics. However, the exercise of these powers challenged
fundamental beliefs about the efficacy of market forces and the legitimate role of
the state. This was because the British regional policy mix was interventionist in
scope.
The distinction between interventionist and market based approaches is vital in
understanding the changing relationship between industry and the state. Market
based initiatives rely on removing imperfections in labour and capital markets,
while the interventionist agenda identifies flaws in market solutions and advocates
imposing settlements on entrepreneurs and workers. Existing studies have
correctly characterised British legislation as interventionist, but have ignored the
administrative and departmental climate. A detailed study of policy execution
reveals a deep scepticism towards interventionist remedies. This was fuelled by
conservatism and a lack of economic understanding. The entire history of regional
policy from 1945-64 can, in fact, be represented as a gradual move from market
based perspectives to an interventionist strategy. While policy tools remained
dirigiste, the nature of the wartime settlement and the Board of Trade's regional
policy portfolio ensured a passive approach.
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These practices came under an unassailable challenge in the late 1950s. It was only
then that political will, a conducive macroeconomic background and effective
economic intelligence combined to produce a paradigm shift. This saw the Board
of Trade abandon its individualistic focus and embrace wider notions of
externalities. The previously unequal location bargain between 'state' and
'business' was replaced by a balanced negotiating framework. For the first time,
the carrot combined with the stick to produce meaningful industrial relocation.
The implication is that, for much of the 1940s and 1950s, the government lacked
the economic intelligence and political drive to successfully challenge business.
§9.3 Motives and Processes
Regional policy is best regarded as part of the legislative package associated with
universal suffiage and a developing consensus on social issues. However, different
political ideologies endorse different forms of regional policy. If we employ the
interventionistlmarket based schema, it is clear that centre-left parties should
favour an interventionist strategy since they support the use of state power to alter
market outcomes. This is in contrast to a centre-right agenda, which shares a
commitment to market based solutions and laissez faire principles. Unsurprisingly,
these divisions shaped wartime policy discussions between Labour and
Conservative ministers, and influenced postwar interpretations of regional policy
administration.
Thus, the historiography distinguishes four phases of regional policy activity from
1945-64: an active period from 1945-50 associated with the first postwar Labour
government; a passive period under successive Conservative administrations in the
1950s, a transitional phase from 1959-63 corresponding with the Brighton
Revolution, and an active period lasting for the remainder of the 1 960s. However,
the left/right model does not reflect policy profile during these years. In particular,
a commitment to free market solutions endured throughout the 1940s. This
suggests that the extent and radicalism of British distribution of industry measures
under Attlee has been exaggerated, and is indicative of an entrenched
'Establishment View' on regional policy. This view eschewed coercion as a policy
tool, and used persuasion to provoke industrial relocation.
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Bizarrely, interventionism was only adopted under a Conservative government.
The nature of this conversion suggests that Brittan was right to identify a 'great
reappraisal' in Tory thinking during 1960. This conversion endorsed a system of
controls and incentives, which had proved anathema to previous generations of
politicians and officials. It also heralded the unprecedented decentralisation of the
British motor industry, which became an intellectual battleground for proponents
and critics of a regional planning framework.
§9.4 Expectations
In many respects, the decentralisation programme was part of a knee-jerk response
to rising regional unemployment in the late 1950s. But it was also crucial in
demonstrating the possibilities and danec of it orñsi strae. roni its
inception, 1M6 had struggled to reconcile the needs of individual manufacturers
with wider economic and social issues. This meant that, by 1960, officials had
acquired nearly twenty years of experience in dealing with industrial location. The
Board of Trade could also exploit the growing body of academic research which
was linked to the expansion of regional science in Britain. Most of this suggested
that efficient relocation could be achieved if establishment costs were defrayed by
appropriate compensation.
In general, the motor firms resisted relocation. Negotiations show how bosses
were wary of increased transportation costs and the problems of dislocation. But
they also regarded the new sites as an opportunity to experiment with different
forms of workplace control. In particular, it was hoped that the regional plants
would benefit from modern machinery and a different industrial relations climate.
Firms aimed to break traditional patterns of union control, and establish fordist
working programmes.
Different companies adopted different negotiating strategies. The American-
owned subsidiaries of Ford and Vauxhall drew on a wealth of US experience, and
engaged the government in a lengthy dialogue. From the very beginning, these
firms decided that Scottish sites were uneconomic and that Merseyside offered the
best solution. These views were shared by BMC and Rootes, but the British
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companies were placed at a disadvantage during negotiations. This was because
(a) BMC was a federated firm which needed to secure expansion at several sites in
the Midlands and South, and (b) Rootes delayed its IDC application in the hope of
securing a last-mover advantage. In both cases, the government was able to out-
manoeuvre the British firms, and secure a commitment to Scottish relocation. But
all the companies won substantial financial support.
§9.5 The Right Sites?
By using published and unpublished data, it was possible to derive spatial cost
profiles for the decentralised plants. The nature of this information precluded a
longitudinal survey, but did allow benchmark estimates to be made for 1971/72.
The investigation was based on Luttrell's methodology, and sought to derive a per
unit estimate of extra costs incurred. This had the advantage of relating findings to
the Clay Committee's original performance criteria.
The estimates suggest that relocation did increase production costs, although
financial incentives and lower labour rates reduced expenditure. As many feared,
Scottish sites were particularly disadvantaged. A key element in the analysis was
the REP, an operational subsidy introduced in the mid-i 960s. In tandem with
other incentives, this allowed firms to defray many additional manufacturing costs.
This study implies that previous analysts have underestimated the importance of
financial compensation for Development Area firms.
Labour relations were also examined in the new plants. It was found that, while
regional sites were more strike prone than traditional regions, they experienced
different patterns of conflict, with a greater emphasis on frequent, short term
disputes. The analysis acknowledged that workers were more militant in
Development Areas, but suggested that management style was an important
variable. All the motor firms used their new plants to experiment with labour
discipline and bosses struggled to come to terms with this new bargaining




The consequences for individual firms depended on their competitive strength and
corporate profile. In all cases, Development Area relocation imposed additional
constraints on motor manufacturing. Break-even points were increased, and there
was an additional imperative to achieve high throughput. But with the exception of
the Scottish plants, locational penalties were relatively insignificant in relation to
retail price and turnover. The analysis suggests that poor product quality was a
more important cause of competitive failure.
While the shutdown of the Chrysler, British Leyland and Triumph plants suggests
a locational element, their demise cannot be understood without reference to the
larger crises affecting British motor manufacturing. It is clear that federated firms
failed to adopt fordist techniques, and produced shoddy products throughout the
1970s. The failure of Linwood was intrinsically linked to the fortunes of the Imp
and the Arrow range, while Speke's fate was sealed by the TR7 disaster and the
need to rationalise production. Similarly, Bathgate was sacrificed because it
produced a peripheral product in a peripheral location. For most of these firms,
lost output did not equate with lost sales. Their problems were more deep-rooted
than militant agitation.
The American-owned subsidiaries faced different problems. While production
costs were more acceptable at Halewood and Ellesmere Port, they were still above
international norms. Moreover, labour unrest was a recurring problem. The results
were unfavourable sourcing decisions and a difficulty in securing new investment.
Here again, the industrial context of the late 1970s was critical in forcing
retrenchment.
§9.7 Reflections
In 1945, Britain introduced a comprehensive regional policy. While both main
political parties shared an interest in reducing unemployment differentials, they
nevertheless represented different policy constituencies. While Labour favoured an
interventionist strategy, the Conservatives and the Board of Trade resisted
planning solutions. The concentration on limited intervention revealed an
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'Establishment View' on regional policy. In the context of postwar Britain, this
meant that businesses became involved in an unequal bargain with the state.
Despite the provision of coercive legislation, ministers and officials felt unable to
challenge industrialists. Key elements in this story were the macroeconomic
environment, and the way in which economic theory developed in postwar Britain.
It was not until 1960 that academic arguments and political pressure forced a
reappraisal.
When the new policy was applied in 1960, British motor firms were sent to the
Development Areas. If we use the same criteria employed by the Clay Committee
in the 1950s, it seems clear that Merseyside-based firms operated within the spatial
limits of profitability. The failures of the decentralisation plan were linked to a
wider crisis affecting British manufacturing. Part of this story was that marginal
firms acquired marginal locations.
However, Development Area manufacturing secured a hidden bonus. As Hall had
predicted (see p. 192), expansion in politically sensitive regions insured that the
government became 'deeply committed to the continued prosperity of the motor
industry'. When Chrysler and BL threatened to fold in the 1970s, the regional
element heightened political debate. More recently, Ford was able to secure
substantial government aid for changes at its Merseyside plant. If we extend the
analysis to include wider forms of assistance, then the broad generalisations
employed by Dunnett (1980) and Foreman-Peck et a! (1995) become less tenable.
In short, the economics of Development Area manufacturing are more
complicated than distance suggests.
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APPENDIX - British Motor Industry Statistics
A1.l Introduction
This appendix details the key statistics for the British motor industry first reported
in Chapter 3 and then used elsewhere in this study. Two objectives underlie this
exercise: first to obtain a consistent record of the industry's performance in the
twentieth century; and secondly to combine statistics from the Society of Motor
Manufacturers and Traders with official CSO estimates. By extending coverage
from 1900 to 1990, the data provides details of the competitive environment
before, during, and after regional intervention. In this way, it is hoped to provide a
firm foundation for policy analysis.
The CSO estimates adopt standard SIC definitions. The Business Statistics Office
put postwar data on a consistent basis in 1978. Under the 1978 regime, the motor
industry is defined in terms of Minimum List Heading 381 - Motor Vehicle
Manufacturing.
Minimum List Heading 381 includes the following activities: manufacturing and
assembling passenger cars (including three wheeled vehicles), commercial goods
vehicles, road tractors solely for tractor-trailer combinations, buses, battery
electric vehicles, motor-drawn trailers and caravans; manufacturing engines,
bodies, chassis, chassis frames, seats and safety belts, cabs for commercial
vehicles; motor body shells and all other parts and accessories (other than rough or
semi-finished castings and forging) when made wholly or primarily of metal and
not specified in other MLH categories.
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TABLE Al
PRODUCTION OF MOTOR VEHICLES iN THE UK, 1908-92












































































































































































































































































































































































































































1908 to 1956: no breakdown available between Cars and Station Wagons
1908 to 1945: no breakdown available between CV'S and Buses
From 1984 minibuses are included in Commercial Vehicles
#1938 and 1939 are SMII'vIl' estimates
* 53 Weeks
**Jncluded in cars.
Source: SMIMT (1939,1991, 1993)
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TABLE A2
MOTOR CAR PRODUCTION BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES, 1940-92






1945	 16,938	 1,565	 1,293	 2,093
1946	 219,162	 30,429	 9,962	 10,989	 703
1947	 287,000	 66,277	 9,541	 23,375	 2,545	 110
1948	 334,815	 100,091	 29,945	 44,425	 2,988	 381
1949	 412,290	 187,653	 104,055	 65,379	 5,341	 1,070
1950	 522,514	 257,292	 219,409	 101,310	 9,911	 1,594
1951	 475,919	 319,881	 276,622	 119,267	 13,078	 3,611
1952	 448,000	 369,938	 317,643	 113,653	 10,529	 4,837
1953	 594,808	 371,168	 387,895	 143,598	 19,176	 8,789
1954	 769,165	 444,242	 561,172	 180,851	 28,564	 14,472
1955	 897,560	 561,465	 762,205	 230,978 33,140	 20,268
1956	 707,594	 662,683	 910,966	 279,900 37,849	 32,056
1957	 860,842	 738,290 1,040,188	 318,775 52,367	 47,121
1958 1,051,551	 968,990 1,306,854	 369,374 75,439	 50,463
1959 1,189,943 1,127,982 1,503,424 	 470,659 95,647	 78,598
1960 1,352,728 1,175,301 1,816,779 	 595,097 108,382	 165,094
1961 1,003,967 1,063,595 1,903,975 	 693,695 109,835	 249,508
1962 1,249,426 1,340,328 2,109,166 	 877,860 129,192	 268,784
1963 1,607,939 1,520,827 2,414,092 1,105,291 145,672	 407,830
1964 1,867,640 1,390,312 2,650,183 1,028,931 161,957 	 579,660
1965 1,722,045 1,423,365 2,733,732 1,103,932 181,755	 696,176
1966 1,603,679 1,785,906 2,830,050 1,282,418 173,499 877,656
1967 1,552,013 1,776,502 2,295,714 1,439,211 193,976 1,375,755
1968 1,815,936 1,833,047 2,862,186 1,544,932 223,330 2,055,821
1969 1,717,073 2,168,462 3,312,537 1,477,366 242,887 2,611,499
1970 1,640,966 2,458,038 3,527,864 1,719,715 278,971 3,178,708
1971 1,741,940 2,693,989 3,696,779 1,701,064 287,398 3,717,858
1972 1,921,311 2,719,401 3,521,540 1,732,379 317,962 4,022,289
1973 1,747,321 2,866,728 3,649,880 1,823,333 341,503 4,470,550
1974 1,534,119 2,698,785 2,839,596 1,630,686 326,743 3,931,842
1975 1,267,695 2,546,154 2,907,819 1,348,544 316,386 4,568,120
1976 1,333,449 2,979,559 3,546,900 1,471,308 317,380 5,027,792
1977 1,327,820 3,092,439 3,790,544 1,440,470 235,383 5,431,045
1978 1,222,949 3,111,380 3,890,176 1,508,597 254,256 5,748,269
1979 1,070,452 3,220,394 3,932,556 1,480,904 296,540 6,175,771
1980	 923,744 2,938,581 3,520,934 1,445,221 235,320 7,038,108
1981	 954,650 2,611,864 3,577,807 1,257,340 258,261 6,974,131
1982	 887,679 2,777,125 3,761,436 1,297,351 294,792 6,881,586





































































Year	 UK	 France	 W. Ocr.	 Italy	 Sweden	 Japan	 Canada	 USA	 Spain
1984 908,906 2,713,289 3,790,164 1,439,283 352,585 7,073,173 1021,536 7,773,332 1,176,893
1985 1,047,973 2,632,366 4,166,686 1,389,156 400,748 7,646,816 1077,935 8,184,821 1,230,071
1986 1,018,962 2,773,094 4,310,828 1,652,452 421,255 7,809,809 1061,365 7,828,783 1,281,899
1987 1,142,683 3,051,830 4,373,629 1,713,300 431,777 7,891,087
	 809,827 7,098,910 1,402,574
1988 1,226,835 3,223,987 4,346,283 1,884,313 407,117 8,198,400 1,024,807 7,110,728 1,497,967
1989 1,299,082 3,409,017 4,563,673 1,971,969 384,206 9,052,406	 983,897 6,823,097 1,638,615
1990 1,295,611 3,294,815 4,660,657 1,874,672 335,853 9,947,972 	 940,319 6,077,449 1,679,301
1991 1,236,900 3,187,634 4,659,480 1,632,904 269,341 9,753,069	 890,847 5,438,579 1,773,752
1992 1,291,880 3,329,490 4,863,721 1,476,627 293,499 9,378,694 1,019,872 5,665,863 1,790,615
Source: MAMA (1992, Table 5)
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TABLE A3
GROSS OUTPUT OF MOTOR VEHICLE iNDUSTRY AS PROPORTION OF
TOTAL MANUFACTURING GROSS OUTPUT, 1948-90 (current prices)
Year	 Manufacturing Motor Vehicles Cars as % of



















































































































Years from 1948 to 1970 are based on Standard Industrial Classification
Reference 381 Motor Vehicle Manufacturing - Source (HMSO 1978). Years from
1970-79(a) have been calculated from the Annual Census of Production, based on
SIC 381 - Source (CSO 1981). Years from 1979(b) to 1990 are based on Annual
Census of Production, Standard Industrial Classification Revised 1980 Division
Class Group 35 - Manufacture of Motor vehicles and parts thereof.
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TABLE A4
EMPLOYMENT IN THE MOTOR iNDUSTRY, SELECTED YEARS, 1948-90




1948	 7,080	 287.4	 4.1
	
1951	 7,594	 324.2	 4.3
	
1954	 7,672	 312.4	 4.1
	
1958	 7,,781	 339.4	 4.4
	
1963	 7,952	 434.6	 5.5
	
1968	 7,826	 457	 5.8
	1970	 8,033	 488.9	 6.1
	
1971	 7,829.8	 483.1	 6.2
	
1972	 7,521.9	 480.6	 6.4
	
1973	 7,616.1	 492.6	 6.5
	1974	 7,754.9	 501.7	 6.5
	
1975	 7,467	 481.5	 6.4
	
1976	 7,305.1	 472.2	 6.5
	1977	 7,280.1	 493.9	 6.8
	
1978	 7106	 496.2	 7.0
	
(a)1979	 6,926.6	 482.5	 7.0
	
(b)1979	 6,909.8	 491.2	 7.1
	
1980	 6,495	 448.7	 6.9
	
1981	 5,777.9	 369.5	 6.4
	1982	 5,360.5	 325.4	 6.1
	
1983	 5,078.8	 302.4	 6.0
	
1984	 5,059.4	 288	 5.7
	1985	 4,975.7	 276.8	 5.6
	
1986	 4,878.2	 261	 5.4
	
1987	 4,874.4	 258	 5.3
	1988	 4,932.2	 265.4	 5.4
	 9	 4,853.1	 266.8	 5.5
	
1990	 4,839.9	 267.8	 5.5
Notes:
Years from 1948 to 1970 are based on Standard Industrial Classification
Reference 381 Motor Vehicle Manufacturing - Source (HMSO 1978). Years from
1970-79(a) have been calculated from the Annual Census of Production, based on
SIC 381 - Source (CSO 1981). Years from 1979(b) to 1990 are based on Annual
Census of Production, Standard Industrial Classification Revised 1980 Division










































































































































































CAPITAL EXPENDITURE iN THE MOTOR 1N)US TRY, SELECTED
YEARS, 1948-90 (current prices)
Year Manufacturing Cars Total Cars as % of Manufacturing Cars New 	 Cars as % of Manufacturing 	 Cars	 Cars as %
Total	 Capital	 Manufacturing New Building	 Building	 Manufacturing Plant and	 Plant and	 of Plant
Capital	 Expenditure	 Expenditure	 Work	 Work	 Building	 Machinery	 Machinery	 and
Expenditure	 Machinery


















































































































Years from 1948 to 1970 are based on Standard Industrial Classification
Reference 381 Motor Vehicle Manufacturing - Source (1-IMSO 1978). Years from
1970-79(a) have been calculated from the Annual Census of Production, based on
SIC 381 - Source (CSO 1981). Years from 1979(b) to 1990 are based on Annual
Census of Production, Standard Industrial Classification Revised 1980 Division
Class Group 35 - Manufacture of Motor vehicles and parts thereof.
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TABLE A6
SUMMARY OF MOTOR VEHICLES iN USE, GREAT BRITAiN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND, 1904-81
Year	 Cars	 Taxis	 Goods Tractors Exenipt 	 Agric	 Motor	 Total
	





























































































































































































































































































Year	 Cars	 Taxis	 Goods Tractors Exempt	 Agric	 Motor	 Total
	
Buses &	 Vehicles Tractors	 Cycles
1948	 2,00,2201 130,519
	
785,334	 4,123	 79,823 242,906	 560,107 3,805,013
1949 2,178,411 136,892
	
862,136	 4,238	 75,383 283,836	 655,200 4,196,096
1950	 2,307,379 139,609
	 915,556	 4,335	 68,930 313,992	 761,500	 4,511,301
1951	 2,433,172 138,670	 955,003	 4,384	 71,283 301,360	 859,034 4,762,906
1952	 2,564,686 135,261	 985,832	 4,687	 97,925 324,132	 962,210	 5,074,733
1953	 2,824,789 118,583 1,018,453	 4,882 100,822 347,811 1,052,864	 5,468,204
	
1954 3,172,869 110,186 1,056,391 	 5,053 100,977 367,403	 1156568	 5,969,447
1955	 3,609,400 104,077 1,134,257 	 5,453 102,105 390,962 1,276,894 6,623,148
1956	 3,980,511 101,692 1,200,588	 5,711 107,949 403,172 1,394,282	 7,193,905
1957 4,282,438	 99,398 1,244,533	 5,842 110,227 424,968 1,497,050 7,664,456
1958	 4,651,021	 97,761 1,298,320	 5,794 110,755 439,669 1,546,183	 8,149,503
1959	 5,080,510	 94,282 1,358,855	 6,197 111,209 459,370 1,764,535	 8,874,958
1960	 5,650,461	 95,302 1,432,475	 6,376 116,303 471,192 1,894,372	 9,666,481
1961	 6,113,764	 93,512 1,490,007	 6,535 121,369 481,420 1,920,832 10,227,439
1962	 6,706,159	 94,896 1,511,060	 5,967 123,848 483,312 1,897,440 10,822,682
1963	 7,564,650	 98,173 1,571,772	 6,206 131,745 496,401 1,878,312 11,747,259
1964 8,436,193	 98,644 1,619,644	 6,836 137,838 506,795 1,866,128 12,672,078
1965	 9,131,075	 98,443 1,643,353	 6,824 145,251 500,719 1,735,495 13,261,160
1966 9,746,887	 95,895 1,610,466	 6,757 162,639 478,335 1,519,981 13,620,960
1967 10,554,193	 96,350 1,661,854	 6,644 168,305 496,578 1,463,764 14,447,688
	
1968 11,078,000 101,500 1,606,800
	
6,400 179,700 489,300 1,343,000 14,804,700
	
1969 10,504,300 104,060 1,604,690	 5,880 186,410 475,510 1,238,920 14,119,770
	
1970 11,801,777 105,421 1,658,261
	
5,697 138,556 457,392 1,155,440 15,322,544
	
1971 12,357,868 108,669 1,660,223
	
5,762 144,157 449,802 1,033,150 15,759,631
	
1972 13,022,764 106,957 1,686,158
	
5,962 147,416 436,660 1,075,770 16,481,687
	
1973 13,815,000 108,880 1,766,430
	 4,750 156,980 438,640 1,122,820 17,413,500
	
1974 13,947,934 108,884 1,800,650
	 5,696 177,165 441,001 1,154,461 17,635,791
	
1975 14,060,973 113,964 1,813,075
	 6,977 183,381 424,889 1,281,576 17,884,835
	
1976 14,372,834 115,392 1,796,281
	
7,211 180,773 414,365 1,347,100 18,233,956
	
1978 14,416,989 112,206 1,742,528
	
7,475 254,343 407,530 1,314,816 18,255,887
	
1979 14,926,571 112,781 1,820,051
	 7,555 381,010 412,654 1,405,435 19,066,057
	
1980 15,437,733 112,502 1,800,335	 7,176 408,732 406,597 1,479,505 19,652,580
	
1981 15,632,683 112,234 1,770,489	 6,888 423,446 372,624 1,473,811 19,792,175
Notes:
The data contained in this table was obtained from a sample count, every tenth
vehicle holding a CURRENT LICENCE, during the last quarter of September
each year for the years 1946-1976. No sample data was collected for 1977. From
1978 a complete census was conducted on 31 December from Great Britain.
Northern Ireland still continued with a sample count.
Source: SMMT (1939, 1991)
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TABLE Al
SUMtvIIARY OF NEW REGISTRATIONS OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 1946-91
Private & Light Taxis, Buses Goods General Exempt Agricultural Motor 	 Total
Goods	 & Coaches	 Haulage Vehicles Tractors 	 Cycles
Trao
1946	 121,725	 4,045 102,680	 608	 18,654	 24,844 75,727 348,283
1947	 147,767	 7,847 123,759	 930	 19,733	 47,016 64,754 411,806
1948	 112,666	 10,096 107,554	 805	 15,247	 54,555 74,167 375,090
1949	 154,694	 12,577 109,815	 582	 12,147	 44,432 90,956 425,203
1950	 134,394	 11,486 93,886	 525	 10,581	 41,108 135,045 427,025
1951	 138,373	 7,881 86,801	 478	 13,389	 36,174 139,076 422,172
1952	 191,037	 5,432 83,916	 510	 12,631	 34,092 137,208 464,826
1953	 301,354	 5,129 99,521	 492	 10,915	 35,183 143,640 596,234
1954	 394,362	 5,593 112,152	 591	 12,359	 36,975 172,373 734,405
1955	 511,420	 5,639 156,889	 568	 15,348	 40,984 195,289 926,137
1956	 407,342	 5,183 151,229	 543	 18,274	 33,292 150,228 766,091
1957	 433,171	 5,130 143,989	 533	 12,835	 41,537 216,699 853,894
1958	 566,319	 4,986 176,615	 593	 10,225	 49,559 193,929 1,002,226
1959	 657,315	 5,128 196,450	 709	 11,532	 51,322 355,615 1,278,071
1960	 820,088	 6,445 231,332	 644	 15,851	 44,834 278,395 1,397,589
1961	 756,054	 6,184 226,390	 600	 18,794	 48,692 227,766 1,284,480
1962	 800,239	 5,614 197,981	 556	 15,959	 44,908 152,435 1,217,692
1963	 1,030,694	 6,531 211,603	 666	 22,672	 50,115 175,544 1,497,825
1964	 1,215,929	 6,615 234,703	 890 23,247	 48,032 217,626 1,747,042
1965	 1,148,718	 6,888 234,785	 692	 33,213	 46,803 164,952 1,636,051
1966	 1,091,217	 6,846 232,136	 917 25,935	 49,844 120,472 1,527,367
1967	 1,143,015	 6,672 226,423	 809	 28,869	 55,732 148,8S6 1,610,376
1968	 1,144,770	 7,111 236,401	 798	 25,630	 59,464 124,445 1,598,619
1969	 1,012,811	 7,251 244,735	 823	 21,133	 51,445 98,082 1,436,280
1970	 1,126,824	 7,828 241,481	 819	 16,360	 51,032 119,526 1,563,870
1971	 1,334,685	 9,722 239,811	 734	 16,457	 39,414 142,672 1,783,495
1972	 1,702,211	 10,012 272,713	 814 30,287	 49,152 167,763 2,232,952
1973	 1,688,322	 10,121 294,847	 719	 31,384	 51,384 207,683 2,284,460
1974	 1,273,814	 8,055 238,690	 590 27,974	 47,225 204,245 1,800,593
1975	 1,211,658	 8,024 222,935	 861	 32,825	 50,347 280,969 1,807,619
1976	 1,307,873	 8,901 215,671	 699	 32,186	 54,341 284,984 1,904,655
1977	 1,335,311	 9,008 235,335	 635	 33,338	 51,509 262,876 1,928,012
1978	 1,618,193	 9,282 270,889	 719 35,444	 52,608 235,494 2,222,629
1979	 1,731,882	 9,258 314,190	 744 39,434	 49,896 294,628 2,440,032
1980	 1,536,243	 8,935 271,132	 633	 39,830	 38,146 320,526 2,215,445
1981	 1,513,875	 7,650 218,705	 425	 32,398	 33,796 278,383 2,085,232
1982	 1,639,121	 7,203 207,915	 443	 36,878	 40,215 238,106 2,169,881
1983	 1,870,556	 7,544 235,661	 570	 45,339	 44,012 180,480 2,384,162
1984	 1,827,883	 7,466 230,663	 451	 62,088	 42,223 150,924 2,321,698
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Private & Light Taxis, Buses Goods General Exempt Agricultural Motor
	 Total
Goods	 & Coaches	 Haulage Vehicles Tractors
	 Cycles
Tractors
1985	 1,908,704	 7,146 246,960	 426	 53,692	 42,637 130,685 2,390,250
1986	 1,943,745	 9,210 245,418	 416 59,780	 36,340 110,859 2,405,768
1987	 2,078,711	 8,975 257,115	 385 68,773	 39,107 94,463 2,547,529
1988	 2,277,306	 9,468 297,290	 404 72,004	 46,905 100,118 2,803,495
1989	 2,373,391	 8,359 302,033	 258	 80,887	 44,351 102,059 2,911,338
1990	 2,076,051	 7,724 226,259	 154 78,740	 35,848 98,797 2,523,573
1991	 1,665,779	 5,548 144,266	 66 78,165	 27,271 79,432 2,000,527
Source: SMMT (1939, 1991, 1993)
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TABLE A8
ANALYSIS OF MOTOR VEHICLE EXPORTS AS PERCENTAGE OF UK
TOTAL EXPORTS. 1952-77
Year Motor Industry Car Industry as
	
CVs as Components as
as Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of percentage of
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IMPORT PENETRATION - PASSENGER CARS (% OF NEW
REGISTRATIONS)
Year New Car Car Imports	 Import
	
ations	 .
1948	 110,634	 221	 0.20
1949	 151,928	 1,868	 1.23
1950	 132,273	 1,375	 1.04
1951	 136,188	 3,723	 2.73
1952	 187,616	 1,876	 1.00
1953	 295,073	 2,067	 0.70
1954	 386,386	 4,660	 1.21
1955	 500,857	 11,131	 2.22
1956	 399,675	 6,885	 1.72
1957	 425,355	 8,828	 2.08
1958	 555,297	 10,940	 1.97
1959	 645,617	 26,998	 4.18
1960	 805,017	 57,309	 7.12
1961	 742,803	 22,759	 3.06
1962	 784,734	 28,610	 3.65
1963	 1,008,608	 48,163	 4.78
1964	 1,190,569	 65,725	 5.52
1965	 1,122,476	 55,558	 4.95
1966	 1,065,422	 66,793	 6.27
1967	 1,116,702	 92,731	 8.30
1968	 1,116,894	 102,276	 9.16
1969	 988,451	 101,914	 10.31
1970	 1,097,214	 157,956	 14.40
1971	 1,301,665	 281,037	 21.59
1972	 1,662,853	 450,314	 27.08
1973	 1,645,555	 504,619	 30.67
1974	 1,234,016	 375,421	 30.42
1975	 1,166,795	 448,749	 38.46
1976	 1,255,847	 533,901	 42.51
1977	 1,285,018	 698,464	 54.35
1978	 1,561,460	 800,772	 51.28
1979	 1,675,829	 1,060,645	 63.29
1980	 1,489,015	 863,080	 57.96
1981	 1,469,448	 805,327	 54.80
1982	 1,584,238	 934,141	 58.96
1983	 1,806,052	 1,075,834	 59.57
1984	 1,759,256	 1,020,494	 58.01
1985	 1,842,075	 1,071,892	 58.19
1986	 1,883,154	 1,071,747	 56.91
1987	 2,016,231	 1,047,413	 51.95
1988	 2,210,309	 1,356,902	 61.39
1989	 2,304,405	 1,370,589	 59.48
1990	 2,005,106	 1,190,420	 59.37
Source: calculated from SMMT (1993)
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TABLE Al2
PRE-TAX PROFITS (LOSS) IN UK MOTOR 1}S DUSTRY, 1945-77
(£m, current prices)




1945	 0.9	 1.9	 0.3	 1.5	 2.1	 1.4
1946	 1	 3	 0.3	 -0.4	 1.5	 3.2
1947	 1.8	 2.6	 0.3	 0.6	 2	 3.9
1948	 1.1	 1.5	 0.9	 1.2	 2	 5.5
1949	 1.6	 2.6	 1.2	 1.1	 2.7	 5.1
1950	 5.2	 7.1	 1.3	 2.8	 2.7	 9.7
1951	 7.2	 8.7	 2.3	 3.4	 2.7	 9.8
1952	 5.2	 1.6	 3.4	 5.3	 9.6
1953	 12.3	 1.6	 2.2	 9.9	 15.7
1954	 17.9	 2.2	 3.5	 12.4	 19
1955	 20.3	 3.3	 3.3	 10.8	 18.1
1956	 11.7	 0.8	 1.7	 6.4	 10
1957	 7.8	 0.8	 -0.6	 -2.3	 20.1
1958	 21	 3.4	 1.1	 24.7
1959	 15.7	 3.9	 13.5	 32.2
1960	 26.9	 4.4	 14.1	 33.7
1961	 10.1	 2.9	 14.5	 22.2
1962	 4.2	 -0.9	 16	 17
1963	 15.4	 -03	 16.3	 35
1964	 21.8	 -0.2	 17.9	 24
1965	 50	 -2.5	 17.7	 8.9
1966	 44	 -3.4	 3.6	 7.4
1967	 16	 -10.8	 5.7	 2.6
1968	 38	 -3.7	 9	 43
1969	 40	 -0.7	 -1.9	 38.1
1970	 4	 -10.7	 -9.7	 25.2
1971	 32	 0.4	 1.8	 -30.7
1972	 32	 1.6	 -4.3	 46.8
1973	 51	 3.7	 -4.1	 65.4
1974	 2.3	 -17.7	 -18.1	 8.7
1975	 -23.6	 -35.5	 -2.5	 40.8
1976	 112.4*
	 -31.9	 7.4	 140.2
1977	 72.5	 -8.2	 5.2	 263.1
Notes:
From 1957, Standard becomes part of Leyland
* 1976 losses relate to 15 month period
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MRC (1960a) BMIHT MSS 226/ST/1/1/14. Standard Motors board minutes, 5
Dec. 1960
MIRC (1960b) BMIHT MSS 226/ST/1/1/14. Standard Motors board minutes, 20
Dec. 1960
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